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SUMMARY 
 
1. Personal Information of Doctor Candidate and Thesis Director, Title of the 
Thesis 
1.1 Personal Details of Doctor Candidate and Thesis Director 
a) Doctor Candidate: Rodrigo GARCIA-BERNAL 
b) Thesis Director: Dr. German de MELO RODRIGUEZ 
1.2 Thesis Title:  
Analysis of the Maritime Logistic System in Chile and the Design of a 
Parametric Model for Decision Making 
2. Project Summary 
Throughout the course of time, the world has witnessed changes that have only recently 
been contemplated by strategists and politicians. Advances in technology and research 
have triggered the development of industry with unanticipated speed, a good example 
of this being the revolution in communications and information systems. 
The internationalisation of investments and the globalisation of markets have created a 
high level of competition among manufacturing and service companies which has 
transcended the competition among nations. In this environment, quality information 
and exact timing are the sole answers for generating comparative and competitive 
advantages with respect to other manufacturers and providers. 
Inspired by these challenges, Latin American countries have searched for ways to 
increase and diversify their exports in order to heighten their trade balance surpluses.  
This, in turn, helps them to overcome their debt problems and gain access to a better 
quality of life. 
With these criteria in mind, these countries have begun to join the economic aperture 
and globalisation processes. United by their common ethnic heritage, they are driven by 
the growing need to co-ordinate national and regional decisions in order to achieve a 
harmonic community development. 
The efficiency principle imposed by the present international trade scenario requires 
extreme attention to detail in the administration of production costs and in placing 
products on the market.  Because a product’s success is highly sensitive to cost and 
distribution methods, maritime transport and its associated systems require very 
specific management techniques.Those management techniques must take into 
account that as transport is a service it gives added value to the cargo. 
Thus, the management model, costs involved, planning processes, and area policies 
are topics of vital importance for achieving these nations’ development objectives. 
The design of specific policies, both operational as well as for development 
(investments), should comply with certain minimum conditions. The resulting policies 
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should satisfy integrally and harmoniously the requirements the State establishes in 
its general National Development Strategy. This strategy considers the factors of 
monetary and trade uncertainty. States must be particularly careful to interpret 
changes, tendencies, circumstances and difficulties which emerge in the international 
markets they serve, correctly. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to analyse the existing maritime transport 
logistic system in Chile, beginning with the history of ports and economic 
development. Subsequently, this study will analyse all relevant information related to 
logistics and the lesson learnt during the process of modernization. 
For analytical purposes, the study establishes an evaluation area which has been 
represented by a “graph” built up from nodes and links. These symbolise the complex 
network of port systems, hinterlands, roads, railways and coastal shipping. Likewise, 
the links and nodes have direction, intensity and values that the study intends to 
describe and evaluate.  
Moreover, nowadays hinterlands are not as exclusive as they were before. 
Consequently, most of the port systems face an extremely competitive market in 
offering services for international hinterlands/foreland. Therefore, this thesis will 
conclude that at least some Latin American countries establish land bridges between 
them. There have already been some studies about the land bridges, “inter-oceanic 
corridors” or “integration corridors” options in South America.  
The Pacific Ocean Basin and the APEC countries represent a huge market for those 
Atlantic countries which have products to export and import from that vast area of the 
globe. The existence of the main industrial site of South America running from the 
Atlantic side of South America to the Pacific Coast, which forms an “Industrial 
Banana”, is the foundation of a massive demand to and from both coasts. 
The study evaluated the logistics system through different criteria, such as logistics, 
physical capacities, and economic, social, environmental and political considerations. 
Having established these criteria, the researcher can better evaluate which are 
the relevant parameters and variables to consider in the design of the 
parametric model.  The model itself constituted a valuable tool in the decision-
making process. 
3. Project Objective 
To study the historical development of the Chilean port system, learn from the 
modernization process, evaluate its success and failures; describe the logistic platform 
in Chile and its Region; and derive the relevant components, parameters, and variables 
to design a Parametric Model for decision making at the port sector of Chile. 
4. Current Situation at the Port Sector 
Currently the port and logistic system in Chile is made up of a model which beginning in 
1978, with the design of a new Economic Policy. The new policy was oriented to the 
reduction of the last consumer prices by mean of: protecting the private ownership of the 
productive means, promoting competition, liberalization of the unionism, opening the 
labour market to all citizen without restriction deregulating the labour market, 
 iv 
liberalization of all economic sectors, implementing a liberalization of the exchange rate 
for export and import currency (US Dollar), decentralization of the decision making, 
deregulating the financial sector, reducing the customs’ rates and barriers, promoting the 
improvement of the management and business innovation, and implementation of the 
“subsidiary principle”, as a way to increase the industrial and service sector productivity 
and provide more job opportunities for the population.  
As a result of that the productive and economic sectors were able to increase their 
mobilization and productivityoriginating a surplus in those productive sector and product 
which present better comparative and competitive advantages. The Government start to 
help the exporters with promotion policies (cero subsidies, Chilean Product as guarantee 
of quality,promoting and organizing international road show for exporters, looking for 
market opportunities abroad) that initiative together with and improvement on the 
marketing strategies of the private companies, allowed to increase the foreign trade of 
the country. Regarding imports, because of the reduction of the import taxes the 
commercial sector was able to import those products were the national factories were 
not competitive,resulting in a reductionof the prices for the last consumers, especially on 
certain products like textile and clothes, electronics and cars. Off course that impact 
negatively in the related national industry which was not able to compete with the import 
ones. The measures applied do not helped some of the productive sectors which were 
not competitive and when out of the market, but help the majority of the country 
population (main objective of the economic policy).  
Therefore, considering the structural changes were generalized and applied to all 
productive sectors, the port sector was able to reduce their operational costs mainly on 
labour costs using the liberalization of the labour market and rationalization of the work 
force use (start in 1978, against all predictions and tendencies).The private port 
operators saw an opportunity with the increasing volume of export and import cargoes. 
In that sense, private management schemesand innovative methodologies where 
applied to increase the port productivity and decrease the ship turnaround time. This 
approach, against all predictions from the European experts and academicians because 
the new port model do not implied big investment neither in infrastructure nor in 
technology until the port concession start in 1997, however, was successful increasing 4 
times the port productivity.   
Because of the market oriented policies, for the State was not allowed to intervene and 
or invest on areas were the private sector was interested, for instance the port sector, 
unless some strategic development was required and the private sector was not 
available or interested then the State became forced to intervene protecting or helping 
the development (mainly on remote areas) of the local population (application of the 
“subsidiarity principle” of the National Constitution) until the private show interest,time 
when the State phase out. 
However, the port sector works in a proper manner, some restriction and rule of 
engagement (regulatory regime) were necessary especially because many foreign 
investors appear on scene, with different behaviour and requirements for a proper rule of 
law. 
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No matter the several changes and modernization processes, still exist some not well 
developed areas like the logistic services, where the Intermodal transport system do not 
perform under UNCTAD standards, but mainly because of the liberalization of the 
Chilean system were the client is the cargo and the cargo owners put the conditions of 
the transport under normal open market system, road carriers are free to enter or to 
leave the market under certain safety conditions, tariffs are not regulated and 
commercial agreement are in accordance to the Commercial Code, been the parties 
who agree on the service modalities and conditions,existing legal and judicial options to 
solve the problems. That made difficult to applied more restrictive or invasive models like 
the UNCTAD standard. 
Regarding the investment approach is mainly done with an assessment of the project 
financial feasibly, if the result is positive and financially feasible, the investment is made; 
only when the maximum capacity of the existing system is reached. Is important to 
consider that because, there are not subsidies in the market, no over investments are 
made. Only those investments which provide a good rate of return (financial for private 
and social and financial for State)to the investors, are made, this approach can be seen 
either in State and private investment. 
Nonetheless, the Chilean port model was pioneer around the world (1978-1981)the 
process took long time until was complete (1978 till 1997) specially because of the 
unique form and lack of similar experiences around the world on the matter. However, 
the gained experiences there are very few Chilean publications on the issue. Majority of 
the papers have been written by foreigners, international organization, even though 
sometimes do not represent the real model and its objectives of the modernization 
process, because their studies are mainly concentrated on investment and level of 
salaries.  
Currently, the presence of Chilean professional (experts) on international forum is still 
scarce; even though most of the delegations are form by politicians without technical 
expertise. That is mainly because of the very practical approach of the nationals from 
the private sector, and also not to many professional are interested in to research and 
write a document, to which we can add the big constrain and barrier of English 
language. In that sense, the use of methodological tools is still one constrain and 
restrain on the making decision process, for what a more practical approach is used.  
5. Brief Description of the Project 
The project is suggested to be divided in 6 Chapters: 
Chapter 1, includes some maritime economics facts fund in the Chilean 
maritime industry, analysisof the port development, costs related to ships in 
port, port tariff system, description of the port system, labour organization and 
its reform, the port modernization process, and its failures and successes. 
Chapter 2: analyze the political and strategic level, discussing matters like the 
added value of the maritime transport, design of maritime policies, the Chilean 
case of maritime commercial policies, and a description of the port nodes in 
Chile. 
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Chapter 3: Made study the Regional logistics in Latino America, the logistics 
and the graph theory, the identification of the potential nodes of the Graph, and 
the Bio-oceanic Corridors or Integration Corridors, and the logistic platforms in 
the South Coneof LA. 
Chapter 4: is for data collection of the details of the different corridors. 
Chapter 5: This Chapter is for the design of the Parametric Model, describing its 
methodology, theoretical principles, and final design of the evaluation matrixes. 
Chapter 6: Includes some Conclusions and Recommendations. 
Finally some Annexes where prepared, as following: 
 Annex 1: Present the description of the elements that constitute the port 
system;  
 Annex 2: Includes the methodology to forecast the container terminal 
demand; 
 Annex 3: The theoretical approach (matrixes of the model) applied to 
Port of Valparaiso. 
For more details, please see Annex A 
6. Methodology of Research 
Research: Collection of historical data and interview of the actors; 
Analysis: Assessment of the results and performance in the historical perspective. After 
the assessment of the results the author made a comparison with other BAT’s. 
Design of the solution: Because the lack of methodological approach on making decision 
processes. 
Research:About the historical development of the Chilean port system, evaluation of the 
results, failures and successes; and research and analysis of the political and strategic 
development in the target sector. 
Data collection and analysis of the performance compared with other BAT’s. 
Finally, the author made the identification of the requirements for the design of the 
matrixes and their analysis.  
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ANNEX A 
ABSTRACT 
 
Throughout the course of time, the world has witnessed changes that have only recently 
been contemplated by strategists and politicians. Advances in technology and research 
have triggered the development of industry with unanticipated speed, a good example 
of this being the revolution in communications and information systems. 
The internationalisation of investments and the globalisation of markets have created a 
high level of competition among manufacturing and service companies which has 
transcended the competition among nations. In this environment, quality information 
and exact timing are the sole answers for generating comparative and competitive 
advantages with respect to other manufacturers and providers. 
Inspired by these challenges, Latin American countries have searched for ways to 
increase and diversify their exports in order to heighten their trade balance surpluses.  
This, in turn, helps them to overcome their debt problems and gain access to a better 
quality of life. 
With these criteria in mind, these countries have begun to join the economic aperture 
and globalisation processes. United by their common ethnic heritage, they are driven by 
the growing need to co-ordinate national and regional decisions in order to achieve a 
harmonic community development. 
The efficiency principle imposed by the present international trade scenario requires 
extreme attention to detail in the administration of production costs and in placing 
products on the market.  Because a product’s success is highly sensitive to cost and 
distribution methods, maritime transport and its associated systems require very 
specific management techniques.Those management techniques must take into 
account that as transport is a service it gives added value to the cargo. 
Thus, the management model, costs involved, planning processes, and area policies 
are topics of vital importance for achieving these nations’ development objectives. 
The design of specific policies, both operational as well as for development 
(investments), should comply with certain minimum conditions. The resulting policies 
should satisfy integrally and harmoniously the requirements the State establishes in 
its general National Development Strategy. This strategy considers the factors of 
monetary and trade uncertainty. States must be particularly careful to interpret 
changes, tendencies, circumstances and difficulties which emerge in the international 
markets they serve, correctly. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to analyse the existing maritime transport 
logistic system in Chile, beginning with the history of ports and economic 
development. Subsequently, this study will analyse all relevant information related to 
logistics. 
For analytical purposes, the study establishes an evaluation area which has been 
represented by a “graph” built up from nodes and links. These symbolise the complex 
network of port systems, hinterlands, roads, railways and coastal shipping. Likewise, 
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the links and nodes have direction, intensity and values that the study intends to 
calculate and evaluate.  
Moreover, nowadays hinterlands are not as exclusive as they were before. 
Consequently, most of the port systems face an extremely competitive market in 
offering services for international hinterlands/foreland. Therefore, this thesis will 
conclude that at least some Latin American countries establish land bridges between 
them. There have already been some studies about the land bridges or “inter-oceanic 
corridors” option in South America.  
The Pacific Ocean Basin represents a huge market for those Atlantic countries which 
have products to export and import from that vast area of the globe. The existence of 
the main industrial site of South America running from the Atlantic side of South 
America to the Pacific Coast, which forms an “Industrial Banana”, is the foundation of 
a massive demand to and from both coasts. 
The study evaluated the logistics system through different criteria, such as logistics, 
physical capacities, and economic, social, environmental and political considerations. 
Having established these criteria, the researcher can better evaluate which are 
the relevant parameters and variables to consider in the design of the 
parametric model.  The model itself constituted a valuable tool in the decision-
making process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the course of time, the world has witnessed changes that have only recently 
been contemplated by strategists and politicians. Advances in technology and research 
have imbued the development of industry with unanticipated speed, a good example of 
this being the revolution in data management and communications systems. 
The internationalisation of investments and the globalisation of markets have created a 
high level of competition among manufacturing and services companies which has 
transcended the competition among nations. In this environment, quality information 
and exact timing are the sole answers for generating comparative and competitive 
advantages with respect to other services providers. 
Inspired by these challenges, Latin American countries have searched for ways to 
increase and diversify their exports in order to heighten their trade balance surpluses. 
This, in turn, helps them to overcome their debt problems and gain access to a better 
quality of life for their population. 
With these criteria in mind, these countries have begun to join the economic aperture 
and globalisation processes. United by their common ethnic heritage, they are driven by 
the growing need to co-ordinate national and regional decisions in order to achieve a 
harmonic community development. 
The efficiency principle imposed by the present international trade scenario requires 
extreme attention to detail in the administration of production costs and in placing 
products on the market. Because a product’s success is highly sensitive to cost and 
distribution methods, maritime transport and its associated systems require very specific 
management techniques.These techniques must take into account that as transport is a 
service it givesadded value to the cargoes. 
Thus, model management, costs, planning, general and specific policies, and maritime 
governance are topics of vital importance for achieving these nations’ development 
objectives. The design of specific policies, both operational as well as for investments, 
should comply with certain minimum conditions. The resulting policies should satisfy 
integrally and harmoniously the requirements the State establishes in its general 
Development Strategy or Agenda. This strategy considers the factors of financial and 
trade uncertainty. States must be particularly careful to interpret changes, tendencies, 
circumstances and difficulties which emerge in the international markets they serve 
correctly, for they have to ensure the use of qualified professionals and methods. 
In accordance with the general work programme planned with the Polytechnic University 
of Cataluña, Nautical and Nautical Engineering Department, the researcher has been 
studying the references listed in the attached bibliography. 
At the same time, he has been reviewing container forecasts for national trade, provided 
by the major national cargo carriers. The researcher has identified and taken into account 
such parameters and variables as: GNP; trade (exports and imports) growth rate; 
container penetration rate; etc. 
The research has also focused on the existence of land bridges or “inter-oceanic 
corridors.”  Furthermore, the study identifies an industrial zone,named by the researcher 
as the “Industrial Banana”, where demand for maritime transport should be measured. 
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A survey to determine how changes in maritime policy affect international trade. This data 
has been useful for understanding the relationship between the maritime environment and 
business and port operations. From this analysis, the researcher derived 
recommendations for maritime policy-making in developing countries. 
Finally, a methodology has been designed to define the physical capacities of a port 
system and a container terminal. This methodology has assisted the researcher in 
evaluating the target ports’ capacities. The researcher has attempted to design a model to 
forecast demand for containers and later to calculate a demand by land, which a 
containers terminal needs to fulfil the demand forecasted. 
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CHAPTER I. MARITIME ECONOMICS 
1.1. SURVEY ON PORTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHILEAN 
TRADE. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PORT 
EFFICIENCY. 
1.1.1. INTRODUCTION. 
This study’s principal objective is to carry out a global analysis of the difficulties 
associated with port systems in relation to the physical distribution of merchandise 
through international trade. This study also incorporates administrative and operational 
matters, as well as some aspects of the modernisation process Latin America is 
presently undergoing. 
The inclusion of the historical evolution of each of the entities involved in the cargo 
transfer process is appropriate, as an analysis of the current situation and the future 
outlook would be partial and incomplete without it. 
In the first stage, the researcher attempts to provide a general focus. This should 
serve as a basis for further analysis of the causes and effects of deregulation in Latin 
American ports. Hopefully, with this in mind, future studies will go deeper into the 
subject  and deal adequately with each topic. 
1.1.2. PORT SERVICES. 
1.1.2.1. THE ROLE OF TRANSPORT IN THE ECONOMY. 
Commerce requires the physical distribution of raw materials and manufactured goods 
from their production sources to the different consumer centres, where there is a need 
for the use of different modes of transport and where a temporary relationship exists 
for the product positioning between each of the modes.  However, it is not enough that 
products merely arrive at their destination; it is also very important that they arrive at a 
precise moment, convenient price and in good condition. The intrinsic qualities which 
make a product desirable must be preserved. In short, consumers desire goods which 
have specific features and which are available when they want them and at a good 
price. Meeting all these demands requires economic resources. 
Costs generated by merchandise distribution are determined by not only the means of 
transport but also by the cargo. These costs relate not only to the transport of products 
from one place to another, but also to the transport time to different destinations, 
connectivity of the ports of origin and destination, and the state of the merchandise 
once it arrives. 
Products can be distributed by land, air or sea (modes of transport). Due to 
geographical variations, cargo in some cases may use different modes of transport 
form origin to destination, which means it is constantly transferred from one mode of 
transportation to another, especially in international trade operations. Therefore, since 
the physical distribution of merchandise requires cargo voyages and transfers, cargo 
should be taken as a whole. 
At present, Latin American countries are facing the imperative need to improve trade 
relations, and thereby accelerate import/export development, by opening their 
economies to foreign trade. Consequently, cargo traffic to and from the continent has 
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increased tremendously. Part of this traffic consists of export products manufactured 
from these countries’ own resources. Other exports are the result of valueadded 
production supported by foreign investment capital (industrial free zone and 
“maquilas”). Once finished, these products are exported again to other destinations. 
In an increasingly competitive system, the location and type of manufacturing centres 
depend on multiple variables such as raw materials, human resources, access to the 
marke, distribution systems and the time needed to reach consumer points1. 
1.1.2.2. THE PORTS WITHIN THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM. 
The ports’ main objective is to transfer cargo between land andmaritime transportation 
modes efficiently. There are intermediate services which add to transport costs. As 
such, ports should perform their functions in the least possible time and cost, while 
maintaining proper safety and security conditions for the means of transport and 
preserving the cargo. 
The cost added to cargo when it passes through a port can be considered an 
economic efficiency measure. 
It is important to emphasise how ports contribute to market development and 
expansion, as well as benefit the region in which they are located. The services and 
infrastructure which ports offer become a source of demand in and of themselves2.  
In regard to operations, ships require that ports provide them with adequate facilities to 
protect them from adverse weather conditions. This allows the ships to reach the 
transfer sites safely and, once there, operate in a safe and more efficient manner. 
Moreover, cargo needs to be handled carefully and expeditiously; thus, ports must 
have the proper loading and unloading equipment, storage facilities, etc. 34 
On the other hand, land vehicles, either lorries or trains, are generally in charge of 
delivering and removing cargo to and from the port. Generally, these vehicles are 
highly inferior to ships in terms of transport capacity. This inferiority restricts access to 
ports and freedom of transit within. Ports should have enough space to regulate this 
lack of balance. 
Ports must also take into account other activities, which are not directly related to 
transfer operations, but nonetheless affect transport and transfer time at port. Customs 
and Public Services enforcement are some of the most important of those. 
Maritime transport, as well as air and land transport, should seek to reduce in-port time 
by improving their procedures and methods. Using containers on ships(cargo 
unitization) to form a cargo unit and enhance capacity facilitates cargo handling, ship 
stowage and unloading, and also makes the ships more secure. Unitization of cargo 
has mainly reduced ships’ turn-around time in port. However, containers have also 
made it necessary to modify traditional port facilities and equipment, thereby 
                                            
1 Port Management Textbook, ISL, 1991. 
2Management of Sea, NMRC, Kings Point, 1973. 
3 Manual de Gestión de Puertos, ISL, 1979. 
4Conference Port, ISL, 1988. 
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substantially revolutionising the transport field. Such integration makes the multimodal 
system possible. 
Maritime transport, characterised by high operational and capital costs, has constantly 
promoted improvements to the port system by trying to reduce the ships’ waiting time 
in ports. They have been pioneers in technological innovations and operational 
organization. 5 
1.1.3. COSTS RELATED TO SHIPS IN PORT. 
First we will analyse the costs associated with the port of call where the vessel is 
carrying out cargo transfer operations. These will be separated into two sections:  
those related to the ship and those to the cargo. 
Generally, it is possible to divide the first section into four ship associated cost 
categories6.  These are:   
a) Ship Daily Costs, expressed in dollars per ton of transferred cargo, based on 
the ship’s daily costs while docked at the berthing site and the manoeuvres 
involved in arriving to and departing from the port. 
b) Berthing Costs, expressed in dollars per ton of transferred cargo, of vessel’s 
payment to the port for permanence at the berthing site. 
c)  Waiting Costs, expressed in dollars per ton of transferred cargo, of waiting to 
berth in case a berthing site is not readily available. 
d) The opportunity cost for the vessel when transport contracts are not fulfilled due 
to a prolonged stay in port and delays in line service causes dissatisfaction 
among clients. Cost quantification will not be simple in this case. 
Furthermore, it is possible to distinguish at least two types of port costs related to 
cargo:  
a)  Cargo TransferCosts, expressed in dollars per ton of transferred cargo, for the 
utilisation of port facilities through the application of a cargo transfer rate. 
b)  Loading and Stowing Costs, derived from loading or unloading operations and 
transport from/to reception/delivery points, depending on the labour group and 
the mechanised equipment. 
1.1.4. PORT TARIFFING. 
1.1.4.1. PORT TARIFFING CHARACTERISTICS. 
The above-mentioned costs do not necessarily represent an actual cash 
disbursement; consequently, it is possible to divide them into the following categories:  
a) Direct Costs, those costs which generate specific expenses;  
b) Indirect Costs, those relating to the time ships or cargo are detained, without a 
specific disbursement; and  
                                            
5TransporteMarítimo, Soulodre, 1982. 
6 Manual de EconomíaMarítima, Musso,1978. 
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c) Risk Costs, those relating to the risks of transfer and damage likely to occur 
during transfer operations. 
Port tariffs, one of the expenses port users actually pay directly, are charges for 
services provided by the port and for the right to use it. 
It should be kept in mind that port tariffs may differ substantially depending on tariffing 
policies, geographical location, infrastructure, facilities, etc., as well as operational 
organization. Given differing port conditions, we would hope that the amount paid for 
each service would vary in accordance with the characteristics of each port.7 
The charges set for services, which often motivate users' conduct, also vary in their 
level of subjectivity. Some analysts from OAS, ECLAC, World Bank and UNCTADhave 
consistently argued for a basic tariff structure which allows, whenever possible, 
standardisation of service charges. Such a structure would reduce subjectivity and 
thereby avoid confusion about the nature of the charges.8 
Standardisation is not an easy task and moreover, in the case of ports,it hasbecome 
difficult,becauseof the cultural approach of a national industry.Different is the condition 
of shipping which is atruly international industry, where a ship which is not controlled 
adequately in her country, without doubt, will be inspected in a port of a third country.  
Regarding port tariffs, the goal is to charge a ship an amount that corresponds to the 
effective services. Determining and assigning costs to each port operation and service, 
and to the cargo of specific ships, however, is a complicated matter.9More during the 
current economic crisis. 
1.1.4.2.IMPORTANCE OF TARIFFING. 
A natural tariff adjustment, with charges truly based on the services rendered, is more 
likely in cases where there is free competition among ports, rather than monopolistic 
conditions. The tariff must include the capital cost of the infrastructure without 
neglecting the necessary funds for development and maintenance of the port’s 
equipment. When the State maintains a monopoly on services, it must be careful when 
deciding how much to charge; unfortunately fiscal authorities consider the port a 
source of revenue instead of an effective international trade catalyst. The tariff should 
be subordinated to the port as an integral member of the distribution system and 
international trade as a whole, including the National Macro Objectives 
We must take into account that port tariffs are only part of the costs involved in cargo 
transfer. Costs related to vessel immobilisation during waiting or transfer times are 
usually so significant that the major concern is minimising transient time at the port 
rather than reducing tariffs.10 
A transfer system performance indicator is generally used to measure operational 
efficiency and costs. It incorporates a port efficiency rating, which is the ratio of "Cargo 
                                            
7Economics of Regulation Shipping, Beth, 1984. 
8 Port Management Textbook Containerisation, ISL, 1985. 
9Conference Port, ISL 1988. 
10Economics of Regulation in Shipping, 1984. 
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Transfer Ton/ Total In-port Time."  In relative terms, this ratio enables port 
classification. 
We must bear in mind that higher transfer expenses will be passed on to the cargo as 
part of the transport cost, and in the end to the final consumer. A product’s 
competitiveness in the international market will suffer if distribution costs increase 
unnecessarily and if distribution is made using modern techniques of information 
management. 
1.1.5. CHILEAN PORT SYSTEM DESCRIPTION. 
1.1.5.1.LEGAL JURISDICTION OF PORTS. 
It is appropriate that this study should include an analysis of legal jurisdiction of ports 
since they are one of the bases of the Latin American modernisation process. 
We should bear in mind that ports unify land and water; therefore, their infrastructure is 
positioned between the two.The water, seabed and land strip that are in contact with 
the port infrastructure constitute public property which cannot be owned by any natural 
citizen or juridical person. This convention states from Roman rule and has been 
incorporated into Chile’s Political Constitution or Civil Right Codes. 
The State normally has taken on the responsibility of managing public property for the 
benefit of the people. In some cases, though, it has used bidding processes to transfer 
property to the private sector for commercial development. 
Under the old concept of ports, the large investments required for their construction 
and infrastructure has come from State funding. Thus, we have facilities built on public 
property and financed by State resources.  
1.1.5.2. INFRASTRUCTURE AND EQUIPMENT. 
Port infrastructure is that which allows the safe realisation of cargo transfer operations 
and provides sheltered waters for the ships operations. It should also include: 
breakwaters; access channels; anchorage sites; surfaces built for cargo mobilisation 
and which also support the transfer equipment; and other transport means, access 
routes, storage sites, among others. The magnitude of the work project, therefore, will 
depend not only on the expected capacity of the port, but also on the geographic, 
oceanographic, and climatic peculiarities, etc. of the area that has been designated as 
the site for the port. 
Construction, maintenance or repair costs of this infrastructure are extremely high, so 
that in many Latin American countries this task has been passed on to the State. The 
projects were simply not profitable enough to attract investors. Some private 
enterprises have invested in ports, but mainly global port operators, companies 
wanting to distribute their own products for their own direct benefit. 
Important infrastructure concerns are a port’s capacity to bear the weight of the transit 
of large cranes, the extent of the facilities for vehicle transit and access for each mode 
of transportation. Ports located within the city’s urban limits or actually surrounded by 
the city, which is a very common situation, create access problems because the cargo 
vehicles passing through usually cause serious traffic jams that consequently affect 
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the cargo. It is essential to keep the entrance and exit roads clear, taking into account 
that the cargo transported by a ship requires several land-based transport units. 
1.1.6.LABOUR ORGANIZATION. 
An issue which must not be disregarded in any analysis of port systems is labour. Port 
workers in Latin America have traditionally been organised, influential and powerful 
labour force with the support of well-structured trade unions. Labour is vital when it 
comes to achieving efficient operations and improving port performance. Flexible 
manpower and lower average costs go hand-in-hand with efficiency. 
These unions have often been the object of harsh criticism because they constantly 
exercise pressure over government or company officials. Many times the unions 
exceed tolerance levels, taking advantage of their position as members of the 
international distribution chain11. The intention of this part of the research is not to 
criticise the actions or demands of these unions. On the contrary, it is mainly 
interested in analysing the causes that have contributed to the creation of such an 
organization, an organization which maintains strong links among port workers 
worldwide. We have to bear in mind that the source of these labour problems is the 
nature of the work itself; it is temporary, based on shifts, and vulnerable to abuse by 
management. 
1.1.6.1. EVOLUTION OF LABOUR ACTIVITY IN PORTS. 
In order to study the evolution of port labour activity (from 1981 on), either on land or 
aboard ship, it is convenient to divide the work into three different schemes: 
a) Temporary employment in which the labourers do not have any kind of 
organised group. 
b) Temporary employment but more stable activity sustained by union strength 
and its own stevedores´ pool. 
c) Permanent and stable work scheme in those enterprises relating to port and 
maritime activities. 
There aredifferent combinations of all these schemes in practice today. 
From the 16th century until the early 20th century, port jobs were occasional work in 
which labourers were hired only for a determined task. There were far more workers 
seeking for jobs than there were jobsavailable, thus exposing employees to work 
irregularity and abusive practices, mainly from their own group of workers and Union 
Directors. The temporary and irregular nature of the work, were strong motivations for 
port workers to organise trade unions12. 
Trade unions have usually fought against the transience of their work by restricting 
access to it and by rotating their affiliates in order to obtain the work.  Frequently, the 
unions would appoint members to different work groups and pressure management to 
hire the largest possible number of their workers.  On one hand, job irregularity and 
                                            
11 Chilean Maritime Chamber, 1993 
12International Ocean Shipping, 1980. 
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abusive management were simply wrong and unjust for workers. On the other, the 
excessive pressure and demands exercised by the labour forces was considerably 
inconvenient not only for employers, but for the port system as well, thereby affecting 
transport costs in general. 
Perhaps the best solution to these labour difficulties and their subsequent damage to 
port systems is a scheme which considers port work a permanent activity. Such a 
scheme would require training labour to work effectively with complex equipment and 
to adapt to the constant innovations and modernisation which ports undergo to 
maintain competitiveness. Improving the qualifications of personnel would thus 
improve employment stability. This approach would relieve traditional labour tensions 
and facilitate the workers’ integration into the companies which employ them. The 
companies and their workers would work as a unit, competing to reach optimum output 
and thus achieve market prosperity and stability. 
The latter scheme seems to be the most favourable for the international distribution 
system, and already it is possible to see it in the new private concession ports. 
However, it is most probable that this option is not available to all the workers in Latin 
American ports. An interesting compromise might be a combination of a basic but 
sufficient permanent salary and incentives based on output as demand for port 
services increases. 
Port labour conflicts have never been beneficial to any of the parties involved.  
Countries dealing with fierce competition on the international markets, in particular, are 
well advised to resolve ongoing labour problems. 
1.1.7. THE INCORPORATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE SOURCE OF 
PORT WORK. 
Fierce competition and the demands of development have compelled ports to 
continuously incorporate new technologies in order to increase productivity. These 
demands have centred mainly on the maritime sector. Modernising or modifying 
operations to improve efficiency and effectiveness frequently reduces manpower 
needs, with a corresponding decrease in labour-related costs. 
Important changes in cargo handling on board ships as well as on shore have taken 
place. Unitisation has eased transport means, storage, specialised equipment 
requirements, etc. For example, in 1886 tanker vessels initiated bulk liquid transport, 
transferring their cargo via hose and pump systems to specially constructed terminals. 
This method proved to be much more efficient than transport with drums, which 
required far more personnel. 
There are various examples of bulk cargo transport, supported by mechanised 
systems, improving performance and reducing employment opportunities. Likewise, 
due to cargo unitization, especially with containerisation, employment opportunities 
during the transfer phase have diminished substantially.13 
It is understandable why port workers are not enthusiastic about technological 
advances which have allowed rationalisation and the reduction of manpower.  
                                            
13 International Ocean Shiping,1980. 
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Solutions to the resulting labour conflicts often include indemnities or the application of 
certain operational regulations which impede ports from fully utilising advancements. 
1.1.8.  CONTROL AND ENFORCEMENT. 
Until the 1960s, Latin American countries generally engaged in import substitution as a 
means of development. Thus, a strong control system emerged which operated 
exclusively to control the exchange of goods with international competitors rather than 
facilitate it. Customs had a large role as an enforcement agency responsible for 
strongly impeding or taxing imported goods.14 
The taxes so-earned provided a significant income for the State. In those days, 
governments did not value ports for their true worth, but rather merely as a way to 
detain cargo and check it, without paying considerable attention to the dwell time. 
Years later, Latin America’s opening toward international markets notably increased 
the flow of import and export cargo. The region thereby entered an eminently 
competitive commercial system where small cost variations made their goods exceed 
market price. Recognising the important role that the physical distribution of goods 
played in the reduction of costs, each country made different efforts to modernise their 
ports. The changes enabled these countries to reduce the time required for moving the 
cargo through the port. It is advisable here to distinguish between simple cargo 
handling operations and those activities related to public services. 
Customs services should not be indifferent to the problems associated with cost 
reduction during the transfer process, mainly because they may tax transport costs as 
well as the cargo value. Nonetheless, this is not the full responsibility of National 
Customs;it is also a responsibility of the Central Government and the National 
Parliament. These taxable transport costs relate more to retention (cargo dwell time) 
than to entrance-related taxes. In addition, it is important to take into account that the 
advantages gained by the use of containers may be lost if these are checked one by 
one during their transit through the port. 
Ports may require documents and paperwork as part of a complex bureaucratic 
apparatus; this is typical of the old concept of ports as instruments of closed 
economies. This tendency has to be overcome by information rationalisation 
processes (avoiding control duplicity), by use of an integrated computer system, and 
by an adequate communications network between the origin and destination ports. 
Public services should understand the importance of their role as efficient institutions, 
in a economy open to foreign trade. Furthermore, ports cannot neglect personnel 
training programs as workers may still be accustomed to the previous control system 
and not fully understand the changes that our present reality requires. 
There are other control activities, either for the vessel or the cargo, such as 
phytosanitary control, health, maritime safety and immigration. These activities also 
have to facilitate rapid passage of the cargo through the port as well as prompt vessel 
attention and dispatch. Despite most government increase the pressure for those 
entities to establish schemes to be financially self-sustainable, which could create a 
contradiction with the reduction costs for the final consumer. 
                                            
14 Maritime Policy Vol. 19.1-21.3, 1993. 
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The timetable that customs and other public entities establish to attend the public 
should be compatible with the port’s work schedule and user requirements. There 
have been cases where work shifts did not coincide, causing co-ordination problems 
which in turn resulted in delays, congestion and finally a higher cost for the cargo and 
the vessel.  
1.1.9. THE MODERNISATION PROCESS. 
In this study, we will discuss the modernisation of ports in terms of their new role as 
part of the international trade distribution chain. The intention is not toestablish 
absolute or inflexible standards for port management or organization. On the contrary, 
each country should seek new solutions suited to its particular economic, political and 
social realities, instead of trying to apply experiments and copy other existing models, 
indiscriminately which were successful in other nations under their own conditions. 
Port modernisation should focus on those actions designed to decentralise 
administrative procedures, eliminate inadequate and inconvenient regulations, 
privatise some services and incorporate effective measures to encourage competition 
within the sector and between port actors. 
1.1.9.1. DECENTRALISATION AND SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE 
Port users are subject to physical distribution needs in the national and international 
markets, and therefore require prompt and flexible services that adapt to the constant 
changes typical of this market. Port decentralisation presents a solution to these 
demands. 
It is said that decentralisation and delegation would give more freedom of action to 
local port administrators, thereby speeding up the decision-making process. Locating 
control near where operations are carried out and where conflicts arise would, in turn, 
facilitate better utilisation of resources (Subsidiarity Principle). A central agency could 
take on planning on a national level and design a general policy, thus maintaining the 
coherence of port development while delegating administration to those who are more 
involved with the local reality. 
1.1.9.2. DEREGULATION. 
The interest in deregulating port systems is understandable since it aims at enhancing 
productivity so as to minimize cargo or vessel transfer costs. The main idea is to 
detain the cargo and the vessel for the least possible amount of time. 
Deregulation does not mean a total loss of control of operations. Even from the State 
do not mean the safety, security and protection of the marine environment is not 
control even regulated, the State keep the control of those matters which represent the 
"General Common Interest”. Rather, it implies a reasonable application of regulations 
in view of the demands of international trade and the need to speed up the passage of 
cargo through ports. Inspection of documents and paperwork pertaining to the vessel 
and its cargo should be prioritized on the basis of operational needs; thus, procedures 
could be adapted and work schedules co-ordinated. 
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In other words, focus the government action on those aspects where the State has a 
role to play and leave the commercial issues to the professionals of the private sector 
and companies. 
Labour regulations,both on board the vessel and on land, are another important issue. 
In Latin America, powerful syndicates have historically been over protective of port 
labour. Labour has transferred cargo at the pace it finds convenient, negatively 
affecting port performance. Deregulation of port labour, however, should not leave 
workers totally unprotected and exposed to sporadic work once again, as this could be 
a source of conflicts which would in no way benefit international trade. 
1.1.9.3.PRIVATISATION. 
The idea of handling State companies over to the private sector, either by sale or 
concession, has gained significant popularity in the world and in Latin America over 
the past few decades. Privatisation advocates argue that the private sector would be a 
better administrator and manager, provide better services or products, and be more 
capable of modernising certain industries. In turn, the State would receive a 
considerable amount of funds which, in several cases, would allow them to reduce 
their high fiscal deficits. 
There is no general consensus about which State companies should be privatised. 
Some say the State should restrict its scope of action to social concerns and national 
regulation, and leave economic development initiatives to the private sector. Others 
maintain that the State should privatise only the unproductive companies and that 
nothing would justify the sale of those which are earning a significant profit. Another 
approach promotes the concept of strategic companies which, from an economic point 
of view, would be vital for national security. 
All of these are defensible positions. Thus, any effort to reach a unanimous agreement 
on which companies should or should not be privatised would be in vain. 
Nevertheless, there is little question that some of the business sectors in which the 
State is heavily involved are already obsolete or soon will be. As their competitiveness 
falls, significant investments are required to catch up with modern standards; however, 
the State may not have the necessary means or the will to make such investments. 
The private sector, on the other hand, could make these investments, given or not 
certain favourable economic conditions. Private entities could purchase such 
companies entirely or in part, or operate them under a concession-type program or 
PPP. 
As a final observation, people often think privatisation can solve all problems. This is 
not so, however, because privatisation is only a means of improving efficiency in 
industrial and business processes in general. 
1.1.9.4. COMPETITION. 
The free market economy is, without doubt, an important motivator for producers. 
Each company must struggle to provide a better product or service than the 
competitor. Naturally, consumers are the usual beneficiaries of this struggle. Further, 
competition is a significant catalyst to modernisation, since it obliges companies to 
constantly maintain product quality and to promote innovation, creativity and flexibility 
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in order to adapt themselves to an ever-changing environment. There are examples in 
Latin-America, where privatization was established in some sectors, without promoting 
competition, which resultedin bad services (private monopoly), increase in tariffs and 
no technical improvement.  
Generally speaking, the companies that form a part of the port system are not 
excluded from this construct; that is, a competitive scheme should be developed within 
the ports and also between them. There are several successful examples of both 
cases. However, we have to be prudent about drawing on any experiences that are 
based on other realities, even though we may be tempted to try to replicate them. 
Competition among ports will compel them to continually improve their services in 
order to develop better solutions and achieve a lower total cost for goods distribution. 
Though these facts of competition are hard to deny, they may nonetheless have 
limited application for some Latin American countries due to their geographical 
location and specialisation. Likewise, we have to remember that ports are a source of 
development for the region. When the time comes for a country to evaluate their 
positioning-related benefits compared with State investments, they may decide in 
favour of State control. In addition, competitiveness will also depend on the quality of 
land transport to and from consumption and production centres. 
The situation regarding competition within ports is simpler. In this case, free market 
competition among private companies will improve cargo transfer services, storage, 
etc., relieving the State of this burden and directly benefiting consumers. 
1.2.  ANALISIS OF PORT RESTRUCTURE AND ITS SOCIAL IMPACT. PORT OF 
VALPARAÍSO, CHILE. 
1.2.1. GENERAL ASPECTS. 
The objective of the following analysis is to describe and evaluate the process of 
changes which have been implemented in the Chilean port system since 1981, focusing 
specially on the social/economic effects on the port of Valparaíso. The structural reforms 
taken place in the later 70’s and early 80’s in Chile, were against the normal trend in the 
other Latin-American countries lead by the ECLA’s substitution of import policy. This 
place Chile as the pioneer in Latin-America on regards to structural reforms and port 
privatization. 
In order to achieve the objective this analysis has been divided into several sections 
using papers prepared since 1981 by the Chilean Maritime Chamber. Also included are 
interviews of people from both the public and private sectors that have been involved in 
the development and implementation of these changes or are currently part of the 
modernizing process.  
The technical data, the statistics and the comparative tables have been put together 
with official information from the Maritime Authority (DIRECTEMAR), the Chilean Port 
Company (EMPORCHI), the Maritime and Port Chamber (CámaraMarítima y Portuaria 
de Chile A.G.), studies by ECLAC, and trade union organizations grouped together in 
the Maritime Confederation of Chile COMACH. 
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1.2.2. HISTORIC BACKGROUND OF THE PORT OF VALPARAISO. 
The Port of Valparaíso is situated at Latitude  33º 01´ 33” South and Longitude  71º 38´ 
22” West, it has a Mediterranean mild  climate and is 110 Km. from the city of Santiago, 
the country’s Capital city.  
It is of particular interest that this port was not founded as a city by the Spanish 
conquerors. It was born essentially as a Port, with the arrival of maritime expeditions of 
the Spanish Navy loaded with supplies for the Army forces lead by Don Diego de 
Almagro. The first of these arrivals was the Santiaguillo vessel in 1536.  
Following that date, commercial and maritime activity began to grow around the port, bit 
by bit the town took shape and the port infrastructure emerged. Some important 
landmarks in the development of the port must be mentioned: 
1600 - Port Fortification and first costal support constructions. 
1791 - Construction of customs buildings where port administration took place.  
1810 - Construction of private VillaUrrutia pier. 
1825 - Construction of the port’s second private pier. 
1832 - Construction of the port’s Duty Free Warehouses. 
1866 - Construction of the Public Pier (first major work undertaken). 
1883 - Construction of the passenger Pier, the Prat Pier of today. 
1910 -Beginning of the mayor construction work of the port and harbour breakwater. 
1930 - Conclusion of all the main port structures that are currently in use.  
The port is state property and administered by the “Valparaiso Port Enterprise” 
(previously EMPORCHI), it is a multipurpose port that has an operative surface of 20 
hectares, with 9 berthing sites suitable for vessels up to 11.5 meters of draft.  
1.2.3. FACTS WHICH HAVE SUGGESTED THE NEED FOR STRUCTURAL 
ADJUSTMENT WITHIN THE PORT INDUSTRY. 
During 1973, Chile suffered a huge structural change when the Military Regime took 
over the Government from the socialist regime that had been in power since 1970.  
Between 1978 and 1981 the Military Government made a series of basic changes to the 
country’s organization and institutionalisation. It was decided that a Market Economy 
model should be implemented, for this reason a general reform programme was 
established that would allow the introduction of new forms of management in the state 
and private sectors. The Market Economy model is still, successfully, in place.  
These reforms were introduced to all the Government institutions which resulted in new 
policies being applied to state, economic and social management. The repercussions 
affected all areas including both the government and the private sectors, applying 
concepts which now are know as, downsizing, reengineering, outsourcing, etc. 
Under these circumstances, the changes applied to the port-maritime sector were 
framed within the country’s general reforms, all of which were aimed at putting an end to 
monopolies and subsidies, reduce the State Entrepreneur and bring the private sector 
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into all the economic activities that were not directly involved with national security 
matters.  
The labour structure of this new economic model offered free access to any type of work 
without the need to sign up with any trade union organization in order to carry out an 
activity creating unionism liberalization.  
In the same way, collective negotiations by economic activities (industrial sectors) were 
ended, as were tri-party Commissions. Negotiations were limited exclusively within each 
business unit or enterprise.   
Also, this model forbid productive sector negotiations (national port sector) the setting up 
work gangs and the signing of exclusive contracts with trade unions and generally 
eliminated any rule that tended to reduce or restrict the use of the labour force.  
In this framework it is the employer who keeps complete control over the selection or 
dismissal of personnel. 
These general regulations, applicable to all economic activity, were incorporated into the 
national legislation through a special law program called the Labour Plan. These new 
laws came into effect in 1978 and were applied to all the country’s work force, except 
the maritime workers, towho, as we will look into later, were only applied in 1981.  
It is within this context that the analysis and studies of the port sector have been set, 
facing a series of inflexibilities and monopolies that made the port system inefficient and 
costly, added to crossed subsidies and inexact and uncoordinated tariffs, and no 
competition either within or between ports. 
The inexistence of an economic framework that set limits to the increase of loading and 
unloading costs is a characteristic of this scenario. 
Given these reasons, the system was in crisis and was completely incompatible with a 
market economy, becoming a serious restriction for foreign trade and development of 
the country.  
1.2.4. FOCUS AND METHOLOGY TO CARRYOUT THE PORT RESTRUCTURE 
AND LABOUR REFORM. 
In 1973 a group of international experts, hired by the Government, concluded that the 
national ports would be insufficient to cope with the volumes of cargo forecast for a 5 
year term, therefore suggested urgent extensions to the physical infrastructure of the 
ports. As these were situated on an open coast and had deep waters the work involved 
would be great and very costly. 
Faced with this situation the Economic Authority in charge of designating resources, 
decided not to go ahead with the recommended extensions until the existent 
infrastructure was used to its optimum capacity. 
In view of the crisis affecting the ports, this decision led to the search of a structural 
solution.  
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1.2.5. RESTRUCTURING PLANS: POLICIES AND STRATEGIES FOR THE LABOR 
REFORM WITHIN THE PORT RESTRUCTURING FRAMEWORK. 
In order to carry out the structural reform, the Government Authorities concluded that is 
was necessary to restructure the state ports, establishing each one as autonomous 
entities, directed, operated, financed and administrated locally, with strong participation 
of the private sector. The framework of costs should be determined by the market forces 
after to establish a competitive market within the ports.  
To achieve these reforms, it was necessary to choose a model that set out the following 
parameters:  
 Replace the centralized state port company with various local autonomous 
limited companies. These companies would own the infrastructure and charge 
vessels for services of berthing at such a rate that would allow them to maintain 
themselves and reinvest as necessary. 
 Reinvestments and extensions should be done guided by a superior body, one 
that was in charge of implementing the national port policies.  
 Each port would allow the existence of various port operators and stevedores 
companies that would carry out integral port operations of cargo, excluding 
berthing and stay. The storing of cargo within the port could be done by either the 
state company or be put out to tender to the private sector.  
 In order to implement these ideas, profound legal reforms to the complete port system 
were necessary, reforms that not only affected the Chilean Port Company 
(EMPORCHI), but also established a work regime that would allow the private 
companies to compete in a free market system.  
1.2.6. RESOURCES AND BASIS FOR THE DESIGN AND SUPPORT OF THE 
LABOR REFORM.  
To implement these reforms, the state would take on the costs implied. For this reason 
the National Port Commission was created, with representatives of the public sector 
together with representatives of the private companies, shipowners, importers, exporters 
and work force.  
1.2.7. THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT, EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES IN 
THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE LABOR MARKET.  
The National Port Commission began an analysis on the legal framework and it’s 
adjustments, and over a long period held an open debate on the issues, all of which 
resulted in the reforms that were started in 1978, and were only finally applied 
completely during the last term of 1981.  
The truth is that the Commission sought to find consensus within it’s members, who had 
serious problems in reaching an agreement and finally the military government decided 
to apply a format/model that was not entirely agreed by all members of the Commission.  
1.2.8. TENDENCIES AND WORK CONDITIONS AND FORMATION.  
LABOR FRAMEWORK BEFORE THE REFORMS. 
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Maritime Personnel. 
The private port sector was only permitted duties of loading and unloading the vessels, 
for which they used part time and casual workers that only carried out such duties.  
These workers were grouped together in trade unions and required a registration in 
order to carry out their work. This registration was managed by the Maritime Authority 
and was limited in number by specialty and by port. 
To set the number of workers there were tripartite employment offices that established 
the number of workers by specialty and by port. The maritime authority granted a 
licence (registration) and only these personnel were authorized to work in port activities, 
in this way establishing a monopolistic condition.  
The sector had a structure that was established by special norms, of varied hierarchy, 
set out in laws, rules and administrative decrees generated since 1945, also, national 
compulsory collective labour conventions, that applied to all employees and employers 
of the sector. 
EMPORCHI Personnel. 
All the functions of assigning berths, designating storage areas, cargo transfer 
operations to and from vessels and quay, movement of cargo between quay and 
warehouse, stowage, reception and release of merchandise within port warehouses, 
etc. were all carried out by EMPORCHI (state enterprise) using their own personnel, 
equipment and machinery. 
EMPORCHI personnel were guided by the general regulations applied to all state 
employees (general rules of the Administrative Statute), they had fixed jobs and 
timetables, work conditions and remunerations fixed by the government through 
supreme decrees.  
The Port Labour System. 
The configuration of this complex system with a varied legal structure tied to strict sector 
rules, gave a monopolist situation of port labour to the labour sector, where by law, the 
maritime trade unions could take on the work and the private companies could only use 
the workers named by the trade unions from the registered list held by the Maritime 
Authority. 
Under these circumstances the port labour system consisted of two groups of workers, 
those belonging to the Chilean Port Company, EMPORCHI, who were employed by the 
state, guided by the Administrative Statute that ruled all public operations, and were 
responsible for moving cargo to and from the quay and the warehouses and within 
them, including delivering to consignees; and the other group, called the Maritime 
Personnel, that worked on board the ships only  loading and unloading cargo, and were 
ruled by special regulations written exclusively for them in various laws and decrees. 
With this structure the EMPORCHI workers had different rules and a different work 
timetable to the other port workers thus leading to hold-ups and wasted time. 
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On the other hand the Maritime Workers were bound by special private sector rules and 
they also had to fulfil a series of requirements like having to be registered with one of the 
authorized trade unions and be registered with the maritime authority.    
Within this group of workers, the maritime authorities recognized five specialties: 
 Bay Employees, Tallymen and supervisors;  
 Stevedores; 
 Bay Auxiliary Seafarers; 
 Carpenters and Packers; 
 Watchmen. 
Port operators, Shipping agents and companies had to work exclusively with the 
registered personnel with whom they were forced to agree collective work bargains. 
The collective agreements were applicable nationwide, and underwritten by the Chilean 
Maritime Confederation in representation of the workers and by the Maritime Chamber 
in representation of the Employers. 
The day to day personnel hiring was done by the Shipping Agents but the collective 
agreements were handled by the Chilean Maritime Chamber in representation of more 
that 50 shipping agents. Equally, the labour sector was represented by the Chilean 
Maritime Confederation, COMACH, to which 5 federations and 52 syndicates were 
subscribed.  
These bargains or agreements established a national tariff of more than 160 items for 
different cargoes and designated fixed gangs with a set number of men who would work 
as a non-dividing team on different jobs. The employer could neither reduce the number 
of men per gang or the number of gangs agreed for each type of cargo, nor was he 
allowed to select workers as these were appointed by the syndicates. 
The Maritime Chamber was the body in charge of maintaining working relations with the 
workers and obtaining their trainingon safety and occupational health.  
As a result, the work force was limited, the tariffs were expensive and were not related 
to productivity and work could not be rationalized by the employer. 
With this system, the ports only worked a total of 11.5 hours a day, divided in two shifts 
and usually only 230 days per year were worked due to the pre-established shifts.   
Under this scheme, the 10 state owned commercial ports for public use, managed by 
EMPORCHI, had 5,117 permanent workers, and the private companies had 3,500 
workers with collective bargains but not permanent, registered with the Maritime 
Authority and a further 2,500 men as replacement workers. In addition, 19,000 workers 
called “pincheros” casual workers (occasional)were used to replace the registered and 
replacement workers when they did not turn up for work or when a larger number of 
workers were required.These workers, however, were designated by the syndicates 
from their own lists held for this effect.  
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EMPORCHI personnel evolution, in the 10 state owned ports. 
1960 Year EMPORCHI was formed  3.034 
1978 Beginning of reform process  5.117 
1981 Implementation of reforms  3.492 
1982 First year of model  1.396 
1991 Tenth year of model  1.750 
1997 Beginning of 2nd phase of reforms  1.500 
1998 First year of new model  654 
2003 After 5 year of the new model 
(Emporchi-Valparaiso) 
148 
Source: EMPORCHI, 2004 
Evolution of Maritime Personnel at national level. 
 1960 1981 1998 
Registered 2.350 3.500 - 
Replacement    700 2.500 - 
Occasional 
“Pincheros” 
- 19.000 - 
Permanent 
Workers 
- - 1.200 
Occasional 
Workers  
- - 3.370 
Source: Chilean Maritime Chamber 2000 
Occasional workers in Valparaiso: 
 1981 1985 1998 
Registered  856 - - 
Supply 233 - - 
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Occasional 
“Pincheros” 
8.338 - - 
Registered 
Workers  
- 10.146 - 
Permanent 
Workers  
- - 850 
Occasional 
Workers 
- - 1.175 
Source: Chilean Maritime Chamber2000 
Evolution of Social Benefits:  
Under the national collective bargains regime that was abolished in 1981, the occasional 
workers had the following benefits: 
Benefits that meant additional remuneration: 
 Holiday 7,46% 
Productivity bonus  5.00% 
Source: Chilean Maritime Chamber 2000 
 
Direct Monetary Benefits. 
Special Allowance  4,0% 
Schooling Benefit 4,15
% 
Home Allowance 7,76
% 
Death Allowance  0,09
% 
Retirement 
Payment  
0,13
% 
Source: Chilean Maritime Chamber 2000 
Other Benefits. 
Clinic Contribution  1,58% 
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Cooperative 
Contribution  
1,14% 
Federation 
Contribution  
1,0% 
Benefits Department 5,0% 
Social Club  1,37% 
Syndicate 
Contribution  
1,0% 
Housing Foundation  5,0% 
Assistance Fund 1,0% 
Paid Leaders  6.0% 
Total Benefits  46,68% 
Source: Chilean Maritime Chamber 2000 
Currently, only the permanent workers have the right to collective bargains and enjoy a 
few benefits.  
The rest of the Occasional Workers only have the additional benefit of a guaranteed 
minimal wage every three months (Approximately US$34 per month). 
These workers are hired and dismissed with each 7.5 hour shift and their wages are not 
increased either by bank holidays, Sundays or night work. Social benefits that amount to 
17.5% are discounted from their day/wage. 
In the Port of Valparaiso, the wage in 2005 for these workers for a 7.5 hour shift was on 
average as follows:  
 In   $ In US$ 
Stevedores 17.200.- 36,6 
Fork lift operators 19.800.- 42,1 
Foreman 21.000.- 44,7 
Supervisor 28.000.- 59,6 
Source: Chilean Maritime Chamber 2005 
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1.2.9. RULES FRAMEWORK, LEGISLATION FOR THE NEW LABOR ORDER. 
1.2.9.1. General Legal Framework of the Port Model 1960-1981. 
The legal framework of the Chilean port system between 1960 and 1981 must be divided 
into an Institutional ruling, that set the models for state ports with commercial use and 
controlled their personnel; and a labour ruling, that set out the regulations for the 
stevedore workers of the private sector.  
For this reason the analysis of the different rulings are not carried out in chronological 
order but by sectors, in order to provide a better understanding of the evolution of the 
process.  
Institutional Framework. 
Between 1960 and 1981, the Chilean State Ports, of public use, were under the 1960 
D.F.L. 290, Organic Statute of the Chilean Port Enterprise EMPORCHI. 
In fact, during 1960 public administration in Chile was restructured and a series of 
Autonomous State Enterprises were created.In order to put these actions into effect, the 
National Congress delegated the corresponding faculties to the President of the Republic 
through Law No.13305. 
With the faculty of dictating decrees on various issues, the President created in 1960 the 
Chilean Port Enterprise, EMPORCHI through D.F.L. Nº 290, an autonomous state 
company that was under the Ministry for Public Works and Transport.  
This legal body restructured the national port system and made it into a unitary system, 
solely dependant on EMPORCHI, which was entrusted with the commercial exploitation, 
the management and the conservation of the 10 main commercial ports of public use and 
also with functions as the National Port Administration.  
The law also gave EMPORCHI, the sole right to cargo transfer, movement, reception and 
storage and the faculty to set tariffs through supreme decrees.  
In 1975 the Ministry for Transport and Telecommunications was created and EMPORCHI 
was placed under this governing body.   
EMPORCHI personnel were guided by the general regulations applied to all state 
employees, they are the general rulings of the Administrative Statute, they had fixed jobs 
and timetables, work conditions and remunerations fixed by the government through 
supreme decrees.  
Given the circumstances, the Government had to prepare the grounds for the application 
of the new rulings and so put EMPORCHI through a severe personnel reduction plan. 
Various incentive schemes were used, such as early retirements, voluntary redundancy 
plans and indemnity benefits, etc.  
By means of these schemes EMPORCHI reduced its personnel from 5117 workers in 
1978 to 1625 over a three year period.  
These actions enabled the Shipping Agents to supply private personnel outside the 
syndicate system and to fulfil the lack of workers in port operations on a temporary and 
exceptional basis, during the process prior to the reform law. 
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This situation led to a stream of public opinion favourable to the changes that were about 
to be implemented.  
Framework of the private port sector work force. 
The private sector, on the other hand, was guided by special rulings, included in more 
than 13 laws and 27 Supreme Decrees, among them the following should be highlighted: 
Law Nº 10.988/52   Establishes Bank holidays for Port Workers;  
Law Nº 16.372/65  Establishes Exclusive Maritime Work for Workers Unions;  
Law Nº 16.724/67  Establishes Exclusive Maritime Work for Employee Unions;  
Law Nº 17.260/69  Incorporates New Unions in the Register; 
Law Nº 17.816/72  Set up the Employment Office for Maritime Employees; 
D.L. Nº 168/73   Gives Extraordinary Faculties to the Maritime Authority on 
Labour Matters; 
Law Nº 18.032/81  Establishes New Port Work System;  
D.S.(M) Nº  1340/41  Order, Security and Discipline Ruling;  
D.S.(M) Nº  100/48   Ruling that sets attributes of the Maritime Authority and Work 
Directorate;  
D.S.(M) Nº  861/58    Establishes Permanent Commission of Maritime Employees;  
D.S.(M) Nº 312/65     Establishes Rules of Employment for Maritime Workers; 
D.S.(M) Nº  153/66    Establishes General Rules for Registers;  
D.S.(M) Nº  1.080/67  Establishes the National Port-Maritime Commission;  
PORT INSTITUTIONAL REFORM.  
Institutional Reform. 
Law Nº 18.042 of 1981. 
In 1981, Law Nº 18.042 was passed, which established a new port model that would 
completely change the state system that had been in place since 1960.  
This model ordered the liquidation of EMPORCHI and suggested the creation of 10 
Limited Port Enterprises that were independent from each other but grouped together 
under a holding that would administrate a National Port Corporation, this legal body set 
up specially for the purpose, would be situated in the City of Valparaiso.  
The general principle behind this model was the privatization of the system, including 
both the port operations of transfer, movement and storage and also the infrastructure. 
Though the infrastructure was not to be sold, it was to be given in concession, enabling 
the berthing sites and the port warehouses to be franchised, thus the private sector would 
manage the ports on the basis of free competition.  
However, this rather liberal legal ruling, with not many regulations, could not be 
implemented due to the fact that it was open to a series of interpretations and 
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eventualities that could lead to some powerful economic sectors setting up a private 
monopoly by obtaining the franchise of all the main ports and berthing sites.  
All of the above opened a strong internal debate within the Military Government, and in 
the end only one article of the new law was applied, allowing the private sector access to 
port operations, so although the law is still valid it has not been applied in the practice.  
It is worth mentioning that soon after the law was in force, the Military Government 
created an Interdisciplinary Commission, which worked for four years in search of an 
alternative solution to the loopholes of the law and thus avoiding the setting up of private 
monopolies to manage the ports and organized unions or federations handling the 
transport of cargo.  
Unfortunately, a compromise was not reached by the various public and private 
organisms involved and the law had to be abolished by the same Military Government 
that had approved it, because it was inapplicable. 
Nevertheless, this legal ruling was the central basis of the complete process of changes, 
as it eliminated the exclusive monopoly held by the State, through EMPORCHI, to 
manage all cargo transfers and handling within the ports, it gave access to private 
companies to become involved in port operations, cargo transfer and handling within the 
port premises.  
The model worked for nine years with problems of unclear definitions and finally had to be 
adjusted by abolishing the original law and establishing an intermediate system.This 
occurred in 1990, just one day before the Military Government handed over power to the 
new democratic Government.  
Modifications to the EMPORCHI Law. 
Law Nº 18.966 of 1990. 
Due to the special circumstances arising from the impossibility of applying the 1981 
model, the Law Nº18.966 was passed in 1990, through which judicial validity was 
restored to the port system and the D.F.L. Nº290 was reformed so that the law confirmed 
what in practice had been applied for almost 10 years. 
With these modifications, a mixed system was defiantly in place, through which the 
Autonomous Company EMPORCHI, on behalf of the State, administrates the 
infrastructure and offers storage services within the port premises, and the private sector 
offers services of cargo transfer, handling and movement on a competitive basis.  
The model comprises one state company, EMPORCHI, which manages the 10 principal 
state ports of public use. In effect, it owns the infrastructure, maintains and administrates 
it, assigns berthing sites, storage areas and offers storage services within the port 
premises. However, it does not carry out operative functions of cargo loading and 
unloading, transfer and movement; these duties are done by the private sector through 
shipping companies duly registered with the Maritime Authority.  
Within this format, EMPORCHI charges the vessels a tariff by the hour/meter/length and 
the shipping company or the ship-owners, according to the transport agreement, for the 
transfer rights and use of the quay; for example, if the transport agreement is under FIO 
 25 
conditions, the transfer tariff is charged to the shipping company but if the transport 
agreement is under LINER conditions, the transfer tariff is charged to the ship-owner. 
On the other hand, the shipping companies do not pay a special or additional tariff to the 
port and are completely free to set their own tariffs for services rendered, these are only 
regulated by the market. 
This new model opened up the system allowing an important number of private 
companies to enter and therefore a high level of competition, this quickly led to important 
reductions of tariffs applied to these operations, which, as mentioned before, had been 
left to free competition without limits or rules of any nature, just dependant on market 
laws. 
1.2.9.2. Second Stage of Port Modernization in Chile.   
Not withstanding the success of the privatization process of port operations, as has 
been mentioned before, the opening up of the Chilean economy has meant an important 
increase in port activity during the last few years, in fact the total cargo moved by ports 
of public use was practically tripled.  
This growth has been absorbed, up till now, with the introduction of competitors within 
state ports, in the mixed system that has been described, with multi-operator operations. 
There is not doubt, however, that the development of the sector is also due to the 
existence of 22 new private ports.  
The continuing growth process does, never the less, pose the challenge of increasing 
the physical and operative capacity of the national port system, requiring new space, 
which is scarce, used in alternative ways, and puts pressure on the existing transport 
networks and their access; therefore, the Government decided to embark on a second 
stage of port modernization. 
For this second stage it was decided to incorporate a decentralization system, which, as 
previously shown, cannot be conceived in a radical way without running the risk of going 
from a centralized administration to a fragmented one.It is important to bear in mind that 
the implementation of a decentralized model should not affect the adequate conditions 
of competitiveness between ports and within them, central objectives of the new 
institution. 
With this orientation, the Government began the second stage of port modernization 
destined to attract investment in infrastructure increase, new technologies and more 
modern management methods, with a view to using the ports more efficiently, assigning 
an adequate amount of resources and creating appropriate conditions for the private 
sector to take on an active role. 
Within this context, it became necessary to apply a new reform to the legal framework, 
with an aim at putting a new format into action and with the outlook of propelling a 
competitive and sustainable development in the long term, making the most of the 
positive elements which were in place, as is the competitiveness within the ports 
administrated by EMPORCHI.  
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Having the parameters well established, this second stage was initiated on the 1st 
September 1995 when theState Port Modernization law was sent to parliament, and was 
later approved as Law 19.542 of State Port Modernization on 19th December 1997. 
This law created 10 State Port Enterprises, with a view to guaranteeing competition 
between ports and encouraging the maximum number of port operators to offer their 
services, as an essential tool for improving the efficiency now required. It is also 
considered indispensable that by the development of their activities, the companies 
promote competition within the ports, seeking non discriminating dealings with all port 
users, keeping a lookout for possible expansion and preserving and strengthening 
productivity, efficiency and competitive levels.  
In this structure, the new companies have started their operations on a scaled basis on 
31st January 1998. They are guided by the Limited Company rulings and each has their 
corresponding board of directors formed by persons designated by the President of the 
Republic. These directors must guarantee their professional qualities and independence 
with regards to corporative interests; they may not be associated with any company 
related to the maritime port business, nor have political or public duties.  
Also, the structure that puts them under the same rulings as limited companies, allows 
them to function within a similar framework as the private companies, but without loosing 
their characteristics as a public company and working independently of intermediate 
government issues.  
The law considers decentralization and autonomy of these companies which are 
compatible with the principle of financial, tributary, labour, auditing and control equality 
with regards to the private ports, in such a way that the management be transparent and 
allows a healthy and loyal competition between the two sectors.  
In order to fulfil their social objectives, the autonomous state companies should favour 
the participation of the private sector and therefore may delegate functions to third 
parties by means of a variety of instruments created for these purposes, such as port 
franchises, hiring of space or forming of limited companies with natural persons or legal 
entities, be they Chilean or foreign.  
With this model, the port companies will have within reach a series of practical tools that 
can be used according to their individual needs and their development plans.  
The essential element of modernization was the change of the labour regime. It was 
established that it should be under the general ruling of the Labour Code; this ruling 
would give the necessary flexibility to select personnel and react by results of all 
citizens. They would be able to evaluate performance not only based on their own 
results but also comparing them with other economic sectors of the country.  
In any case, the Government thought it necessary and indispensable not only to 
consider the rights of the EMPORCHI workers, but also promote a series of incentives 
destined for indemnities and early retirements and, further more, as a principle of 
acknowledgment and justice, make them participates of the process by designating a 
representative to the board of directors of each of the autonomous companies.  
During this second stage, from the current 1500 EMPORCHI workers, 850 took on 
retirement, early retirement and voluntary redundancy. 
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Investment in the Chilean Ports:  
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1997 >2003 
Valparaiso 711,900 1,545,500 554,080 396,167 2,458,333 27,000,000 
National 5,610,000 5,810,715 4,765,456 4,086,000 9,443,000 400,000,000 
Source: DIRECTEMAR 2005, expressed in US $ (1 $ Chilean peso = US$ 500) 
1.2.10. PORT LABOR SITUATION REFORMS. 
Law Nº 18.032 of 1981 Private Port Sector. 
The legal rulings for the private labour sector, as was previously mentioned, was made up 
by a series of laws, supreme decrees, Maritime Authority rulings and resolutions, and the 
Obligatory Collective Labour Bargains, applied nationwide. From all this tangle of laws 
and regulations a new reformed Law Nº18.032 of 1981 was passed. This law eliminated 
the syndicate monopoly for port work and put an end to the registration system by paying 
50 million dollars in compensation to the registered and replacement workers. The law 
also stated the freedom of the labour system and terminated all the previous collective 
bargains and restrictions of labour force in the ports.  
These changes marked the freedom of work in the sector and facilitated direct 
negotiations by businesses and by ports, also allowing the shipping agents to operate the 
complete process from the ship holds to the final destination of the cargo and vice versa, 
thus putting an end to interrupted operations due to different gangs of workers on board 
and on land.  
On the other hand, as indicated, EMPORCHI no longer offered the services of cargo 
movement and dismissed a large number of state employees that carried out this work, 
most of whom were re-employed by the private sector.  
Law Nº 18.462 of 1985. 
The free employment regime together with the lack of control of the inspection authorities 
and new labour problems that arose, led the Military Government to introduce more 
modifications to the labour laws in 1985. For this reason, Law 18.462 was passed where 
by minimal conditions were set for port workers and the responsibility of control was 
delegated to the Ministry of Employment and Social Security, which was given the faculty 
to create a set of rules for the purpose.  
To this effect, in May 1986 the Ruling for Port Workers was passed by means of the 
Supreme Decree (T) Nº48. 
This legal text established special registers and conditions to be met by port operating 
companies.  
The concept of Private Port Operator, of Shipping Company or Shipping Agents was born 
from these rulings. 
 28 
The Ruling stated that only the national companies that were registered with the Maritime 
Authority could carry out these functions, they should also fulfil all the requirements set 
out in the same legal document. The Maritime, Customs, Port and Employment 
Authorities were given the faculty to inspect these companies.  
The system began to restructure itself under these rulings and operations became more 
orderly giving a transparency to the labour market and to the services.  
The legal ruling, which is currently in place, established the following requirements: 
 Formation as a Chilean Company. For which it is necessary to have 51% of real 
and effective capital in the hands of Chilean people or companies. 
 National Directive Personnel. It was established that the President, General 
Manager and most of the Directors should be Chilean.  
 Registered with the Maritime Authority. 
 Setting up of premises and office in each port where activities were carried out.  
 Designation of authorized representatives before the Maritime Authority, the Port 
Authority and the Customs and Labour Authority. 
 Declaring Capital to the Maritime Authority.  
 Give the Labour Authority a guarantee of keeping to work contract obligations.   
Control Organism: 
Before 1981, the Maritime Authority, represented by the General Directorate of Maritime 
Territory and Merchant Marine on national basis and its Maritime Governors and Port 
Captains at local level, controlled all the functions of maritime traffic, piloting and general 
safety and security both physical and industrial; it registered and granted license to port 
workers, stevedores, auxiliary seafarers, carpenters and watchmen, it applied the rulings 
of order, security and discipline, and controlled the fulfilling of the collective agreements.  
With the new model, the Maritime Authority continues to regulate all functions of maritime 
traffic, piloting and general security both physical and industrial, having only ceased in its 
responsibility for port labour aspects, which are now under the tuition of inspection 
organisms of the Labour Ministry. 
These conditions are applied until today.  
1.2.11. MODIFICATIONS TO THE CODE OF COMMERCE.  
In order to have the complete picture of the legal framework of the port business sector, 
Book III of the Code of Commerce was modified in 1988, including in its rulings a special 
chapter on Shipping Agents, Quay or Port Operators where the afore mentioned general 
rules were incorporated, defining their scope of action, setting out the legal framework 
through which the private port operators can carry out their functions in Chile.  
The code also established that in order to act as Port Operator or Stevedoring Company, 
they would require a written mandate by a Ship-owner, Consignor, Shipper, General 
Agent or Shipping Agent expressly stating that this mandate could be made by public or 
private writing, telex, fax or any other means of writing.  
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In the same manner, the Code stated that relations between the Operator and its clients 
would be ruled by the corresponding service agreements and only as a substitute or in 
the absence of these, would the merchant mandate rulings set out in the same Code for 
commercial acts be applied.  
In these matters it is important to highlight that under the current ruling the Port Operators 
are defined as Shipping Companies, Quay Companies or Shipping Agents, and states 
that they are the Chilean natural persons or legal bodies who will carry out the total or 
partial work of cargo movement between vessels and port premises or land transport and 
vice versa.  
It is also set out that these Agents represent their clients before the maritime authority 
and port administrations and can offer services of loading and unloading and all the other 
duties connected to the loading and unloading of ships and naval artefacts, including the 
functions of consolidating and deconsolidating containers within port premises and 
generally carrying out all the actions related to cargo movement between ships and land 
transport, including intermediate operations that must be carried out in the ports and on 
the ships, either while docked or in the bay, such as piling, stacking, horizontal and 
vertical movements, deposits, storing, etc.  
In general, these Agents, apart from being registered with the Maritime Authority, must 
declare their capital and give a guarantee, even though these requirements which were 
expressly detailed have been difficultto verify in the practice.This has allowed them to be 
substituted by nominal capital declarations as the law does not require a set amount of 
capital in order to operate. On the other hand, the guarantees that can be quantified by a 
calculating table, which depends of the average number of workers used on the jobs, are 
allowed to be substituted by insurance policies. All of these, facilitate the access to the 
sector to any interested person and leaves an opening for inexperienced, unprepared 
companies with no financial backup or human resources to offer services; such would be 
unscrupulous people operating with a fictitious office and nominal capital and were 
commonly called “Briefcase Enterprises”; they were liable to disappear from the market 
as and when their proprietor desired, generally after some disloyal competitive act that 
only brought disrepute to the system and mistrust among users.  
1.2.11. OPTIONS POSED AND APPLIED IN THE LABOR REFORM.  
In the development of the port modernization process in Chile one of the most delicate 
aspects to be covered has been the problem of work relationship, not only due to the 
social and political effects, but also because specialized human resources are basic 
elements of any port system. 
It is clear that we can have a port with modern infrastructure and equipment and state of 
the art technology, but if we don’t have adequate personnel, technically trained to operate 
it, nothing will be gained from such installations and the port will continue to be inefficient 
and of no interest to the users.  
This is, no doubt, a critical point in all modernizing process, and in the Chilean case it 
certainly was and what is more important, it continues to be so.  
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The main criticism to the system was not only centred on the proliferation of the port 
labour rules, but also on the inflexibility of the collective bargains, negotiated by the 
Maritime Chamber and the COMACH 
 
1.2.12.SUCCESS AND MAIN DIFFICULTY FACTORS IN THE LABOR REFORM.  
The First Stage of the reform (1981-1985). 
The monopolistic rulings, formally mentioned, were ended by the passing of Law 18.032 
that was put into force in September of 1981, resulting in the following immediate effects: 
The Government cancelled the registration of 3,500 workers and 2,400 supply workers 
with a compensation of 50 million US dollars put an end to the collective bargains and to 
restrictions on the use of work force in the ports.  
The new labour scheme permitted the following: 
a) That the employer could choose personnel freely. 
b) That the employer could send the actual number of men required for the job in hand.  
c) That the registration system was abolished and work opportunities were opened to 
anyone.  
d) That the employer ceased to be obliged to request personnel from the authorized 
syndicates and was able to hire non syndicate employees.  
e) That wages ceased to be fixed by the National Labour Conventions and were freely 
agreed between each company and its workers.  
f) A triple shift system of 7.5 hours each was set up and hence working the ports for 22.5 
hours a day and 365 days a year.  
Moreover, the reduction of the EMPORCHI personnel was carried out through a series of 
incentives of voluntary redundancy, early retirement and justified dismissal with a right to 
special compensation. 
Once these changes were in place, a free hiring and free work planning stage was 
initiated bringing with it a significant increase of port efficiency based principally on the 
freedom of employment between employers and workers, who would negotiate their work 
conditions, wages, benefits, etc.  
Unfortunately, this employment freedom soon turned into licentiousness, with no minimal 
wage limits or basic work conditions, this generated a system with a serious social 
problem and the port workers wages were substantially reduced to less than 20% of what 
they received with the old system.  
This situation produced serious difficulties, and four years later, in 1985, there was a 
violent reaction on behalf of the workers that almost left the Chilean ports at a standstill.  
The Second Stage. (1986-1989). 
Since the standstill in November 1985, part of the business sector, basically the traditional 
established companies with largest turnovers, changed the labour rulings conventionally 
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and agreed a new system with groups of workers based on the setting up of so called 
Work Pools. 
This system comprised the unification of the personnel administration departments of 
groups of shipping companies, and then the selection of a certain number of workers that 
would offer joint services under pre-established work and wage conditions, giving certain 
work stability to about 40% of the casual port workers.  
However, the other 60% of workers could only get a few work shifts a month, working 
occasionally for smaller companies of the sector, and continued to insist on the need of 
work protection rules.  
Unfortunately, during the length of this period, the Authority did not apply its inspection 
faculties and the system continued with evident abuse of the workers by many employers.  
The Third Stage (1989-1990). 
This unstable situation continued for two years during which the difficulties continued due 
to an excessive offer of work force and a merciless competition between Shipping 
Companies, all of which was worsened by the lack of supervision on behalf of the 
Government Authorities.  
During this period, the companies with larger turnover, aware of the system’s lack of 
stability, began perfecting their employment mechanisms and started to substitute the 
Work Loads with other employment forms by creating their own Work Force Providing 
Companies that were separate from the Shipping Companies.  
Within this scheme, the new work force providing companies selected casual workers 
who were given a long term contract, with a fixed basic wage and an additional 
productivity bonus for each shift worked.  
This system began working quite well and certain stability was achieved, the workers 
began once again to form syndicates but this time, within each company. This allowed 
them to negotiate collective bargains; however, they were now separated by companies 
and by ports.  
Despite this improvement, the medium and smaller companies continued employing 
casual workers per shift and continued to bring new workers to the sector, with a lack of 
control and benefits for the workers and the system, in such a way that the excess in 
work force offer was maintained.  
This system began a new competition between the large and medium companies, as the 
latter were able to reduce costs due to their mechanism of only employing casual workers 
by shift and not offering them any access to collective bargaining, thus securing the bids 
of various cargos that were given to the best bidder by the users who sought to reduce 
the costs of integral port services.  
This was the situation in March 1990, when full democracy was reassumed by the new 
Government.  
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The Fourth Stage (1990-1993). 
In view of this new scenario, the workers began to request changes in the labour 
legislation to the democratic government, and bipartite commissions of businesses and 
worker began studying a Frame Agreement of new employment relations.  
The major companies, through the Maritime and Port Chamber, joined the workers and 
began to stress the need for change and presented a model based on a system called 
“Work Place Provision Agreement”, which would have a minimum number of permanent 
job places paid by port operators and thus reduce the possibility of individual casual 
workers, therefore giving the system more stability. 
This model wouldbenefit the companies directly, with larger turnover of ships per month 
and reduced competition from the medium and smaller companies which could not 
absorb the higher cost of the work force.  
In February 1991, the Frame Agreement was endorsed by the labour sector, the great 
majority of the companies, the trade unions and the Labour Ministry of President Aylwin’s 
government.  
The basic lines of the new system were confirmed in this document, where the 
Government agreed to pass a bill before Congress that would turn the conditions of this 
agreement into a law. 
The Agreement set out the modelwhichguaranteed workers selected by an employer, a 
certain number of working shifts. These shifts should be agreed between the companies 
and the workers selected, either members or not of a port syndicate. 
These agreements could be renewed every three months and thanks to them a national 
training and work retraining programme was given, and precise means of inspection 
introduced to avoid disloyal competition.  
The objective of the Agreement was to promote a more stable system for the workers and 
reduce the number of workers, and therefore the work force offer. These aims would be 
reached only as a result of the labour market rather than by enforcing legal rulings or 
other artificial administrative measures.  
Moreover, the upper end of the business sector agreed to increase the number of 
permanently employed workers and reduce the casual workers that were used in the 
work loads.  
This scheme was supported by all parties, workers and businesses; however, the bill was 
delayed for a long period in the National Congress and was only passed and put in force 
in December 1993 as Law Nº19.250 that introduced reforms to the Labour Code, 
including the port sector. 
It is worth highlighting that although the law set out clear rulings; the shift guarantee wage 
was set very low, only giving a legal minimal wage every three months that only 
amounted to approximately US$34 per month, in current terms.  
On top of this modification to the Agreement, was the added fact that the employers, who 
had verbally agreed to increase the permanent workers, changed their position and did 
not employ more workers and finally the Government, which had set strict inspection 
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rules, never passed the corresponding ruling nor made sure that the inspecting 
organisms applied them.  
The Fifth Stage (1993 to date). 
As can be seen, the labour problem has not been solved, and what is worse, the 
business sector that promoted the law and did not fulfilit’s promise of increasing 
permanent work places is currently dismissing permanent workers and substituting them 
with casual workers with “Work Place Provision Conventions” that due to the low minimal 
wage set by the Government, are cheaper than workers with fixed basic wages, 
production bonuses and access to collective negotiations.  
This makes the process to continue to be uncertain and leads to a high spirited work 
force that can bring serious complications, as has been seen during mobilizations and 
standstills by port workers in the ports of Valparaiso, San Antonio and Talcahuano, 
following the implementation of the second stage of state port company modernization; 
this included the concession to the private sector of the berthing sites under a mono 
operator concessionary agent system, allowing all operations to be carried out and the 
infrastructure managed by a sole company.  
1.2.13. ACHIVEMENTS AND RESULTS REACHED.  
As can be appreciated by the information described, the Chilean modernization process 
in its first stage since 1981 to date, has mainly consisted of the incorporation of the 
private sector into port operations, opening the possibility of free competition within the 
ports, where shipping companies must adjust to market rules and where performance has 
increased and costs have decreased, all of which have been of substantial benefit to the 
country.  
In this section are highlighted the cargo movement and performance indicators.  
A. Cargo movement in the Port of Valparaiso. 
In order to make some comparative analysis, it is important to show the evolution of cargo 
movement in the port, with before and after indicators regarding reforms on imports, 
exports, traffic and coasting trade: 
Movement of cargo before reforms: 
1960   887.343  Tons 
1978 1.658.163 Tons 
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B. Performance:  
In the same manner, the performance of the most relevant cargos in 1980 was at the 
following levels:  
Copper Bars 80 Ton/hour/hatch 
Fruit  20 Ton/hour/hatch 
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Source: EMPORCHI, 1999 
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General Cargo 30 Ton/hour/hatch 
General Container 
Cargo  
73 Ton/hour/hatch 
Fishmeal in bags  18 Ton/hour/hatch 
C. Costs: 
The port costs of these same cargos were as follows: 
Copper Bars 9,00 US$  by ton 
Fruit 0,62 US$  by ton  
General Cargo  8,00 US$  by ton 
Fishmeal in bags  16,00 US$  by ton 
Cargo movement and performance indicators after the reforms: 
Cargo movement in ports sustained a permanent growth with the implementation of the 
explained reforms. This has reinforced the openness of the economic model to foreign 
trade and increased competition between shipping companies.  
It is of interest to highlight some key years in cargo movement in the analysed ports, 
reflected in the first year of the reforms, the first year of the return to democracy and 
some years after: 
1981 2.188.793 tons 
1990 3.501.447 tons 
1995 4.621.730 tons 
1997 4.666.812 tons 
2003 5,103,507 tons 
 
With regards to container movement, this reached the following numbers:  
1981 87.274  TEU´s 
1990 130.753  TEU´s 
1995 241.910  TEU´s 
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1997 271.730  TEU´s 
2003 319,368 TEU´s 
                Source: Valparaiso Port Enterprise. 
 
Indicator North 
America 
Europe LA World Valparaiso San 
Antonio 
TEU/mtb
erth line  639 868 907 1,109 1,500 1,389 
TEU/ 
Gantry 82,476 111,048 124,521 129,295 186,035 177,974 
TEU/ 
Hectare 10,774 21,150 31,638 26,015 63,754 36,950 
Source: Global Container Terminal Operator, 2012, Drewry 
Regarding performance and the significant increase in port efficiency, for the first 5 years, 
since 1986, the following data of the most significant foreign trade cargoes stand out:  
Copper Bars  From 80 increased to 
100  Tons/hour/hatch 
Fruit From 20 increased to 30   
Tons/hour/hatch 
General Cargo  From 30 increased to  
35  Tons/hour/hatch 
General Containerized 
Cargo 
From 73  increased to 
140  Tons/hour/hatch 
Fishmeal in bags From 18 increased to 21  
Tons/hour/hatch 
Copper Bars  From 80 increased to 
100  Tons/hour/hatch 
Fruit From 20 increased to 30   
Tons/hour/hatch 
General Cargo  From 30 increased to  
35  Tons/hour/hatch 
General Containerized 
Cargo 
From 73  increased to 
140  Tons/hour/hatch 
Fishmeal in bags From 18 increased to 21  
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Tons/hour/hatch 
 
On the other hand, the port costs for those same cargos decreased by 1986 to the 
following: 
Copper Bars  From 9,00 US$  per  ton down to US$ 
5,5 
Fruit From  0,62 US$  per ton down to US$ 
0,23 
General Cargo  From  8,00 US$  per ton down to 
US$2,50 
Fishmeal in bags From 16,00 US$  per ton down to 
US$9,20 
With regards to performance and the increase of port efficiency on 2000was: 
Copper Bars  120 
Tons/hour/hatch 
Fruit  62  
Tons/hour/hatch 
General Loose Cargo   40  
Tons/hour/hatch 
General Containerized Cargo  220 
Tons/hour/hatch 
Fishmeal in bags  30  
Tons/hour/hatch 
Moreover the port costs of those same cargos decreased and are currently the following: 
Copper Bars  3,51 US$  per ton 
Fruit 0,22 US$  per ton  
General Loose 
Cargo  
2,30 US$  per ton 
Fishmeal in bags  8,02 US$  per ton  
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General performance in cargo/fruit, currently:  
Fruit season time  90 days 
Berth occupation rate  70% 
Performance in 1980 800/tons/day/berth  
Performance in 1997 2.000/tons/day/berth 
Tons of fruit in 1997 1.170.000 tons 
With these performance parameters in 1980, 24 berths would be needed to move the 
fruit.  
With the 1997 performance, only 10 berths were needed.  
Also, if we apply to the foreign trade data moved by sea in 1997 (excluding bulk liquids), 
the cost savings per ton that have been indicated, the results are the following benefits to 
the country by means of annual port cost savings: 
PRODUCT THOUSANDS 
TONS 
SAVINGS  x 
TON 
SAVINGS x 
YEAR 
FISHMEAL 663 5,8 3.671.000 
FRUIT 1.298 26,0 33.748.000 
WOOD 2.898 3,0 8.694.000 
PULP/PAPER 2.110 5,5 11.605.000 
SEMI ELAB COPPER 2.189 3,5 7.592.000 
OTHER GENERAL 
CARGO 
7.595 7,1 54.456.000 
SOLID BULK 25.123 1,4 35.926.000 
TOTALS 41.826 3,05 155.692.000 
Source: Chilean Maritime Chamber (1997). 
These figures show that the country has reduced its costs by more than US$155 million 
per year that no doubt has opened the way for new export products that were not cost 
effective due to high port costs.  
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1.3. SOCIAL IMPACT OF PORT RESTRUCTURING. SITUATION IN THE PORT OF 
VALPARAISO. 
Most of the state ports do not operate in a competitive climate, because they have been 
isolated from market forces, either by means of decrees, government policies or 
rulings.The possibilities of progressive improvement in productivity and efficiency 
regarding costs through adopting new technologies, better work rules and money 
incentive plans, are at best limited, which has a negative effect on productivity, costs, 
work relations and operation levels and has caused market benefits and disadvantages 
not to be taken into consideration at decision making time. However, the historic 
justifications of state control and ownership of the ports have been so solid that the 
participation of the private sector in installations and port services has encountered strong 
resistance from the port administrators and workers, the military sector and other superior 
groups, which consider that state port monopolies are necessary and desirable, and they 
consider that such participation in the public ports would not only alter the balance of 
economic, political and social privileges, but also would become a serious threat to the 
benefits they receive and  to their own professional targets.  
The main consequence of the restructuring of the Port of Valparaíso reflected in the 
social aspect is on the companies that offer services within the ports. Although they are 
private and can enter and leave at will, according to the type of work offered,If 
concessions are given, the port would be mono-operated and therefore the other private 
port operators would not have access to the concession terminal.  This brings direct 
consequences to the port workers.  
The advantages of carrying out a franchising are many. The main ones being the benefits 
in installations and port services: they are a source of additional funds to finance port 
projects, and a means of reducing exploitation costs and incrementing productivity; the 
development of technology, the innovation and investment in this area; the commercial 
advantages and the competition generated in relation to other ports of Latin America are 
indisputable. 
The protest of the port workers in view of the possible redundancy this would provoke 
have has taken the workers to suggest to the Government the need of finding 
agreements that will not be detrimental for them in the franchising process.  
 
Port Workers Petition. 
The points considered by the workers as undividable are grouped in a technical area and 
an economic one. The first concerns the port credential, the inspection according to the 
new system in place in the ports because of the modernization, and a modern and equal 
training scheme for all port workers left within the system. The other is related to 
compensations and early retirement for those who will be forced to leave the port work. 
Only one of these points was accepted by the Government Commission. This was in 
article 133 that states that in order to carry out maritime port work, it is necessary to go 
through a training course given by any recognized training institute. In this aspect, the 
leaders of the sector identified a serious deficiency, as they were only fulfilling part of the 
law.  
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Due to the fact that the negotiations and petitions with the Government have not lead to 
agreements with the port workers, the latter have carried out total and partial stoppages 
(respecting shifts), in protest and for national and international recognition of their 
situation if the franchising were to occur. The workers are supported by the Central 
Workers Union (CUT), and the International Transport Federation (ITF). 
The costs of these stoppages are economic, but not tangible; moreover, they can be 
associated with Chilean ports and give an international impression of unstable ports, thus 
generating considerable damage to foreign trade.  
The Government and the workers must find a way of minimizing the consequences of this 
change, which is inevitable, in lieu of economic and technological development for the 
country. Should this change not come into effect, the Chilean maritime sector would be at 
a commercial and technological disadvantage with regards to similar Latin American 
ports. 
Social Costs 
Not withstanding the excellent economic results mentioned above, the workers have 
suffered a high social cost, which can be quantified by the following results: 
From a total of 25,000 Permanent, Supply and Pinchero workers through out the country 
in 1981, today near 5,000 currently work in the ports.  
The average wage per man/shift was US$188.04 in 1981, today’s average wage is only 
US$45.75 
From a total of social benefits that increased the workers wages by 46.68%, today only a 
few workers with permanent employment have additional benefits that do not amount to 
more than 16%.  
The Government paid the supply workers in 1981 a total of US$50 million in 
compensation.  
In the same way, during the second stage in 1998, the Government paid the State 
workers from EMPORCHI compensation amounting to US$84.16 million.  
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CHAPTER II. POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS. 
2.1. IMPORTANCE OF CREATING AN ADECUATE POLICY FOR THE 
 COUNTRY’S OBJECTIVE. 
2.1.2.MARITIME TRANSPORT AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. 
An important obstacle exists when trying to determine the total contribution of maritime 
transport on the Balance of Payment. About one third of the world’s tonnage is 
transported under flags of convenience. The services that this tonnage lends to 
international trade are registered as debit in the balance of payments statistics in the 
countries that use them. On the other hand, corresponding credit is not allocated, 
because the flag of the State considers the companies that possess and manage these 
fleets as extraterritorial entities. 
Consequently, by comparing the maritime trade contribution to the balance of payments 
of both developed and developing countries to the gains of developed countries, 
unallocated credits must be added, because it is the citizens of these countries that are 
the principal owners and beneficiaries of open license tonnage. 
In2000, the payments for freight were approximately $155 billion dollars compared with 
US$ 45 billion dollars in 1980, and contributed to the present disequilibrium of the trade 
balance and, as a consequence, to the debt problems of developing countries. 
However, when the potential contribution of a national fleet to the balance of payments 
is evaluated, one should bear in mind that, although the total freight paid to the national 
company in the country’s foreign trade represents a gross savings (earnings) in foreign 
currency, its overall effect on the balance of payments will be considerably inferior and 
will depend on the amount of services rendered by the national company, both national 
cargo services or as a cross trader. The most important expenditures of foreign 
currency that result from maritime transport activities are the financing costs of ships 
bought abroad, fuel expenses and port costs. 
As a result, the saving of foreign currency varies from country to country, and available 
figures oscillate between 10% and 70% of net earnings as a result of various factors. 
Therefore, even beginning with a prudent calculation in which only 30% of gross foreign 
currency savings represent an effective net savings, developing countries could reduce 
their foreign currency outflows by approximately $7 billion dollars, if they could divert 
towards national carriers half of those resources that are set aside for paying foreign 
carrier companies. 
Nonetheless, there are some examples like the Chilean case, where the economic 
deregulation of the shipping sector in 1980 (i.e. abolishing the fiscal exemption to 
national or Chilean owned companies and opening the trade to foreign ship-owners) 
openedthe national shipping market to free competition and thereforepermitted the 
entrance of international competitors. The main effect of this was a55% reduction of the 
Chilean flag fleet, and because of this and other reasons, in the next decade the freight 
rate was reduced up to 50 % in southbound and up to 65 % in northbound trips. 
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Comparative freight rate between 1992 and 2015: 
TEU Container 
Freight Rate in 
a Liner Ship 
Distance 1992 2004 2015 
Hamburg to 
Valparaiso (with 
households) 
7,831 US$ 
3,400 
US$ 
1,500 
US$ 
1,385 
Hamburg to 
Cartagena de 
Indias 
4,943 US$ 
4,500 
US$ 
1,650 
US$ 
1,300 
Source: Information from Chilean port operator AGUNSA and Schenker 
Logistic Operator 2015. 
In order to maintain and, if possible, improve their position in world maritime transport, 
developing countries should plan a coherent maritime transport policy, not only at a 
national level, but also at a sub-regional or regional level. This policy should aim 
towards establishing cooperation bases at an operational level and towards assuring 
competition, in the long term, to developing country carrier companies and avoid 
wasteful spending of resources that are in short supply. However, in that which refers to 
planning and application strategy of this coherent policy, it is recommended that a 
relatively prudent focus be adopted.  
According to past experience (70´s to 90´s) in shipping and ports, most of International 
Organization recommendations on economic matters have been impracticable in the 
long run; this, because of their orientation towardsstate control of economic and 
operational issues when world business was moving towards deregulation and leaving 
such issues to the private sector. Policy makers must be in contact with the industry day 
to day and work close to the industry sectors. An imposed policy could result in being 
impracticable. 
What really is imperative is the need to improve national plans and policies in order to 
create necessary liaisons. The institutional requirements needed to formulate and apply 
these policies have been complied with, to a certain extent, in developing countries. 
2.1.3. DEVELOPING COUNTRY PROBLEMS IN THE CREATION OF A MARITIME 
TRANSPORT POLICY. 
2.1.3.1. Distribution of world trade and maritime transport. 
The distribution among groups of countries of world maritime transport activities 
continues to be unequal and notably contrasts with the respective participation of these 
countries in world trade. The important participation of developing countries as a group 
in world trade has made it so that, due to its access to independence, these countries 
follow an active maritime transport policy. 
This policy can be summarized into two objectives: firstly, protect national cargo owners 
by creating a fair balance between their interests and those of the ship-owners; and 
 43 
secondly, encourage the establishment and expansion of national merchant fleets. 
These two objectives were not followed simultaneously. 
In the beginning, maritime transport policy was directed in a general manner to 
commercial aspects; for example, the protection of ship-owners interests. Later, a 
second element was added, the matter of development, as the answer to structural 
problems that came about from industry, as well as comprehension that a policy that 
does not try to establish a minimum of direct control over maritime transport services 
cannot render satisfactory results. 
2.1.3.2.Commercial practices. 
The commercial conditions convened in a sales contract determine the rights of the 
buyer or seller to carry out necessary transport arrangements. The most frequent 
arrangements are:  "Free on Board"(FOB) or similar which estipulate that the buyer is 
responsible for organizing the transport and “Cost and Freight" (CFR) or similar where 
the seller undertakes the task of organizing transport. 
The election of commercial terms influences in a decisive manner, the capacity of any 
country to participate in the transport of their foreign trade merchandise. Although it is 
not possible to define the customary guidelines of the conditions applied in maritime 
trade generally, there is no doubt that in bulk trade, whether it be liquid or dry cargo, it is 
possible to observe a systematic tendency in which developing countries are obliged to 
accept the FOB conditions for their exports and the CFR for their imports. This situation 
impedes them from initiating export activities of raw materials that could allow them to 
diversify their economic ventures and thereby reduce their dependence on the exclusive 
production of raw materials. 
This tendency of imposing unfavourable trade conditions which result from power 
differences between businessmen of developed countries and those of developing 
countries, as well as from the considerable participation of trans-national companies in 
bulk trade, has frequently being doubted. This was largely confirmed by research 
carried out on a worldwide scale concerning dry cargo trading during the beginning of 
the eighties (UNCTAD, Review on Maritime Transport, 1992-1997). 
According to information received from the importers of nearly 80% of the world trade 
flow of crude oil, a group of experts in the transport of liquid hydrocarbons determined 
that, according to available data, 76% of the volume of these currents was under FOB 
conditions, where transport was the responsibility of the buyers, and that, in general, 
originated from developed countries.  Additionally, according to available data, 47% of 
imports resulted to be operations between affiliated companies. Another group of 
experts of the UNCTAD pointed out a similar tendency in the application of FOB 
conditions in the principal markets of dry bulk cargo (i.e., iron ore, phosphates, bauxite, 
aluminium) of interest for developing countries that export such cargo. In these markets, 
the percentage of FOB contracts fluctuate between 80% and 94%, corresponding to 
phosphates and bauxite respectively. 
2.1.2.4. Customizing services. 
In order for any type of maritime transport service, particularly a regular shipping line, to 
be adequate for maintaining and/or developing relevant trade, it is imperative that some 
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minimum requirements be met that pertain to transit time, frequency and regularity of 
trips, the type of vessel being used and the availability of services for all the cargo that 
is being transported. Even though it is logical that differences of opinions exist between 
the providers and the users of maritime transport services in that which constitutes 
"adequate service", in general terms, one must suppose that "adequate service" can 
only be the one whose quality assures an orderly development of trade between 
concerned countries. This level of quality should be decided for each commercial route 
after rigorous and effective consultation between ship-owners and users. 
In practice, however, shipping conferences, acting as monopolistic factions for each 
trade in discussion, have frequently refused to hold meetings concerning these matters 
and have arbitrarily and unilaterally decided on types of services, frequency of trips, etc. 
In developing countries, in particular, no prior effort was made to discuss matters 
concerning service characteristics, because, among other reasons, the Maritime 
Administration is not strong, giving way to inadequate services and therefore worsening 
port congestion problems. 
2.1.2.5.Transport costs, included are the level and structure of freights. 
In addition to the considerations regarding the quality of services, the level and structure 
of freight also have crucial importance on trade. In international trade, transport costs 
basically have the same protection effect as customs tariffs and constitute a decisive 
factor in determining a country’s export potential. In view that the principal export 
merchandise of developing countries is transported in regular shipping liners, the 
relationship between the freight of these liners and the prices of determined products 
constitute a representative sample of freight expenses that developing countries face 
and, as a consequence, indicate the repercussions of these expenses in the 
competition of developing countryexports in foreign markets. 
The cost of maritime transport services also has a very important effect on the industry 
of developing countries, particularly in the recently formed manufacturing industries 
established for elaborating imported raw materials with the object of producing 
manufactured or partially manufactured export products by taking advantage of 
relatively low costs for labour and fiscal policies. Such industries are only viable whilst 
the costs and transport difficulties do not have an adverse effect on the economic 
advantages of using local labour force. 
In addition to the effects of maritime transport on trade and industry, developing 
countries are affected by the level of freight rates, since they are accustomed to having 
to pay the cost of freights for their imports as well as their exports. If the level of freight 
rates increases, generally these countries will have to pay more for their imports and 
their manufacturers usually receive less for merchandise that is sold in foreign markets. 
In the case of Latin America, this situation is very clear in Central American countries, 
where its predominant market is USA and the freight rate of a TEU from USA to Central 
America, sometimes could be more or at least similar to one coming from USA to Chile 
(three time distance) generating competitive advantages for those cargoes coming from 
countries with lower freight rates.  
The problems developing countries havehad by the level and structure of freight rates 
are closely related to the existence and mechanisms of the maritime conference 
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system. This system (created to eliminate price competition among its members), taking 
advantage of its monopolistic power, has adopted unilateral procedures and 
determination of freight rates. In various international meetings, developing countries 
have manifested their opinion that some of the practices adopted by the maritime 
transport conferences have resulted in being damaging to trade and for their 
development. The grievances of developing countries concerning the conference 
system in that which refers to the level and structure of freight rates has been 
concentrated in the following aspects: 
 a)  Arbitrary imposition of freight rates, for example: 
i)  General increases and the level of freight rates; 
 ii)  Fixation of determined freight rates; 
iii)  Absence of freight rates and promotion, and 
 b)  Loyalty agreements and unfairness of obligations. 
The scepticism of developing countries towards the conference system, which has 
continuously stirred up complaints, is also largely due to the secret that surrounds the 
establishment of freight rates by the conferences and other policies. Undoubtedly, the 
mysteriousness in which the system has worked has given way to a considerable 
amount of alienation. However, the majority of the users and ship-owners of developing 
countries look at the conference system as a necessity or at least the lesser of two evils 
where instability of freight rates and irregularity of services are concerned. 
The problem of unilateralism and the lack of transparency in the determination of freight 
rates was hoped to be overcome, or at least appeased, by institutionalizing the 
consultation procedures between ship-owners and users. However, the users of 
developing countries complain that the "meetings" held by the shipping conferences are 
of a superficial character. One of the complaints is that the conferences hold their "real" 
negotiations with trade spokespersons of developed countries, and elude the 
consultation procedures concerning basic freight rates as that this is the reason for 
increasing surcharges on the prices of fuel and for adjustment factors in exchange 
rates, where they frequently apply formulas, that according to the users, are 
incomprehensible. 
2.2. FORMULATION OF MARITIME POLICY IN EMERGENT ECONOMIES. 
2.2.1. OUTLINE FOR A MARITIME TRANSPORT POLICY. 
2.2.1.1.Theoretic outline and definitions. 
A policy is a group of definitions formulated by the government of a nation in order to 
explicitly express the government’s field of action in specific matters, in conformity to 
philosophic concepts which is inspired in a political, economic and social model. 
Maritime transport policies are therefore the application of these philosophical concepts 
to water transport activitieswith the purpose of regulating their operation, economic 
efficiency and harmonic development, in national as well as international settings, 
considering the present external realities and its foreseeable trends. 
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The maritime transport policy should be the government’s formulation of thecourse of 
action to be taken by the State and its institutions in the area of maritime, fluvial and 
lacustrine transport, as well as the necessary guideline for private sector participation. 
2.2.1.2.General considerations. 
Even though historically maritime transport has not been completely free of government 
regulation, in the past,interventions by important maritime nations largely limited 
national policy measures in order to maintain trade and military power structures. Due to 
technological and organizational development of maritime transport in the past decades 
and the process of decolonizing, these national policies of maritime transport based on 
considerations of power have become less evident. The growing structural and 
geographic segmentation of the maritime transport market has made it more difficult, if 
not impossible, that isolated countries be able to formulate ample regulatory policies. 
At the same time, the mobility of their own vessels, the internationalization of market 
segments and the growing of multinational crews, has necessarily presented 
implementation problems of national policies, even in cases in which these policies 
were formulated for isolated sections of the market. 
Another important change that has characterized the evolution of the maritime transport 
policy refers to the actual contents of this maritime policy. Traditionally, the development 
of an active maritime transport policy has been the prerogative of the important maritime 
States and only in the past decades has the concept of maritime transport policy lost its 
unique significance as the promoter of the national maritime fleet and has expanded in 
order to take in two elements of equal importance: the already mentioned promotion of 
national maritime transport and, secondly, the protection of theuser’s interests in the 
most ample possible way. Thus, countries that are basically users of shipping services 
now have ambitions in maritime transport policy matters, a fact that has influenced 
policy considerations at both a national as well as international level. 
These elements inevitably influence the contents of the policies. The principal objective 
of the policies is to allow the industry to carry out its corresponding role in the 
international maritime trade and to encourage international trade and economic 
integration. Therefore, a maritime transport policy’s end result should be the 
establishment of a framework which allows the industry to reach a balance between real 
costs and the economic benefits it hopes for, establishing in this way the bases so that 
maritime transport services may respond to the necessities of trade and offer efficient 
services and at low cost.When these policies do not exist, trade can remain subordinate 
to transport, which introduces the danger of limiting access of national products to 
foreign markets. 
Policy considerations are not limited to maritime transport commercial aspects only, but 
also include development matters, and they should not be completely separated from 
one another. An international maritime transport policy should also allow or actively 
encourage international participation in the maritime transport sector. Bearing in mind 
existing policy limitations, both economic as well as social, the ideal objective would be 
that this policy should allow maritime transport activities to spread to those countries 
that enjoy a comparative advantage for the lending of services. 
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As an example, until 1978 Chile hada Merchant Marine Development Law, whose main 
objective was to promote a bigger national fleet passing from 400,000 GRT to 1 Million 
GRT no objective was considered on relation to cargo transported by those companies. 
After 1979 this Law changed, permitting international shipping to serve Chilean ports 
(inverse objective to the previous law). The main effect that occurred was, as indicated 
previously, a decrease of the national fleet and the re-flagging of almost 50 % of the 
Chilean owned ships into Open Registers. The most important impact though (real 
objective of the new de-regulation), was the impressive improvement of their cargo 
transport efficiency under competition, rising from 1,000,000 tons transported in Chilean 
owned ship was in 1978 to 2,000,000 tonsin 1982, and 4,000,000 tons in the year 2000, 
thus favourably reducing the freight rates ofthe country’s imports and exports 
(enormous benefit for the competitiveness of exports and lower price for the nation last 
consumer of imports). The lesson learnedwas that a country must be coherent and 
consistent with its own national economic policy and strategy, deregulating all those 
sectors which could help the national economy and the external trade and therefore 
allowing for competitive exports. 
Promotion policies and regulatory policies complement each other, even though their 
objectives are different. Exclusively applied national promotion policies assume the 
acceptation of existing market structures and are basically limited to improving the 
competitive situation of the national fleet in regard to its foreign competitors. On the 
other hand, with ample regulatory policies, the idea is to place influence on market 
structures in order to obtain a desired level of competition. In practice, it is not always 
possible to clearly distinguish between these policies. The type of policy combination 
chosen for each country depends fundamentally on two factors: the political framework 
established by the general economic policy and the capacity of each country in applying 
the formulated normative principles. 
One of the most important promotion measures that is presently applied, which also 
contains elements of protectionist policy, is the concession of direct or indirect subsidies 
to national ship-owners, fundamentally in developed countries. Even though it is 
undeniable that these normative options are justifiable by some policy considerations in 
reference to the maintenance of a minimum national fleet, the generalized concession 
of subsidies has considerable negative effects on international maritime transport 
markets creating or promoting inefficiency. This policy not only does not serve to correct 
the distortions of the maritime transport markets, but contributes considerably to 
maintain or even worsen the actual structural disproportion, because it maintains at an 
artificially high level the offer of shipping services and impedes the spreading of capital 
to other countries that enjoy a comparative and or competitive advantage in the sector.  
Additionally, it has been shown that this type of policy liberates a slew of subsidies that 
place the countries at a disadvantage, particularly in developing countries that cannot or 
do not want to participate in it. 
Other types of promotion policies exist that do not present the same prejudicial effects, 
but by all means are convenient to combine with a coherent regulatory policy, because 
a promotion measure results all the more efficient when the development of an entire 
section of maritime transport or the participation in it of a specific national fleet of the 
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actual market structures are limited. Structural problems can not be resolved by way of 
promotion policies. 
Promotion policies are frequently applied indifferently in all sectors of maritime 
transport, but regulatory policies are necessarily more selective and their applications 
have been largely limited to maritime transport by shipping liners. The mechanisms of 
the market, particularly in linershipping, has resulted to be only partially adequate for 
permitting the industry to carry out its role in the orderly development of world 
commerce. The existence of shipping conferences is usually accepted as a beneficial 
factor for trade and development, but ample consensus exists in that the system is open 
to abuse, by which it is necessary to establish a multilateral regulatory structure that 
guarantees beneficial development of trade and maritime transport services. Whatever 
policy measures are applied, the fundamental objective is to regulate two crucial 
aspects of the shipping conference system: the admission of shipping lines and the 
relationships between conferences and users. 
The basic concept underlying maritime transport regulation for shipping liners consists 
in reducing the concentration of power stimulated by the actual structure of the market, 
whether establishing the necessary frameworkso that it develops a counteracting power 
within the market or by way of an institutional neutralization of power exercised by the 
cartels of maritime transport. An example of the first method would be a greater control 
of the user’s suggestions, and the second, the creation of a supervising body that would 
specifically see to the conferences. Consequently, the fundamental objective of a 
regulatory policy should not be to reduce or eliminate competition, but to assure a 
minimum level of loyal competition when the actual forces of the market cannot 
generate it. 
The concrete objectives of the regulatory policy, also urgently makes it necessary to 
apply explicit normative measures. Bearing in mind the structural differences of the 
maritime transport market sectors, these measures have to be conceived in such a way 
that they allow the undertaking of specific problems. This necessary selectivity would 
make any attempt to introduce wide-open regulation that covers the entirety of maritime 
transport markets impracticable. There is no doubt that, both nationally and 
internationally, promotion and regulatory measures can be applied simultaneously; what 
is needed is to know at what level they can be applied more efficiently. In that which 
concerns concrete promotion policies, the answer largely depends on the exact 
formulation. On the other hand, the situation is very different in that which refers to the 
policies of regulation. As has been pointed out, their goal is to correct market 
mechanisms which are, naturally, international. As a consequence, the application of 
unilateral and uncoordinated regulatory measures will lead to new distortions in the 
market instead of a utilization of the market structures. To design the above policy, it is 
recommended to use a strategic planning methodology and model (see Picture No. 1). 
Even though, the Chilean maritime transport policy case present undoubtedly success, 
because of the specific cultural characteristicsin the country, it is not wise to be used by 
other countries. Chile apply an implicit maritime transport commercial policy (no written, 
but derived and coherent with country’s macro-economic policy) and an explicit one in 
regards to maritime safety, security and marine environmental matters model which 
works very efficiently for the Chilean market culture. 
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Currently, most of the port and maritime transport policies in the region, show deficiency 
on the evaluation in issues like: institutional, logistics, labour, port networks and IT, 
infrastructure development, competitiveness, sustainable development and economic 
regulation (Doerr at el 2011)  
2.2.3. SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS. 
2.2.3.1.Diagnostic evaluation of the country regarding immediate maritime 
surroundings. 
This evaluation will consider an analysis of the following subjects: 
- Position and geographic condition of the country; 
- Political-institutional structure; 
- Comparative advantages in regard to the resource availability and 
productive factors; 
- The country’s role within the scheme of transport, user or provider of 
services; 
- State’s level of participation in the administration of the transport chain; 
- Economic policy; 
- Tradition and knowledge of the maritime transport market, (know how); 
- Business culture; 
- Market ethic (level of corruption at private and public sectors); 
- Level and philosophy of investment in the country; 
- Predictions of events, forecasts; 
- Independence for decision-making; 
- Country’s capacity to participate with other nations; 
- Public and private collaboration in the rendering of services; 
- International agreements and standards prevailing in maritime transport, 
ratified by the country; 
- Market participation; 
- Maritime Governance (rule of law, accountability, commitment, 
institutionalism, etc.). 
2.2.3.2. Evaluation and analysis of the international maritime setting. 
This study should at least consider the following material: 
- World practices of maritime transport; 
- The world trend regarding this topic; 
- The phenomenon of regional integration and globalization; 
- Technological innovation; 
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- Ecological consciousness; 
- International regulations: 
- Market conditions (level of perfection). 
2.2.3.3. Requirements for the establishment of modern policies. 
- Political and institutional stability; 
- Institutional flexibility when faced with changes; 
- Knowledge improvement; 
- Legal framework that guarantees the competitive conditions of the market 
(rule of law); 
- Consistency with other policies (economic, labour, etc.); 
- Access to financing of investments in terms of agility and reasonable 
interest rates. 
Picture No. 1. RGB Model of Strategic Planning 
.
Source: RGB Model, own design.
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2.3. COMMERCIAL POLICY.THE CHILEAN CASE. 
During the nineties, some complementary actions to the open economy strategy, which 
had been in force since the middle of the seventies, were introduced to the Chilean 
commercial agenda. Among the new measures, the main ones were the celebration of 
commercial agreements, initially with Latin American countries, in the context of 
international regionalization and more recently, a series of negotiations and agreements 
with countries outside the region, currently more than 63 FTA have been signed mostly 
in all continents with the exemption of Africa and Russian Federation (source: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Chile, 2015). 
Throughout the last 30 years Chile has gone through a series of structural changes, 
such as an important increase in openness to and value of exports, market and product 
diversification, increase in number of exporters and decrease of the relative weight of 
the principal products, especially copper, although it still represents more than a third of 
the sales.  
With regards to the exporters, although there has been an increase in the number of 
agents participating in the process, the bulk of the activity is still concentrated in a few of 
them and the annual rates of income and expenditure of the exporting companies show 
that the continuity and consolidation of these companies is still very weak (Silva, 
200115). In the same way, though there has been a diversification of markets, there is 
still a high concentration in certain geographical areas; this makes it susceptible to the 
closing of markets as currently almost 50% of all Chilean exports are concentrated in 
only 5 countries. 
Exports to Latin America have shown an important activity that can be explained both by 
the unilateral liberalization assumed by these countries, and by the bilateral agreements 
reached with them. 
 1970 1985 1990 1995 2000 2014 
Exports 
(US$ Millions) 
1,112 3,804 8,620 15,680 19,210 76,648 
Copper % 76 47 46 41 34 47 
Markets       
Asia (ex. China) 12 19 26 35 27 25 
Europe 61 33 37 28 29 18 
Latin America 12 17 13 19 20 16 
                                            
15 Silva, Verónica: “Estrategia y Agenda comercial chilena en los años noventa” Serie Comercio 
Internacional, Número 11, CEPAL, 2001 
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NAFTA 15 24 18 16 22 15 
CHINA 0 0 0 0 2 24 
Source: Central Bank of Chile, 2015 
On the other hand, even though there is no systematic information sufficiently detailed 
on exports of services, the available indicators show a significant increase and 
diversification, and also an incipient export activity in more sophisticated areas that 
require qualified work such as data processing, telecommunications, engineering or 
health and safety services (Prieto, 199916). The investment process towards other 
countries, especially within the region, where the internationalization of local companies 
is reflected, has increased steadily since the beginning of the nineteen nineties, 
meaning that in the medium term, Chile could become an expansion platform for the 
markets of other countries.  
During the restructuring process of the last 30 years, it is possible to appreciate a 
reorientation of exports, from the natural resources towards more manufactured 
products and a very clear export diversification strategy, which during the 90’s was only 
reaching 30% to US, 25 % to Japan, 25 % to some countries in EU and rest to LA, in 
2014 almost 49% of the exports are with Asia including 24% of it with China, mainly 
covering 5 different continents. 
2.4. CHILEAN PORT MODEL. 
The importance of port, road and telecommunications infrastructure for the economies 
that take part in the globalized trade is fundamental. In Chile’s particular case it takes on 
an even greater importance, not only due to the distance of the export markets (NA, EU, 
Asia and Australasia) for its products, but also due to its particular geography of the 
country. 
Chile has 91 ports, of which 77 are in the hands of private investors and 14 are 
autonomous state owned17. The volume of cargo transported has increased by 63% 
between 1991 and 2001, when a total of 55.9 million of metric tons were transported 
through Chilean ports, this represented nearly 85% of Chilean foreign trade. Investment 
in infrastructure has increased from US$270 million in 1990 to more than US$1500 
million in 2002, including the contribution of the concessionary system.   
  
                                            
16Prieto, Francisco (1999), Chile y el GATS 2000, hacia la liberalización efectiva del comercio servicios. 
Propuestas para la acción. DIRECON/ Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Santiago, Diciembre 1999. 
 
17DIRECTEMAR, BoletínEstadísticoMarítimo, 2015 
 68 
Table1: Table - TEUThroughputby Area of Influence, data period 2012 - 2014 
Ports  2012 2013 2014 
Arica  182,039 204,174 216,392 
Iquique  245,290 244,565 240,823 
Antofagasta  134,162 148,973 167,266 
Valparaiso  942,647 910,780 1,010,202 
San Antonio  1,069,271 1,196,844 1,093,625 
Lirquen  143,635 126,244 106,438 
Coronel  167,682 394,070 521,527 
San Vicente  585,280 453,174 475,164 
Source: ECLAC, Maritime Profile, 2015. 
 
Beginning of the Chilean Port Model  
Up until 1981, the Chilean state administrated and operated all the public ports of the 
country through the Chilean Ports Enterprise (EMPORCHI). The high port costs and the 
inefficiency of the system led to the abolition, in 1981, of the monopoly held by 
EMPORCHI for the unloading of merchandise, and also the special licenses held by the 
shipping companies. A multi-operator system was introduced to the ports and licenses 
were given to private companies to carry out their services in public ports, subject to 
meeting minimal standards of quality, also trade union pressures and abuses were 
eliminated that affected port competitiveness. The changes were such that the cargo 
handled by the public ports increased from 22 million tons in 1979 to 66 million in 1998, 
without significant infrastructure investments during this time, demonstrated by the 
following graph. Together with the improvements in efficiency, the reforms brought 
reductions in port costs and these continued to be low and competitive to the end of the 
nineteen nineties.  
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Graph 1: Movement in Chilean ports, 1979 – 1998 
 
 
Fuente: BID, Estudio sobre reestructuración portuaria - Impacto Social, 
2002http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubB-2001S_1684.pdf 
Not withstanding the initial success of these measures, the scheme did not encourage 
investment in equipment; neither did it set the conditions for maintaining and 
construction of new port infrastructure, this continued to be the responsibility of the state 
that didn’t have the necessary resources to invest in such ventures. The need grew 
considerably due to the enormous increase of foreign trade during the export boom of 
the eighties and nineties. As a result, in 1997 Law 19,542 on Port Modernization was 
passed, through which the 10 state owned ports managed by EMPORCHI were 
transformed into autonomous enterprises. This measure was aimed at incorporating an 
active participation of the private sector in operations, cargo transfer and investment in 
berthing sites, allowing a reduction in port costs and improvement of the precarious 
existing infrastructure. By means of the same law, the state and the port 
concessionaries have generated new public areas for recreational, tourist and 
commercial activities, leading to new integration opportunities with the city, the sea front 
and the port activity.  
The concessions are given for a period of 15 to 20 years, with the possibility of 
extending them to a maximum of 30 years. The concessions in the ports of San Vicente, 
San Antonio, Valparaíso and Iquique began functioning in the year 2000. The 
simultaneous franchising of the three main ports turned out to be so attractive that four 
of the five largest companies in the world, including Hamburger Hafen und Lagerhous 
(HHLA); SSA Holding International, Mersey Docks and Harbour Company, International 
Container Terminal Services, Hutchinson International Port Holding Ltd, P&O Australia 
Ports.  
The criteria for choosing a winning consortium was to select the participant with the 
lowest minimal tariff and if there was a draw amongst them, as in fact occurred, the one 
with the highest bid, giving the government an extra income of US$300 million, that was 
used to compensate 50% of the port workers who did not continue work under the new 
concessionary scheme, through a series of provisional, training and work reinsertion 
measures. If these measures were fully carried out the cost would amount to 
approximately US$30 million. In addition, the government receives US$16.3 million 
 ‐
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annually from tax and the concessionaries hold US$380 million in assets most of which 
would be handed over to the Chilean State once the concession ended.  
In general terms, the franchising of the Chilean ports left three main lessons (BID, 
2002):  
a) An increase in efficiency does not necessarily require additional investments 
in physical infrastructure; 
b) Even when a multi-operator system is successful, it may not offer good 
incentives for infrastructure investment; 
c) Concessions can provide a good level of service, without incurring in huge 
investments. 
THE RESULTS. 
During the first years of running, the terminal concession to the private operators 
duplicated the transfer capacity of the traditional public ports, as shown in Table 1. It 
also changed the form of management in the autonomous public port enterprises, 
placing them under a Board of Directors, which in turn was ruled by Limited Company 
Laws. Therefore, they became liable, together with their assets, to negative results 
attributed to management. The state port administration was reoriented exclusively to 
marketing, concession control and landlord functions. 
Between the years 2000 and 2002 cargo transfer in the ports grew by 4.97%, confirming 
an increase in efficiency by the concessionaries.  
Table2: Transference Capacity, 1999 - 2002 
Concessionaire Container Transfer 
rate (Box/Hour) 
1999 2001 2002 
TPS Valparaiso 26 43 68 
STI San Antonio 26 53 75 
SVTI San Vicente 18 31 36 
ITI Iquique 18 33 36 
Source: Revista Chile Portuario, Número 13 - 2003. 
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Table 3: Top 5 TEU Ranking per LA Country 
Country 
Years 
2000 2005 2010 2013 
Brazil 2,474,127 5,608,035 6,815,554 8,683,379 
Panama 1,357,464 2,774,579 5,593,179 6,561,396 
Mexico 1,313,580 2,133,476 3,691,616 4,892,881 
Chile 1,082,359 1,854,958 3,149,300 3,821,999 
Colombia 673,461 1,198,756 2,054,894 3,124,903 
Argentina 1,189,732 1,362,739 1,992,900 2,055,489 
Source: CEPAL, Perfil Marítimo, 2014 
 
2.5. PORT NODES IN CHILE. 
2.5.1. GREATER-ANTOFAGASTA PORT SYSTEM. 
Port of Arica. 
The port of Arica is managed by the Arica Port Enterprise; it is located in the 1stRegion, 
in the province of Tarapacá, which borders with Peru to the North. It has a multipurpose 
site (Berth Site 5) with an annual transfer capacity of 3,346,000 tons and berth 4 with 
610,000 tons. It has rail links for the transport of cargoes to and from Bolivia, also 
serving neighbouring Peruvian cities.  
The port provides services with following cargo handling equipment: 
Crane 
Type 
Quantity Capacity Owner 
Mobile 
Gottwald 
2 100 Concessionaire  
Source: www.epa.cl 
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Picture 1:  Arica port terminals 
 
Source: Puerto de Arica: http://www.puertoarica.cl 
Port of Iquique. 
The port of Iquique is situated on the Northern coast of Chile, in the First Region of 
Tarapacá. The exact location is Latitude 20°11,35' S and Longitude 70°09,5' W. It 
covers 33 hectares for loading and unloading operations, storage, cargo stacking and 
all other complementary activities carried out within a port zone. It also has warehouses 
for bulk and general cargo.  
It has two terminals known as Front Nº1 “Molo” and Front Nº2 “Espigón”, each of which 
has two berthing sites with their corresponding backup areas. The main characteristic of 
the current berths is that their water depth is similar, allowing vessels of up to 9.3 
meters draught. 
Regarding the services offered by the port, although the State owns the port 
infrastructure, both fronts are run by the private sector, servicing the vessels and the 
cargo. The Molo terminal has a multi-operator system whilst the Espigón terminal, has a 
mono-operator concession held by Iquique Terminal International (ITI). 
Berth site Nº1 has a crane capacity of 12 tons with a 38 m outreach (50 tons at 13 m) 
and an electrical sub-station of 100 KVA, which provides the power for refrigerated 
containers, conveyor belts, pumps for loading liquid bulk, tugs, lighting and others. It 
also has 2 warehouses with 9,680 m2 and open areas of 5,980 m2. Front number 2 of 
the Iquique Terminal International S.A. (ITI) has 2 berthing sites that are separated by 
100 meters of backup grounds. The Espigón terminal has two state of the art quay 
cranes (Gottwald) and three conveyor belts for bulk loads. The total backup area of the 
concession to ITI covers approximately 85,000 m2. 
Crane Quantity Capacity Owner 
Mobile 
Gottwald 
5 100 Concessionaire  
Mobile 
Demag 
1 50 Concessionaire 
Source: www.iti.cl
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Picture 2: Port of Iquique 
 
Source: Puerto de Iquique; http://www.epi.cl 
Port of Antofagasta. 
The port of Antofagasta is situated in the Second Region and apart from dealing with 
cargo directly related to this region, it also serves the Mediterranean areas of North-
western Argentina by the border passes of Jama and Sico for road transport and by rail 
connections of the Antofagasta – Bolivia Railways (F.C.A.B), and Argentinean 
FERRONOR and FC BELGRANO. In the same manner, the branch-line Salta – 
Antofagasta, shared by three different companies, F.C.A.B., FERRONOR (Chilean) and 
FC BELGRANO (Argentinean), is capable of moving 200.000 tons per year. 
The Antofagasta port has an outer harbour called Portezuelo, situated 33 kms.to the 
northeast of the city of Antofagasta, designed for the collection and storage of bulk 
minerals, this cargo is then transported in hooded lorries to the port for loading. 
Portezuelo has a direct railway access to and from Bolivia, and direct rail and road links 
to the Port of Antofagasta. 
 
Crane 
Type 
Quantity Capacity Owner 
Mobile 
Gottwald 
3 100 Concessionaire  
Source: www.anfport.cl 
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Picture 3: Port of Antofagasta 
 
Picture 4: Port Complex Mejillones 
 
2.5.2. GRAND-VALPARAISO PORT SYSTEM. 
Port of Valparaíso. 
The Valparaíso Port Enterprise (EPV) has 8 berthing sites, coveringapproximately 50 
hectares of protected waters. The first five berths make up Terminal 1, which is 
operated under concession for a period of 20 years, extendable to 30, by a Chilean 
German Consortium made up by Inversiones Cosmos that belongs to the Von Appen 
shipping group, and Hamburger Hafen und LagerhausAktiengesellschaft (HHLA). The 
consortium operates under the name of South Pacific Terminal Valparaiso (TPSV). 
Terminals 2 and 3 are managed directly by EPV through a multi-operator system.  
Berthing sites 9 and 10 were transformed into MuelleBarón Promenade according to the 
tourist infrastructure development model being led by EPV. Additionally, the concession 
of the passenger terminal of the Port of Valparaiso is now in force, providing the 
necessary infrastructure required to handle the growing demand of cruises that is 
expected to triplicate to 70.000 tourists during 2003-2004. 
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Table4: Physical characteristics of the Port of Valparaíso 
Terminal TPS Terminal 2 
Berth Site 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Length(Mts) 142 200 229.5 230.5 107 245 125 240 
Depth(Mts) 11.4 11.4 11.4 9.39 9.39 8.5 6.19 8.80 
Source: Puerto de Valparaíso; http://www.valparaisoport.cl 
Berthing sites 1,2 and 3 have five Gantry cranes (2 Panamax and 3 Post-panamax) for 
Panamax vessels and 1 mobile crane Gottwald of 100 tons capacity. Berth 4 has a 
Hitachicrane capable of lifting 36 tons and anoutreach of 34.4 meters. 
Berth 8 has two MAN cranes, with a 5 ton lifting capacity and a 15.4 – 19.4 meters 
outreach. The mobile equipment comprises 2 Gottwald cranes, with 100 ton capacity 
and 50 meters outreach, 7 container park Top-Lifters and 12 Reach-Stacker’s.   
 
Picture 3: Terminals in the Port of Valparaiso 
 
Source: Puerto de Valparaíso; http://www.portvalparaiso.cl 
The operators working in the port of Valparaíso are: 
1. Terminal 1 is operated by South Pacific Terminal Valparaíso (TPSV) in a mono-
operator scheme.  
2. Terminal 2 is multi-operator scheme managed by the Valparaíso Port Enterprise.  
3. Terminal 3 is a passenger terminal, given in concession to the Valparaiso Passenger 
Terminal (VTP) Company. 
Picture 4: Valparaiso Development Plan 
 76 
 
 
Port of San Antonio. 
The port of San Antonio is situated in the country’s central zone, and is the port terminal 
nearest to Santiago, the capital of Chile. It serves the central zone of Chile and the 
province of Mendoza in Argentina. 
The total area covered is 271 hectares, 189 of which correspond to maritime areas and 
82 hectares to land areas. Moreover, 4.4 hectares were added in November 1999, with 
a surface regained from the sea. The maximum water depth is 12 meters. It has six 
Gantry Cranes, besides other cargo transfer equipment: two Gottwald cranes, two 
Demag cranes, one Level Luffing crane, specialized in moving solid bulk, 14 Reach 
Stacker cranes and 12 specialized container movers.  
Table3: Physical characteristics of the San Antonio Port 
 South 
Molo 
Espigón NorthernTerminal Policarpo 
Toro 
Berth Site 1-2-3 4-5 6-7 8 9 
Length (Mts) 537 341 321 200 190 
Draft (Mts) 10.3 9.2 7.1 10.4 10.1 
Source: Puerto de San Antonio; http://www.saiport.cl 
The San Antonio Port Enterprise is an autonomous State company, created by the 
1997 law, its aim is to administrate, conserve and develop the port-maritime activity 
of the San Antonio Port. It is governed by a board of Directors, named by the 
President of the Republic, and managed by a General Manager and five area 
managers.  
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Following the process of concessions in the year 2000, the San Antonio port 
comprised four terminals and a total of nine berthing sites. Two of the terminals are 
under a mono-operator system, with exclusive management and operation by the 
concessionary, also including responsibility for maintenance and development. The 
remaining two kept the multi-operator system of 1981, where a number of private 
shipping companies have access to the port offering cargo movement services. The 
management of these sites corresponds to the San Antonio Port Enterprise.  
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Picture 5: Hinterland of the San Antonio Port 
 
Source: Puerto de San Antonio, http://www.saiport.cl 
 
The operators of the San Antonio port are: 
1) The South Molo Terminal (berths 1,2,3) given in concession to the San Antonio 
International Terminal (STI), Works under the mono-operator system. 
2) The Espigón Terminal (berths 4, 5, 6 and 7) operated by many companies under the 
multi-operator system.  
3) The Northern Terminal (berth 8) specialized in solid bulk imports, is concessioned by 
Puerto Panul with a mono-operator system and Policarpo Toro Terminal (berth 9) 
specialized in liquids, has an operational contract held by Vopak Terminal San 
Antonio Ltda.  
Picture 6. Terminals in the Port of San Antonio  
 
Source: Puerto de San Antonio, http://www.sanantonioport.cc.cl 
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2.5.3. GREATER- CONCEPCION PORT SYSTEM. 
Talcahuano Port/ San Vicente. 
The Talcahuano San Vicente Port Enterprise, operates the port of Talcahuano, which 
has two berthing sites and various installations that allow timely and efficient services to 
be given to national and international clients. It also controls the concession of the San 
Vicente International Terminal S.A. (SVTI). 
Picture 7: Geographical distribution of the Talcahuano/ San Vicente Complex 
 
 
Source: Puerto Talcahuano/ San Vicente; http://www.ptotalsve.cl 
Port of Talcahuano. 
The Talcahuano port has two berthing sites and covers an area of 110,850 mts2, of 
which 92,350 mts2 correspond to the primary zone and the other 18,500 mts2 belong to 
the Malecon Blanco. This area holds installations of the Industrial Fishing Association 
(Asipes), of the Talcahuano Maritime Government and a private warehouse, all by 
means of land concessions. 
The areas destined to specific use are the following: Transference 17,750 m2; 
Conveyance 10,000 m2; Storage (2 covered warehouses) 5,267 m2; Stacking, 
consolidation/deconsolidation (parks) 33,220 m2; among other areas destined to 
services, maintenance and operation. 
Port of San Vicente. 
Set among a series of privileged natural conditions, it is only two kilometres from the 
Talcahuano Terminal. The San Vicente Terminal has three berthing sites. Its position as 
a marginal quay, allows it to offer independent attention to vessels free of interference 
from the arrival and departure, this represents an advantage with regards to the other 
ports of the area.  
The San Vicente Terminal was given in concession to San Vicente International 
Terminal S.A. (SVTI), a consortium formed by SudamericanaAgenciasAéreas y 
Marítimas and SSA Holdings International, the main port operator in the USA. The port 
and containers operation is provided with 9 mobile craneGottwald with a capacity of 100 
tons each. 
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Lirquen Port. 
Lirquén port is a multipurpose terminal, located in the Concepción bay, VIII Region of 
Chile and has road and rail access that link it to the various production centres between 
the Seventh and Tenth regions, principally related to timber, agro industrial and salmon 
industries. It covers a total area of 415,000 m2 destined to collection and storage parks, 
warehouses, workshops, administration buildings and common areas among others.  
Table4: Physical characteristics of Lirquen Port 
Pier Pier 1 Pier 2 
Berthing Site 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Length (mts) 220 210 200 160 200 200 
Draft (feet) 39.0 37.3 29.4 24.3 50.8 42.3 
Source: Puerto Lirquen; http://www.puerto.cl 
It has four mobile Liebherr cranes model LHM 400, with 100 ton capacity, which are 
used mainly for loading and unloading containers. In addition, it has three Bromma 
spreaders, model EH-5 with a 35 ton capacity. 
For the unloading of bulk, Lirquen port has a conveyor belt with a 7,200 tons/day 
capacity that is complemented by atrimmer within the hold, making efficient use of 
available space. Also, 13 bulk spades with a capacity of between 5 and 8 m3  and 11 
hoppers of 8 to 26 m3 capacity and 3 sacking plants and a fertilizer mixer plant with a 10 
to 12 fifty kilo sack per minute capacity. 
The port also has 11,448 line meters of rail sidings that link the regional rail network to 
its installations.  
Puerto Montt. 
Puerto Montt is located in the X region, in the city of the same name. It has a total area 
of 9 hectares and berthing length of 385 m divided into: Berth 1,240 m long with a 9.30 
m depth; Berth 2, 145 m long and 7.50 m deep. 
A capacity of 80 Reefer containers, 2 quay cranes with a 5 ton capacity, three with 3 ton 
capacity and one mobile crane of 23 ton and a forklift of 7.5 tons. Also, 5 ramps at 
different levels according to tidal changes and 2 buoys in the ferry terminal, 2 
warehouses of 30X125 m, Container Park, paved and unpaved collection areas, 
parking. 
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Picture 4: Puerto Montt Terminals
 
 
Source: Puerto Montt; http://www.empormontt.cl 
 
Picture 8: Chilean Commercial Ports 
Public Use Private Use 
State Port 
Enterprises 
Private 
Ports 
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Bulk Ports 
10 14 15 17 
Source: Own design with information from DIRECTEMAR, 2014  
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CHAPTER III  REGIONAL LOGISTICS. 
3.1. GENERAL CONCEPT. 
The Council of Logistics Management (CLM), define Business Logistics as the 
following: 
“ Logistics is the process of planning, implementing and controlling the efficient, 
effective, flow and storage of row material, in-process inventory, finished goods, service, 
and related information from point of origin to point of consumption  (including inbound, 
outbound, internal, and external movements) for the purpose of conforming to customer 
requirements”. 
 It is possible to derive that Maritime Transport Logistics is the process of planning, 
implementing, and controlling the efficient and effective flow, information, and storage of 
cargoes, going from point of origin to point of destination, for the purpose of fulfilling the 
clients’ requirements. 
3.2. THE LOGISTICS SYSTEM AND THE GRAPH THEORY. 
For the purpose of this research and because of the huge area covered (the Southern 
Cone, see figure 1) the author considers it is required to focus the area of study. 
According with the above a “Graph” has been designed and showed as figure 2. 
Therefore, the figures were based on the logisticsystem of nodes and links. The first 
represents mainly logistics at origin or destination. Consequently, those are the ports, 
hinterlands, industrial sites, cargo depots, and their related places.  In the case of the 
links, they represent the roads, railways and shipping systems involved. All of them 
have to be analysed considering the restrictions of the problem presented and the target 
area predetermined. 
It is also important to have in mind that nodes can be simple or complex depending on 
their composition. 
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Figure No .1.Routes and Connections. 
 
Likewise, complex nodes represent port conglomerates and regional 
hinterlands, when simple nodes are hinterlands or single ports. 
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3.3. THE INDUSTRIAL BANANA OF THE SOUTH CONE. 
Having constructed the “System Graph”, there is a demand derived from the industry 
located in the target area. From that, a survey been done for the researcher determined 
there is a physical relation between the industrial zones of the different countries 
involved in the Graph. 
Furthermore, it can be said that the industrial site for the South Cone of Latin-America  
forms a line coming from Santos (Brazil), crossing through Uruguay, Argentine, to arrive 
to the Central Region of Chile and the Pacific Ocean. 
This industrial zone, formed by the countries mentioned above, is the conglomerate the 
author has named the “Industrial Banana”. This area is going to generatea great 
demand for maritime transport, to and from the products final destinations. 
Considering Latin-America surplus production is being exported as part of the new 
economic policy enforced on the majority of the“industrial banana” countries,there is a 
need for export diversification in terms of searching for new market possibilities. 
So, the huge market located in the Pacific Ocean basin, represents a real incentive for 
exporters of the South Cone. Chilean ports could be the communicating gates between 
South Atlantic countries and the Asian-Pacific emerging economies. 
It is important to have in mind that the facts that show freight rate fluctuation are related, 
among other parameters, not only with port efficiency but also with economies of scale 
which are reached depending on the quantities, connectivity and periodicity of the 
cargoes shipments. 
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Figure No. 2.Industrial Banana of the Southern Cone. 
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Figure No. 3.Industrial Zones Nodes and Links. 
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3.4. THE BIOCEANIC CORRIDORS OR CORRIDORS OF TERRITORIAL 
INTEGRATION. 
Using both, the land bridging concept and the design of the above logistics graph, the 
links connecting nodes which, depending on the case, represent a national or 
international hinterland, and communicate ports belonging to different Oceans, should 
beeither land bridges or micro bridges, depending of the cargo destination. 
Likewise, in both cases they establish a system and represent a multimodal corridor 
connecting both Oceans. From that, and hereinafter the author will name the multimodal 
corridor as “Bioceanic corridors”. 
Considering most of the corridors are not implemented with the adequate infrastructure 
to fulfil the requirements needed for international multimodal transport, there is a need 
to revise their condition, characteristics and physical capacities. 
Moreover, the acceptance of these corridors dependsnot only on their infrastructure but 
also on political and strategic decisions. 
Therefore, the Bioceanic corridors actually represent a greater advantage for the 
integration of the related zones to their national and external markets that is why the 
author named them as “Integration Corridors”.   
3.5. SURVEY OF THE LOGISTIC TRANSPORT SYSTEM IN THE SOUTHERN 
CONE OF SOUTH AMERICA. 
3.5.1. OPERATIVE ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS WITHIN 
MERCOSUR. 
As a result of the integration policies carried out by South American countries within 
each of their regional commercial blocks, the Inter-regional commerce has seen a 
considerable increase during the last decades. 
In order to maintain the current economic openness in the region and produce the 
desired effects by the participating countries, it is fundamental to deepen and perfect 
the current economic agreements until they reach a real Common Market level, where 
goods, services, capitals and work can circulate freely between member countries, with 
no obstacles regarding nationality or citizenship. Even though Mercosur has advanced 
considerably in commercial matters, an agreement has not been reached on other joint 
matters that are just as important, such as employment and tax legislation, monetary 
handling and macroeconomic coordination between member countries. This subject will 
be clearly seen in this part of the document as there is an analysis of the operative 
aspects of MERCOSUR, where even the established agreements for the commercial 
promotion and transport infrastructure integration are not put into practice in the day to 
day reality.  
However, the adjustment of the regulation framework does not only make the countries 
more competitive, it also requires the optimization of the different production phases, 
the integral and synergic improvement of the logistic chain and the infrastructure that 
supports it, allowing the transformation of the development poles in sustainable 
development areas.  
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Recent studies have highlighted the importance of adequate consideration of the 
concepts of economic distance over and above physical distance in global 
environments; this leads to a discussion over how to analyse the logistic chain of each 
product adequately and competitively.   
It is not only necessary to have the sufficient infrastructure to dispatch products, it is 
also important to optimize the different factors that are part of the process (packing, 
transport, insurance, bank transactions, customs operations, dispatch costs, delivery, 
etc.). It can be seen that in a large proportion of cases, the differentiation of the 
competition and the better returns obtained, are due to the integration of activities, 
through the propagation of up to date and equal information of the process to the rest of 
the components of the productive chain and the introduction of improvements – 
operative, organizational and technological – that lead to substantial savings in both 
time and resources.  
It should be of no surprise that the businesses work in an environment with very 
favourable conditions, either due to the availability of workforce, tax exemptions or their 
closeness to large markets, where they make up real development poles, 
requiringintricate logistic and transport networks that connect the production centres 
with storage areas and sale points. 
The opening of free market economies forces a continual optimization of the 
participants of the logistic chain process, seeking savings that can be passed on to the 
final consumer and therefore making the products more competitive. This concept is not 
shared by some governments, where the savings are not passed on to the final 
consumer, increasing the state income.  
Aware of the fact that transport makes up a significant part of the final cost of the 
product, the companies have taken on board the issues of: 
i) Optimizing transport, selecting the adequate mode of transport according to the 
type of cargo and privileging the multimodal transport schemes.  
ii) A larger and better planning of the position of the warehouses and logistic 
centresthat provide services to the cargo.  
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Figure No. 4.Industrial and Agricultural Zones of the Southern Cone. 
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3.5.2. MODAL CHOICE IN THE MERCOSUR (SOUTH CONE). 
In theory, experience shows that the more the distance increases, the land transport 
mode (by road in the first instance and then by rail) loses competitiveness against the 
maritime mode. However, the analysis of the particular situation for the MERCOSUR 
region, shows an overuse of road transport in some sections mainly due to the lack of 
rail infrastructure capable of satisfying the demand for transport services within 
Mercosur and the legal framework established on the use ofcoastal shipping(countries 
protection of the short sea shipping/regional cabotage) that impedes the use of 
complementing schemes between modes, as shown on Table 1. 
Table 1: Competition and Complementation between modes of transport 
Transport Mode Competition  Complementing 
sequence with other 
modes 
Rail Road  
Maritime  
Road  
Maritime  
Road Rail 
Maritime (Cabotage) 
Rail 
Maritime  
Internal water lanes  
Air  
Maritime  Road (Short distances) Rail 
Air 
Maritime (Cabotage) 
Internal water lanes  
Air  Rail (short distances) 
Road (short distances) 
Rail 
Road 
Maritime  
Air (domestic services) 
Source: Ruibal, Alberto, 1994 
Although 67% of cargo exported within the Mercosur, use maritime transport and only 
24% use the road, the maritime mode is only dominant for the bilateral traffic between 
Argentina and Brazil, and also between Brazil and Uruguay. While for the rest of the 
commercial flow, the main transport mode is by road, especially for cargos to and from 
Chile.  
The use of air freight within the block for inter-regional commerce, although currently in 
the process of expansion, is still low, mainly due to the lack of rulings and common 
policies (for example open sky treaties) and the lack of minimal aeronautical 
infrastructure in most of the regions.  
River navigation, on the other hand, although an economic means of transport and of 
low environmental impact, is only used intensively by Paraguay on the Paraná – 
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Paraguay Waterway, and by Brazil on the Madeira, San Francisco, Tocantins and 
Araguaia rivers and the Tiete – Parana Waterway (Sánchez, et al, 2003). 
Multimodal transport is precarious and only present in particular cases or as a result of 
artificial bureaucratic obstacles, forcing cargoes to be transferred at the border, bringing 
forward structural differences. The advantages of multimodal transport are diluted by 
inefficiencies in the procedures that add no value to the final process.  
This lack of optimization in the modal choice means that, in order to satisfy the returns 
of transport companies that cover the MERCOSUR, the final users must pay overprices 
on the products due to an inadequate modal choice. This is clearly reflected in the high 
rate of empty return journeys that occur by road transport through the border passes of 
the Mercosur countries (see Table 2), although this has improved considerably in the 
last years, around 40% reduction of border transfers in some passages and between 
20% and 35% reduction of empty journeys, they continue to be important factors that 
affect the competitiveness of the MERCOSUR products. 
Table 2: Frontier transfers and ballast returns, in MERCOSUR land lanes, 1999 
Land Lanes Frontier transfers 
Empty 
Legs 
São Paulo – Buenos Aires 67% 37% 
Buenos Aires – Valparaíso 23% 42% 
São Paulo – Montevideo 57% 44% 
Paranaguá – Asunción 5% 38% 
Montevideo – Buenos Aires 0 28% 
Buenos Aires – Santa Cruz de la 
Sierra 0 N/d 
Río de Janeiro – Valparaíso 74% 40% 
Buenos Aires – Asunción 0 23% 
São Paulo – La Paz 69% 0 
Valparaíso – Asunción 0 0 
Source: Elaborated based on ALADI (2000); “DITIAS” 
3.5.3. SPATIAL PLANNING FOR LOWER COSTS. 
The need for logistic nodules capable of transporting merchandise at the lowest 
possible costs with high levels of quality and security, have led to search for organized 
ways of making the costs structures flexible, reducing fixed costs and empty returns and 
optimizing the logistic process in terms of time and service quality.  
One of the schemes that has taken on some strength is the logistic platforms, this was 
based on EUROPLATFORMS in 1992 as limited geographical zones, within which 
 92 
different operators carry out all the activities related to transport, logistics and 
distribution of merchandize, both for national and international transport. 
Depending on the size of the market and the level of competition and service ruling the 
market, different types of logistic platforms can be set up, as shown by the following 
table: 
Table 3: Types of Logistic Platforms 
Logistic Platforms  
With only one transport mode With more than one 
transport mode  
Road Centres 
Transport service Centres 
Urban distribution or city-logistic 
Centres 
Distriparks 
Transport Centres 
Port Logisticactivity Zones 
(ZAL/LSA) 
Air cargo Centres 
Dry Ports  
Multimodal Logistic Platforms  
 
Source: Ministerio de Fomento de España, September de 1999 
The logistic platforms have a geographical situation that allows the communication and 
integration of the urban and international distribution of merchandise, resulting in 
important savings for the companies that participate in them due to the concentration of 
services and large volumes. 
In the case of logistic platforms where more than one mode of transport operates, 
especially the multimodal and the port ZAL’s, the concentration of logistic activities in 
the same environment – mainly port – allows important scale savings due to handling 
large volumes of cargo and the correct integration of transport modes. At the same time, 
they enable optimization of working times and the use of the available physical 
infrastructure, technology and telecommunications. If in addition there are tax benefits 
or customs facilities, as is the case in some platforms, it is highly favourable to the 
competitiveness of the country to have such platforms.  
The setting up of logistic platforms in the ports presents advantages as they are 
traditional points of modal change and traffic concentration, offering privileged 
characteristics to house added value functions, although it is necessary to have the 
correct integration of land logistics (second port line) with first line operations (port – 
maritime logistics). With the understanding that all logistic operations (static and 
dynamic) in the port nodule ambit, including those of Logistic Zones, should be 
integrally optimized in order to increase global competitiveness with regards to other 
alternatives of transport and logistic chains.  
The following picture shows the reduction of the logistic flows in a Port Logistic Activity 
Zone, which finally reverberate in a reduction of logistic costs and an improved service 
regarding quality and time.  
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Picture 5: Logistic Flows in LSA 
 
Source: Manchon, F. RevistaPuertos; Número 97 Julio-Agosto, 2002. 
3.6. LOGISTIC PLATFORMS IN MERCOSUR. 
Although Latin America has not been an outsider to structural changes that have 
occurred in the production, commercialization and distribution of goods in the new 
economic globalization context, the development of logistic organizations is still in its 
early stages, mainly connectingorigin with destination of goods, and not usinga concept 
of logistic services or a logistic operator from holistic point of viiew. However, the 
number of integral logistic operators is small in most countries and even non-existent in 
others. 
In the MERCOSUR region, there are no undertakings of logistic platforms to the level 
that the commercial block suggests. The reason for this, according to some 
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logisticenterprises, is the existence of some regional rulings18 that put restrictions of the 
services that can be offered on the logistic platforms, restrictions they hope will be 
abolished soon in order to increase the commercial exchange within the region. 
Nevertheless, in the last few years there has been an increasing interest on behalf of 
the regional ports in transforming into logistic platforms as part of their master plans. 
These initiatives are presented below, stressing that the level of advancement in each 
case is relative and many are still only projects.  
In Latin America, the multimodal transport, according to UNCTAD definition, has not 
come into effect due to the non-existence of a regulatory framework that would allow it 
to work as an efficient system. However, transport users have developed a logistic 
system that is not necessarily dependant on a complex and bureaucratic legal 
framework, therefore its implementation is more operational than regulatory. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to establish some sort of regulation regarding civil 
responsibilities and insurance.  
3.6.1. LOGISTIC PLATFORMS IN ARGENTINA. 
BUENOS AIRES: EXOLGÁN. 
The ITL (International Trade Logistics) group, proprietor of the Exolgán terminal in the 
port of Buenos Aires, has implemented a multimodal logistic platform called PLS: 
Southern Logistic Park, with a view of integrating its related business to the port and 
logistic operations, thereby increasing the efficiency of the process, 
eliminatingintermediate costs and increasing the speed of the operation.  
PLS has 22 has. situated at 400 mts from the Exolgán Container Terminal. It has 
110,000 m2 of depots for IMO cargo storage and refrigerator chambers, a container 
stacking park and a pier for loading and unloading barges. In order to facilitate the 
movement of large volumes of cargo, the logistic zone has an internal connection with 
the Ferrosur Roca rail network, this provides a connection with the centre and south of 
the Buenos Aires province, the high valley of Rio Negro, Neuquén, Plaza Huincul and 
Zapala, reaching as far as Bariloche and Esquel; by connecting with other railway 
networks it is in effect linked to the rest of the country.  
It also has a pier on the River, which helps with the connection to the navigable 
estuaries and the main maritime points of the country, such as: Mesopotamia, the 
Paraná River estuary and Uruguay River (Paraná – Paraguay Waterway) and other 
ports that allow the connection of the Buenos Aires Province with Paraguay and 
southern Brazil. 
                                            
18 The resolution 252 of 1999, of the originating regime of the ALADI, establishes, among other 
dispositions, restrictions on the operations that can be carried out with the cargo and disallows the division 
of the certificates of origin in the countries where depots are installed; this restricts the services to the 
cargo that logistic platforms can offer.It has been requested that logistic platforms be considered an 
exception to the rule, which would favor the free circulation of the merchandise in transit within the ALADI 
and allow the distribution of products with certificates of origin, according to the quantities required by the 
importing companies. (Chile Portuario, 2003) 
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In addition, the ITL group owns the Zárate Distribution Center, one hundred kilometres 
from the city of Buenos Aires, where 15,000 m2 of depots and container parks operate, 
with future plans for dangerous goods installations, such as chemicals with IMO 
classification. It has close access to rail side-tracks to the north of the country and also 
to Puente ZárateBrazo Largo, the main highway between Argentina and Brazil. 
ROSARIO PORT. 
The Rosario region follows the length of the southwest bank of the Paraná River, with 
4,200 km of coast between Argentina and Brazil, covering an area of three million 
square kilometres and a population of around 72 million inhabitants. The link of the 
Paraná River with the Rio de la Plata guarantees an opening to the sea through the Ing. 
Emilio Mitre Canal at about 550 km distance with an effective depth of 32 feet.  
After the failure of the port’s concession process, the strategic aim was set to convert it 
into a Multipurpose Terminal, capable of complementing with the regional port system 
and position itself as a multimodal cargo centre for the Mercosur. For this reason, 
together with the port of Rosario, there are many terminals and private ports and, by 
working jointly with the Tax Free Zone of Santa Fe, (whose port is also going through 
the process of logistic transformation, as will be seen) they make up a modern complex 
with state of the art technologies.  
The existing transport network in the area has road and rail lanes that connect by land 
with the whole of the country and adjoining countries, the rail networks of Nuevo Cen 
Argentino S.A., Ferro ExpresoPampeano S.A. and Belgrano enter the port directly, 
giving easy access to the centre and north of the country. 
Parallel to this, they are near the access to the Highways Tte. Gral.Aramburu, 
AutopistaBrg. E. López, National Route N° 9, National Route Nº11, National Route 
Nº33, National Route Nº 34, this last one connects Rosario with the northeast of 
Argentina and reaches the Republic of Bolivia. The Rosario – Victoria Bridge and the 
Rosario – Cordoba Highway connections are under construction. The Fisherton 
International Airport is situated 15 km from the centre of the city of Rosario and has a 
direct access route to the port.  
SAN LUIS: MULTIMODAL DRY PORT  
The San Luis province is in the centre of Argentina, where all the routes meet that 
connect Buenos Aires, Rosario, Mendoza with Santiago and Valparaiso in Chile as can 
be seen in the following picture. 
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Picture 1: Dry Port in San Luis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gobierno de San Luis, http://www.sanluis.gov.ar/ 
The region has the Justo Daract Duty Free Zone covering an area of 42 hectares, 
providing industrial, commercial and logistic services with customs advantages that give 
preferential treatment to investments, merchandise, operational expenses and provision 
of goods and services, enabling commercialization, deposits, storage, conditioning, 
selection, division and return of merchandise without having nationalized the 
merchandise.  
The setting allows road connections with ports both on the Pacific and the Atlantic 
coast, and the Waterway by means of the Route 7 (Bi-oceanic corridor Buenos Aires – 
Pacific), Route 8 (Mercosur corridor Santiago of Chile, Santa Fe, San Pablo of Brazil). 
Route 36, connected to Bahía Blanca and southern Argentina and 36 linked to Cordoba 
and the northeast of Argentina. 
The rail network is connected to Mendoza, San Luis, Buenos Aires and the Port of 
Rosario. Finally, at a distance of 26 km is the Villa Reynolds airport, with sufficient 
infrastructure for loading large airplanes. 
To complement these activities, a logistic activity zone is under construction and so is 
an inter-modal cargo transfer station in San Luis, aimed at consolidating the province as 
a centre of basic services in the Mercosur. For this, the provincial government 
expropriated 90 hectares adjacent to the Bi-oceanic Corridor (Provincial Highway Nº7) 
where the logistic centre will work as a platform for freight or merchandise station, and 
where all the activities related to transport, logistics and goods distribution will be 
carried out.  
PORT OF SANTA FE. 
The Santa Fe port is set in the Heart of the Paraguay – Paraná Waterway (Km 584 of 
the Paraná River) being the highest up river port suitable for ocean liner operations. 
Making the most of its strategic location, it stands as a strong candidate to become a 
multimodal node, to develop regional trade operations and be the cargo transfer centre 
for the waterway. For this, within the “Port Reconverting Process” that is being carried 
out, is the change of location of the port itself and the creation of logistic activity zones 
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and the possibility of adapting existing structures for intermodal transport. All this with a 
view to modernizing and adapting it’s infrastructure to face the growing needs of 
commercial cargo exchange in their captive and potential hinterland.  
The road network that links the Port of Santa Fe with the main areas of the province and 
the regions of its hinterland, is made up by the National Route Nº11, connecting with the 
city of Clorinda, opposite Asunción in Paraguay, the National Route Nº19 – bioceanic – 
that followed by Nº20 leads to Cordoba, San Juan, San Luis, Mendoza and Chile; 
towards the Northeast, by National Route Nº34 it links with Santiago del Estero and 
Tucuman. 
The railway connections that converge to the Port, are the Belgrano Railway and the 
Nuevo Central Argentino, linking it with the provinces of Cordoba, San Juan, La Rioja, 
Tucumán, Salta, Catamarca, Jujuy, Chaco, Santiago del Estero and Formosa. 
3.6.2. LOGISTIC PLATFORMS IN BRAZIL. 
With the objective of transforming the Paraná state into a network of logistic platforms, 
which on the one hand, would adequately organize and supply the Brazilian industries 
present in the area, and on the other, would attend the production and consumer 
markets of the southeast of Brazil and the whole of MERCOSUR, the “Paraná Logistic 
Platform” project was set up, this intends to make the most of the location and economic 
importance of the area within the block, develop the economic activities in Paraná 
through establishing a network of Logistic Platforms that act as centres for 
consolidation, transfer and distribution of cargos. 
Some of the main points of this project are the following: 
 Logistic Director Plan: will encourage a harmonious economic development of 
the state, setting priorities according to efficiency and interaction of economic 
activities. Custom aspects are fundamental for this, therefore Interior Custom 
Stations (EADI) will be created in Curitiba, Foz do Iguaçu, Maringá and 
Paranaguá. 
 Paraná port system: through strategic expansion plans, an integral analysis of 
expansion and extension will be made on the Paraná port system: Paranaguá 
and Antonina Ports, adapting the port authority and integrating attached agents 
(importers, exporters, dispatchers, operators and public authorities) into its 
mandate.  
 Western Multimodal Pole: The Paraná government wishes to integrate the 
existing transport systems of the region, like the waterways, in order to ease the 
passage of cargo through the triple frontier. 
 Logistic Institute: Pretends to establish a centre capable of generating and 
storinglogistic information about the region, and then train the workforce 
according to the new needs of the region. 
A series of complementary and other measures being development in other areas of 
Brazil are shown below:  
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INLAND CUSTOMS STATIONS (EADI). 
Since 1996, a Project has been analysed in the federal congress of Brazil, to simplify 
the creation of inland customs stations (EADI) also known as dry ports. These are 
located near production or merchandise unloading centres and have the same 
bureaucratic and inspection structure as the ports, airports or frontier passes, in addition 
to other logistic services offered. 
The location of the first EADI, was chosen according to geo-economic criteria linked to 
the concentration of both exporting and importing cargos, these were:  Santo André e 
Campinas (SP), Brasília (DF), Cascavel (PR), Caxias do Sul (RS), Anápolis (GO), 
Manaus (AM), Salvador (BA), Juiz de Fora (MG), Recife (PE) and Resende (RJ). Other 
inland Customs Stations that are important due to their location or cargo movement are 
(Patricia Coast, 1999): 
MARINGÁ EADI (PR). 
Administrated under the name IngáArmazénsGerais, it is located north of Paraná and is 
a low cost alternative for the transit of cargos using the triple frontier (Brazil – Paraguay 
– Argentina). Given its location it also provides support for operations of the Paranaguá 
Port, storing and helping with the customs process of cargos destined to or originating 
from the north/western markets of Paraná, Mato Grosso do Sul and the south of São 
Paulo. 
ITAJAI EADI (SC). 
Administrated by Portobello ArmazénsGerais, it offers a series of services such as ship 
hiring, port operations, customs advisor, merchandise storage and distribution to final 
clients, in addition to speeding up the services and operations of foreign exchange, it 
also reduces the costs, offers fiscal advantages and a better level of services to the 
clients that move cargos in the areas of Paraná, São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul and 
Minas Gerais. It is located at a distance of 14 km from the Itajaí port and from the 
highways BR 101 and SC 486. 
JUIZ DE FORA EADI (MG).  
Administrated by MiltiterminaisAlfandegados, this EADI serves the South-eastern region 
of Brazil, connecting via the TEF railway – Express Rail Transport, to the ports of Rio de 
Janeiro, Santos and Vitória. It is mainly aimed at offering logistic services from 
production centres to the departure port or airport; it also has technologies for electronic 
marking and tracing of cargo.  
PORTO ALEGRE LOGISTIC CENTER. 
Aimed at satisfying the demand generated within the MERCOSUR, the Logistic Center 
of Eichenberg&Transeich, in Porto Alegre (RS) was set up close to the Salgado Filho 
airport, having also five additional operational units in the ports of Rio Grande (RS), 
Paranaguá (PR) and Imbituba (SC), and in the cities of Novo Hamburgo and Santa 
Cruz do Sul. 
The main objective is to speed up the movements and transport of cargo, optimizing the 
time and cost of the logistic chain, in order to accomplish this, it has an operational and 
 99 
data processing structure capable of dealing with the requirements of the clients in the 
fastest and safest way possible. 
GLOBAL TRANSPARK BRAZIL – GTPB. 
Global Transpark is a multimodal industrial infrastructure that provides an advanced 
logistic environment for the production and distribution of merchandise in a competitive 
environment; it has installations in USA, Asia and Europe providing a global logistic 
network.  
One of the cities interested in developing the project is Uberlândia in Minas Gerais, this 
region concentrates 75% of the Brazilian GNP, principally through the pharmaceutical 
and automobile industries. 
The Transpark infrastructure is made up by a combination of the concepts of Just in 
time, multimodal transport and advanced electronic information systems, such as EDI; 
satellite navigation systems, and electronic information systems in general, which permit 
the acceleration of production and distribution of products throughout the world.  
3.6.3. LOGISTIC PLATFORMS IN CHILE. 
PORT OF VALPARAÍSO: EXTRA-PORT LOGISTIC ACTIVITY ZONE (ZEAL/ELAZ) 
The Valparaíso Port Enterprise (EPV) is in the process of building on 90 hectares of 
land in the high sector of Valparaíso an Extra-port Logistic Activity Zone (ZEAL), the 
idea was conceived as a place to concentrate operations such as customs control, SAG 
(Agricultural and Animal Services), parking and selection of lorries before loading. Other 
associated activities could also be carried out like storage of loaded or empty 
containers, container consolidation and deconsolidation, storage of loose cargo, reefer 
containers and other services associated to cargo, transport and personnel.  
Initially, the area used has been distributed in the following way: 
 Lorry parking 10.0 hectares; 
 Operational support areas 14.3 hectares; 
 Cargo and Transport services 5.5 hectares; 
 Inspection Control Services 1.3 hectares; 
 Handling and operational terminal 12.3 hectares. 
The terminal’s operation will be shared between the Valparaiso Port Enterprise (EPV) 
and various private operators. The latter will concentrate on Operational Zones destined 
to offer services to the cargo. It is planned to implement four Operational Zones. The 
rest of the activities, shared by all the operational zones will be developed and 
implemented directly by EPV. 
This undertaking is complemented by the implementation of the Technological Platform 
carried out by the VLT (Valparaíso Logistic Trade), capable of speeding up the customs 
procedures and operations, facilitating the transfer of information, communication and 
electronic commerce between the different members of the Valparaiso Port Community. 
Opening the possibilities for exporters, importers and transporters, shipping agents, 
customs agents and shippers to obtain information associated to the cargo and the 
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vessels through the web, simplifying in this way the foreign exchange, the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the transactions used.  
Table 4: Logistic Services Given by VLT of Valparaiso  
Information System Target Groups 
 
Lorry dispatch (DESCAM) Exporters and shippers 
Lorry and cargo location  (UBICAM) Transporters, Exporters and shippers 
Lorry request ( SOLCAM) Ship or cargo agents. 
Personnel  traffic Control  Custom agents and ship or cargo agents 
Fruit services 
 
Shippers 
Source: EPV, http://www.portvalparaiso.cl/ 
 
PORT OF TALCAHUANO: TRIPORT OF THE BÍO - BÍO 
This initiative is set out over 900 hectares situated in the bay of Concepcion and 
contemplates the establishing of a triport and a logistic platform, where the production 
process of various goods can be finished, services offered and goods distributed.  
In order to achieve this, it is planned to construct an infrastructure suitable for interport 
services such as storage, container and stacking parks, and also for a series of 
productive processes that could be carried out within the premises. 
The project also considers the total integration of the different transport modes that are 
present in this area: 3 air terminals, Carriel Sur among them; seven ports, an important 
road network, permitting easy and fast transport of cargos almost to the port zones 
themselves, connecting with two of the main bi-oceanic corridors by the boarder pass of 
Pehuenche (in the Maule Region) and PinoHachado in the  Araucanía Region. 
The rail connection is going through an expansion process, allowing a future link of 
Central and Southern Chile with Bahia Blanca in Argentina (Transandino Sur project).  
Recently the authorities of Incheon Metropolitan City, one of the six Metropolitan Zones 
of Korea, have shown an interest in the development, in conjunction with Chile, of this 
triport in the Talcahuano area, with similar characteristics to Incheon, that is, an integral 
combination of port, airport and telecommunications complex. Their main interest is 
based on the fact that geographically, Talcahuano is opposite Incheon, and this could 
offer comparative advantages with regards to other ports of the area that would like to 
take part in the trade with Pacific Asia. 
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Picture 2: Road System in the Bio- Bio Region. 
 
Source: COMEXI, consultoría de empresas 
Other comparative advantages of this project in the Bio-Bio region with regards to 
similar initiatives, including Valparaiso, are: 
i) The availability of sufficient land to expand the port and construct a logistic 
platform, immediately adjacent. It is worth highlighting that the land is currently 
owned by two companies: ASMAR and FORESA, both of which would participate 
in the project, therefore facilitating its implementation. 
ii) It has the complete backing of the regional government that placed it at the centre 
of it Regional Development Strategy.  
iii) It has the particularity of having the four transport modes in the same area (air, 
sea and land).  
iv) It is part of the regional integration to the bi-oceanic corridors and would give 
between 6 and 7 days advantage, for the Asian market, compared to the Atlantic 
ports.  
v) The existence of the ASMAR zone, the only shipyard in Chile, capable of offering 
services to all types of vessels.  
vi) The capacity of the “Greater Port of Concepcion”, made up by 7 commercial 
terminals situated between Coronel and Lirquen (see Picture 2n), is of 15 million 
tons, with the possibility of increasing this by up to 50% with sufficient 
technological investment. The area also has unlimited potential for the 
construction of new terminals in the Concepcion bay.  
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vii) The Bio-Bio region has an important scientific potential and qualified workforce; 
this is reflected by the existence of 9 universities and around 90 technical-
professional institutions.  
LOS ANDES INLAND DEPOT. 
Covering an area of 24 hectares approximately, theInland Depot/Port of Los Andes, was 
given in concession to the private sector, will have the design, construction and 
operation of a Port Area capable of offering complete services, both public and private, 
to the transport, storage, customs and agricultural control of cargos that enter and leave 
the country through the border pass Los Libertadores.  
The dry port will be located in the area of El Sauce, near the Los Andes County and will 
have an estimated annual demand of 135,000 lorries transporting around two and a half 
million tons a year, easing the passage of international cargo going to the Atlantic 
countries and also the products coming directly to the Valparaiso and San Antonio ports 
by the bi-oceanic corridor.  
 
Picture 3a: Location of the Los Andes Land Port 
 
Source: http://www.ptla.cl 
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Picture 4b: Layout of Los Andes Land Port 
 
Source: http://www.ptla.cl 
 
PORT OF SAN ANTONIO. 
The San Antonio Port System has begun the modernization of its logistic platform. In 
order to accomplish this, technological innovations have been introduced, destined to 
support the cargo transport chain; the information flow has been optimized in common 
areas, together with the different terminal operators; and improvements have been 
made both to the physical and the documentary coordination. These changes have 
resulted in an increase of port productivity, a reduction in congestion and a considerable 
decrease in contamination levels.  
The destination of new areas for port activities and new technological 
investments for flow control and information exchange, are also planned. 
3.6.4. LOGISTIC PLATFORMS IN URUGUAY. 
PORT OF MONTEVIDEO. 
Located in Rio de la Plata, it is geographically outlined as one of the main routes for 
cargo movement of the MERCOSUR, becoming its hub. It is immersed in an influential 
area of nearly 200 million inhabitants with the highest economic average per capita in 
Latin America. However, due to the low volume of cargo belonging to the port of 
Montevideo, it is mainly focused on being a logistic port, serving the extended 
hinterland. The area it covers ranges from the south of Santos, Porto Alegre, and Rio 
Grande to the centre of Argentina.  
Its transport links are varied, connecting the Uruguay national road network with the 
network that joins Chile to Brazil, through Argentina. The Paraná-Paraguay Waterway 
permits the connection with the landlocked countries of Bolivia and Paraguay. Lastly, 
the International Airport of Carrasco, is only 18 Km from the Montevideo Port.  
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By authorizing the operation of Montevideo under the Free Port19 regime, a series of 
rulings were established that gave the port a higher level of competitiveness and also 
benefited the companies that operated through it, for example with free circulation of 
merchandise in Montevideo, without the need of authorizations and formal procedures, 
and the added value services – within the port premises – to cargo, without modifying its 
nature, such as dividing, repackaging, re-labelling, consolidation and deconsolidation of 
merchandise according to logistic and commercial requirements. 
3.7. ORGANISATIONAL ASPECTS IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR. 
The market globalization has had a strong impact on the logistic systems, demanding a 
higher level of management in order to ensure the sending of merchandise to any 
destination in the quickest and safest way at a cost that will keep them competitive.  
In spite of what could be thought, operational aspects within businesses, as with the 
organizations linked with foreign trade (customs, sanitary controls, customs agents, 
etc), have a fundamental and distinguishing importance for the country’s foreign trade. 
Becoming either intentionally or unintentionally, important obstructions to the commerce 
and integration of countries, turning into real bottlenecks for the logistics of the products.  
A recent study by ECLAC (Sánchez et al, 2003) states that a large proportion of 
physical chokes in the road and frontier infrastructure, are due to organizational faults of 
these organisms, although the main responsibility falls on the national public sector at  
local or national level because of not carrying out agreements; the main problems 
being:  
i) Bureaucratic obstacles resulting in delays and uncertainties in the 
international authorizations to the transporters; 
ii) Discontinuity in the public organisms and their functions;  
iii) Multiplicity and superposing of national rulings;  
iv) Non-fulfilment and ignorance of sub-regional rulings (especially regarding the 
application of the MERCOSUR rulings).  
With regards to this last point, the need for a unified and coherent ruling for transport is 
obvious, especially for land transport (road and rail) and also for multimodal transport as 
will be seen further on. Although partial agreements exist, they are not applied 
completely or are incompatible with national rulings (ALADI, 2001). Also, tax legislations 
need to be standardized, being the transport sector the highest taxed at world level, this 
becoming a disincentive for the sector to acquire new technological equipment. 
3.7.1. PROBLEMS IN THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS.  
The border crossing points (BCP) are an important link in the integration process 
between countries and a source of operational inefficiencies, reflected mainly by the 
excessive delay times at the border; this has been considered in an analysis regarding 
frontier passes integration by IIRSA, where it also states that “there is a general 
consensus, both in the government and private sectors, that part of the inefficiencies 
                                            
19 Ley de Puertos N° 16.246 de mayo de 1992 
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that are suffered by the international cargo transport are rooted in the ineffective 
operations and lack of adequate equipment and infrastructure, especially in frontier 
passes”.  
Within the Mercosur, the situation is maintained, registering an extremely high level of 
dead time at the border for road transport, where for example, 65% of lorries covering 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, suffer delays of 30 to 36 hours, whereas in Europe, 
considering there are 51 frontier passes, the average delay is 2 hours and twenty 
minutes; and at the border between USA and Canada, even after the 11 September 
attacks, there is only one hour delay, the timings being similar at the Mexican border. 
(Sánchez et al, 2003) 
Table 5: Dead Times in MERCOSUR corridors, 1999 
Corridor Dead Times at border 
São Paulo – Buenos Aires Over 24 hours  
Buenos Aires – Valparaíso Over 24 hours 
São Paulo – Montevideo Between 6 and 24 hours 
Paranaguá – Asunción Between 6 and 24 hours 
Montevideo – Buenos Aires Up to 6 hours 
Buenos Aires – Santa Cruz de la Sierra Up to 6 hours 
Río de Janeiro – Valparaíso Over 24 hours 
Buenos Aires – Asunción Between 6 and 24 hours 
São Paulo – La Paz Between 6 and 24 hours 
Valparaíso – Asunción Between 6 and 24 hours  
Source: Elaborado sobre la base de ALADI (2000); “DITIAS” 
The ECLAC study previously referred to, based on consultations and estimates for the 
three countries, stated that the cost of the delays at the three frontiers imply an 
inefficiency cost20 of 32,28 million dollars per year calculated at 2002 values. 
Considering the delays at each frontier, 80% of the mentioned value was generated 
between Argentina and Brazil and only 6,50% between Uruguay and Argentina, by 
averaging the number of lorries that operate between Argentina and Brazil, leaves a 
loss of 170 dollars per trip per lorry. This amounts to more than 10% of the cost of a 
typical freight between Buenos Aires and São Paulo or Porto Alegre. In a similar way, 
                                            
20 Considering the market values of a semi-trailer with tractor, paid off in 7,5 years, with 50% of residual 
value at five years, discounted at 10% per year, see document for further methodological details. 
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the extra costs between Uruguay and Brazil amount to 70.65 dollars per lorry and 38.27 
dollars per unit between Uruguay and Argentina. 
Regarding opening hours, there are only a few border passes in the MERCOSUR open 
24 hours a day for customs duties; these are an exception in the South American 
region, as usually, opening hours are restricted to 12 hours daily, even when passenger 
transit is continual. The rest of the participating organisms in the customs process are 
totally uncoordinated, with more restrictive timetables than customs, this forces the 
transporters to adjust their schedules according to the opening times or the additional 
delays. 
3.7.2. INCORPORATION OF TECHNOLOGY AT BORDER CROSSING POINTS. 
Another source of inefficiency and loss of time at the frontier, in some cases is due to 
poor integration of computer data between national organisms that are part of the 
clearance process, as to the non-existent connection between the information systems 
of the countries customs services; this not only impairs operative improvements in terms 
of time but also diminishes and complicates the state protection of the nations. (IIRSA, 
no date) 
It is therefore necessary to incorporate information technologies and optimized 
procedures allowing the customs services at the frontiers to operate by means 
integrated IT systems, leaving the tiresome paperwork behind; and taking on a 24/7 
working scheme (24 hours a day, 7 days a week). A pioneer on the use of IT platform is 
the Chilean Customs Services incorporating (earlier 2000) the authorization of 
electronic signature on the custom declarations. 
3.7.3. PROBLEMS WITHIN THE PRIVATE COMPANIES. 
Added to the delays at the border, are those produced by organizational inefficiencies of 
the transport companies themselves, mainly related to: 
i) Lack of professionalism on behalf of the private transport sector, reflected in 
some cases in the absence of complete documentation required at the border 
and lack of knowledge of the current rulings 
ii) Inadequate structure of routes and driving itineraries, often pressured by customs 
restrictions.  
iii) Uneven distribution of freight direction, high seasonal traffic and high levels of 
empty returns.  
It is estimated that all these factors together can result in an additional delay of 8 hours 
per transport section on average (Sánchez et al, 2003). 
3.7.4. INCORPORATION OF TECHNOLOGY WITHIN THE PRIVATE COMPANIES. 
Notwithstanding the important changes that have been made to logistics and transport, 
these have suffered with the market globalization, where management information and 
other added value services are fundamental to clients that are working with global 
markets. There are no initiatives on behalf of the transport companies to invest in 
information technologies, even when such equipment could bring more favourable 
contracts and for a longer term. Moreover, the few companies that have satellite 
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tracking of their fleets do not use them as a means of management efficiency, but only 
motivated by the security this gives in cases of total loss due to robbery and fuel 
consumption. 
 Although the transport companies able to operate internationally are less atomized than 
the national ones, with an average of 20 lorries, most of the vehicles have reached or 
are about to reach the end of their serviceable life (IIRSA, no date).  This aspect 
prevents strong investments in information technology for management, even though 
they could provide important returns to the companies that incorporated them.  
All these inefficiencies, some of the sector itself, others due to institutional faults, result 
in a high rotation of road transport companies and a disincentive to enter the sector, 
based on the fact that the average monthly run of a vehicle transporting cargo within the 
Mercosur, is 30% less than in 1970, this implies that the lorry spends more time 
stopped, waiting for cargo or to pass the border, than circulating with the cargo 
(Sánchez et al, 2003). 
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CHAPTER IV DATA COLLECTION 
4.1.  DISTINCTION OF INTEROCEANIC CORRIDORS. 
4.1.1 ZONE ESTABLISHMENT IN THE SOUTHERN TIP OF AMERICA (SOUTHERN 
CONE) 
As a general rule, the Northern, Central, Southern, and SouthernmostZones are 
very easy to distinguish. Not only do they differ in the characteristics observed in their 
frontier paths, but also in the activities carried out in each of them which depict well-
defined areas. 
The Northern Zone is understood to include the Greater Northern Region Bolivia and 
the northeast and northwest provinces of Argentina: Salta, Jujuy, Tucumán, Santiago 
del Estero, Formosa, Misiones, Chacao, and Corrientes. 
The most important axis that links Argentina to Antofagasta is Salta, which is connected 
by the crossings Sico-Huaytiquina, and Jama-Jujuy. On the other hand, the importance 
of Arica and Iquique in the northern zone must also be emphasized because of its 
significance in relation to the integration with Bolivia. 
The Central Zone is understood to be made up of the Minor Northern Region and the 
Chilean Central Zone, i.e, from the third to the Seventh Region, and the Argentinean 
provinces of Mendoza, San Juan, La Rioja, Córdoba, San Luis, Buenos Aires, Santa 
Fe, La Pampa, and Entre Ríos.  
The Cristo Redentor border crossing is the main transit route for this zone, 
approximately 55% of all commodities transported to Argentina are taken over this 
border (source: Customs). However, on an average of 35 to 40 days yearly, this 
crossing remains impassable, just as others located in the northern region, due to 
topographical and weather conditions. The Cristo Redentor crossing roughly registers 
one million tons annually; such figure is not comparable to those registered by other 
crossings among which the Concordia crossing - created for local transportation 
purposes between Arica-Tacna - and the San Sebastián-Integración Austral crossings, 
which connect Chile and Argentina - are the most important. 
The Southern Zone is mainly made up of two secondary road systems. The first is 
limited to the Chilean Eighth and Seventh Region and in Argentina to the provinces of 
Neuquén and Río Negro. These crossings are characterized by having a low trade 
exchange mainly due to the asymmetry in population; the Chilean side has around 4 
million inhabitants, whereas the Argentinean side has merely one million. In this zone, 
the same poor infrastructural conditions are as present as they are in the northern zone; 
the most important crossing is Puyehue, which is also an alternative route when the 
Cristo Redentor crossing is closed off. 
The second road system of the southern zone establishes the link between the XI 
Chilean Region and the province of Chubut in Argentina through the use of the 
Coihaique-Huemules crossings which end in ComodoroRivadavia in Argentina and in 
Coihaique, Chile respectively. The high traffic flow is due to the fact that Chilean traffic 
must travel through Argentina towards Osorno, then pass through the Puyehue crossing 
to be able to reach any other northern area. 
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Picture 1: South America General Map 
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Finally, across the San Sebastián-Integración Austral border crossings, which connect 
Punta Arenas and the southern part of Santa Cruz province in Argentina to enter into 
the Patagonia Region. These crossings establish obligatory binding points for incoming 
or outgoing traffic from Argentina; since, the highway system is interrupted by the 
Magellan Strait. As a result, the traffic between these two countries is minimal.  
Table5: Comercio Intra Mercosur+ 2000, toneladas métricas. 
Export 
Import  
Argentina Brazil Chile Paraguay Uruguay Imports from 
MERCOSUR 
Argentina        12.499.171        1.165.038          564.538          935.485        15.164.233  
Brazil       
19.057.249  
       1.614.161        1.621.038        1.074.228        23.366.676  
Chile        7.449.886         2.397.506             47.334          127.309        10.022.035  
Paraguay        1.086.749            963.246            95.777             66.538         2.212.310  
Uruguay        1.325.676            751.874            91.405            16.193          2.185.147  
Exports to 
MERCOSUR 
      
28.919.562  
      16.611.797        2.966.381        2.249.102        2.203.560        52.950.401  
Source: BTI, International Transport DataBase, 2003, Transport Unit, ECLAC, United 
Nations. 
 
4.1.2 HIGHWAY INFRAESTRUCTURE. 
In the light of the current study, the highway network is defined on global terms.  Further 
details will be provided in relation to ports and border crossings which may be 
considered the critical points in the system. 
Next, an overall description of the highway system and its main features, per country 
will be presented: 
Brazil. 
There are mainly three roads taken into account:  
- The first one connects Santa Cruz - Campo Grande - Puerto de Santos;  
- The second route is longitudinal and connects Porto Alegre - Paranagua - 
Santos; finally,  
- A route that connects Argentina and Brazil through the Los Libres border 
crossing: Uruguaiana - Porto Alegre is also taken into account. Roadways are 
paved and in fair conditions, with an average width of 7 meters.  Moreover, they 
are characterized on having a flat course and a plain surface. 
Paraguay. 
The main road is: 
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- The route that connects Asunción to Ciudad del Este (bordering with Brazil) with 
a trunk road between Asunción and Resistencia (Argentina). Both roads are 
paved and are in fair conditions, the average roadway width is 7 meters. It also 
has a flat course and a plain surface. 
Uruguay.  
In Uruguay, there are two main routes: 
- One connect Brazil with Argentina: from Paisandú to Rivera  through 
Tacuarembo, and  
- Connect Fray Bentos to Chui passing by Montevideo.  Basically, these roads 
which are 7 meters wide are covered with asphalt and are in a fair condition, 
have an undulating course  and a plain surface 
Perú. 
The network concerned comprises the following link: 
- Port of Ilo and Matarani and their link to Desaguadero (border with 
Bolivia).These roads are of an average condition, they are fairly paved with low 
slopes, a slight-curved surface and generally a flat course. 
Bolivia. 
It comprises of one route: 
- That connects Desaguadero (border with Perú) to Puerto Suarez in Bolivia, 
which runs along La Paz and Santa Cruz. The mentioned route links up with a 
highway that runs lengthwise, including Oruro and Potosí, then joins Uyuni and 
continues towards the Argentinean border. The road conditions are usually fair, 
with steep slopes, a slight curved surface, and a partially mountainous course. 
Argentina. 
The Argentinean system consists mainly of three main longitudinal highways and a 
transversal one: 
- Route 9 which crosses from Buenos Aires to Córdoba, running north along 
Salta and Jujuy until the border of Bolivia (La Quiaca).  It is in fair condition and, 
on average, 7 meters wide; except in the section between Buenos Aires and 
Santa Fe where the width increases to 14 meters. This route, like the majority of 
the Argentinean highway system has a flat course and a plain surface. 
- Route 3, thoroughfare from Buenos Aires to Bahía Blanca runs south along the 
coast, passing Antonio Oeste, ComodoroRivadavia, and Río Gallegos up to the 
Integración Austral border crossing. This road has the same condition as route 
9. 
- Route 40, longitudinal road which connects the border crossings with Chile, and 
links up, in the south, with route 3 in Río Gallegos.  With regard to its features, 
they are of inferior standard compared to the above-mentioned routes, since 
they are mainly unpaved with a plain surface and a 2% slope average. 
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- Route 7. It is the most important transversal road which links Buenos Aires and 
Valparaíso passing along the Cristo Redentor border crossing. This road is 
paved, in good condition and presents a flat course.  
Chile: 
The highway system is mainly comprised by: 
- Route 5 represents the main road starting from the Concordia borderline 
(border with Perú) and ending in Puerto Montt.  It exhibits homogeneous 
features, is thoroughly paved and 7 mts wide, its surface is in fair conditions, 
excepting the La Serena – Puerto Montt stretch with four lanes. It has a plain 
surface and a flat course, excepting the Vallenar – La Serena stretch and the 
Arica - Iquique stretch. 
- Route 16, towards Iquique is well-paved. 
- Route 26, towards Antofagasta is well-paved. 
- Route 68 from Santiago to Valparaíso has a four lane roadway and a flat to 
undulating course. 
- Route 60 CH, towards the Cristo Redentor border crossing is a fair road with a 
flat course which becomes mountainous near the borderline.  It presents an 
undulating surface. 
- Generally, the access roads to the border crossings in the north of the Cristo 
Redentor present a fair condition; its surface is a 7mts. wide, an undulating 
course and stretches over 4,000 m high above sea level. 
- Route 60, Calera - Valparaíso, it is fair condition, with a surface width of 14 
meters, four lanes and a flat course. 
- Route 78, Santiago – San Antonio has four lane roadway and a flat course. 
- Route 148, Bulnes - Concepción, is 10 mts wide with a roadway in fair 
conditions.  It has a flat course and a plain surface. 
- Route Itata, Bulnes – Concepción, is a four lane roadway and a flat to 
undulating course. 
- Most access roads to the border crossings in the south of the Cristo Redentor 
crossing do not present any altitude problems; however they have 
constructional problems, this makes some sectors impassable for heavy duty 
vehicles. The Puyehue border crossing is the exception since it is in fair 
condition and does not restrict traffic of any sort. (see picture 2) 
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Picture 2: General Road Map 
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4.1.3. PROGRAMMED INVESTMENTS 
Northern Zone:  
Route 27, San Pedro Atacama – Jama (border with Argentina) was paved in 2000. 
Estimated Investments US $ 40 million. 
Route 1, Antofagasta – Iquique, was finished in 1998. No available information 
regarding investments. 
Paving access road Arica - Santa Cruz. Work completion was in 1996. No available 
information on investments . 
Central Zone: (Concessions) 
Route 78, highway Santiago - San Antonio.Estimated investment of US$120 millions. It 
was finish in year 2000. 
Route La Dormida.Programmed Investment of US$ 120 million.Has been completed. 
Route 68, construction of two four lane tunnels 68.Programmed investments of US$ 60 
million.Has been completed. 
Route 60, expanding Route Los Andes - La Calera to a four lane roadway.  No available 
information regarding its completion.  
Route 71, Santiago - Los Andes, expansions to a four lane roadway.Programmed 
investments of US$ 36 million.Has been finished. 
Route Las Palmas, Rodelillo and El Salto (Viña de Mar) . Programmed investment of 
US$120 millions Route was complete and finished in 1998.  
Paving completion of CardenalSamore crossing in 1997.Programmed investment for 
US$ 5 million. 
Route La Pólvora. South access to Port of Valparaiso (including a tunnel) ended in 
2005. 
Route Troncal Sur, Viña del Mar – Limache. Highway with four lanes. Investment was 
US$ 120 million. 
Final stage study for the expansion of Route 60 La Calera - Con-Con to a four lane 
roadway. 
Southern Zone. 
Paving agreement for the PinoHachado crossing.Estimated investments was US$ 25 
million.   
Paving completion of the CardenalSamore crossing.Estimated investments was US$ 5 
million.  Was finished in1997. 
Route 180, paving Camino de la Madera.Estimated investments for US$ 21 million. 
Austral Zone. 
Pavement of Integración Austral crossing.Estimated investments was US$ 6 million. 
Completed in 1997. 
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San Sebastián crossing, paving KimireAike - Punta Delgada stretch.Completed in1997.  
Investment was US$ 6 million. 
4.2.RAILWAY INFRAESTRUCTURE. 
The Southern Region railways, other than Brazil, have been on a decline for more than 
25 years. Thus, the infrastructure and the equipment of the Bolivian, Argentinean, and 
Chilean systems are far from reaching a high standard. 
Today, there are only three Chilean international connections still working mainly with 
private investment:  
Arica - La Pazand Antofagasta –La Paz, between Chile and Bolivia, and Antofagasta – 
Salta between Chile and Argentina.  
At present, there is a general commitment among private parties in studying the 
feasibility of the Lonquimay- Zapala railroad project. 
4.3. SPECIFICATION OF LOGISTIC CORRIDORS. 
Next, details of the railway and road corridors will be presented. 
4.3.1. RAILROAD CORRIDORS. 
These are those through which whole or part of the journey is linked to two or more 
ports located in different oceans is made by the railroad system. FERRONOR (North 
railroad) connection to the ports of Iquique, Tocopilla, Antofagasta, and Mejillones is an 
excellent alternative for MERCOSUR parties to access the pacific. 
4.3.1.1. Iquique  Antofagasta-Buenos Aires Connection. 
Nowadays, there is a interoceanic railroad corridor underway starting from the port of 
Iquique. It is connected through the main north road to the ports of Tocopilla, Mejillones 
and Antofagasta passing over the border with Argentina at the Socompa crossing which 
forms an interoceanic corridor. At that point, it is connected to the Argentinean railway 
system, and thus, linking the Chilean northern territories and their ports with the 
Argentinean provinces of Jujuy, Salta Santiago del Estero, Santa Fé, Entre Ríos and 
the northern part of the Buenos Aires province. 
Through the international trunk road to Socompa, agricultural products from the 
northeast of Argentina are transported to the First and Second Region of Chile for 
localconsumption and export purposes. Since 1994, Argentinean minerals headed for 
the external market have been transported for their shipment in the ports in Antofagasta 
and Iquique. 
Mineral copper and saltpetre products and especially goods from the duty-free area in 
Iquique are transported from Chile to Argentina. 
This railway has the potential of connecting the Paraguay - Paraná waterway at 
Barranquera fluvial port (Argentina), where the load is then shipped on barges to the 
fluvial port of Villetas (Paraguay). 
This combination can attend the needs of Paraguay and the north of Argentina resulting 
from the waterway expansion. It gives an alternative to using the Barranquera - Buenos 
Aires stretch. 
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This system offers a large scale shipping option for grains, woods, ores, and others.  
4.3.1.2.Iquique - Antofagasta - Porto Alegre O Rio Grande Do Sul Connection. 
At present, a railway corridor starting from the port of Iquique is serviceable. It is 
connected through the main north road to the Chilean ports of Tocopilla, Mejillones, and 
Antofagasta. It passes over the Socompa crossing and runs through the Argentinean 
system to the Brazilian ports of Puerto Alegre, and Río Grande do Sul; thus, it bridges 
the frontier between these two countries in Sao Borja. 
This railway corridor can meet the needs of the First and the Second Region of Chile; 
the northern provinces of Argentina: Jujuy, Salta, Formosa, Chaco, and Corrientes; and 
the province of Río Grande do Sul, in Brazil.   
4.3.1.3.Iquique - Antofagasta - Santos Connection. 
This railway corridor starts from the Port of Iquique connecting Antofagasta through the 
north trunk line which runs to Argentina.  It passes over the Socompa crossing. From 
the Argentinean province of Salta, it goes to Santa Cruz (Bolivia) extending over the 
Argentinean - Bolivian boundary in the province of Tarija in Bolivia. From Santa Cruz, it 
runs to port of Santos in Brazil crossing the boundary at the Suarez port. 
This passage can meet the needs of the First and Second Regions of Chile; the 
Argentinean provinces Salta and Jujuy; the Bolivian provinces Tarija, Chuqüisage and 
the southern centre of Santa Cruz; and the Brazilian provinces of Matto Grosso do Sul, 
north  of Paraná and Sao Paulo. 
4.3.1.4.Arica - Santos Connection. 
There is also a possibility in connecting up the railway of Arica - La Paz with the 
Brazilian railways.  It may even be possible to link up Port Santos, passing along Sao 
Paulo; thus an inter-oceanic railway corridor will be formed. 
This combination can meet the needs of northern Bolivia, the central south of Brazil, 
and the north of Chile.  
4.4.ROAD CORRIDORS. 
The governments´ delegate members of Brazil, Paraguay, Perú, Bolivia, and Chile 
gathered in Santiago de Chile on August 16, 17, and 18, 1996. As agreed upon Brazil 
and Bolivia’s Minister of Transport, the Paraguayan Vice Minister of Public Works and 
the Chilean of Minister of Public Works under the Cuiba Declaration dated July 14, 1996 
and within the Multilateral Task Interoceanic working Group created during the 
conference held in Arica, April 28 1995, the following corridors were defined: 
Corridor Nº1:   Santos (Brazil) - Buenos Aires (Argentina) - Valparaíso (Chile). 
Corridor Nº2: Santos (Brazil) - Antofagasta (Chile). Passing along Paraguay and 
Argentina. 
Corridor Nº 3:  Santos (Brazil) - Matarani (Perú) - Ilo (Perú) - Arica (Chile) - Iquique 
(Chile) passing along Paraguay and Bolivia). 
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4.4.1. CORRIDOR No.1. 
We have to point out that this is the only corridor which adjusts to the bi-dimensional 
use for transportation and trade. 
As far as Chilean imports and exports are concerned, Santiago is the main centre of the 
international commercial corridor as Buenos Aires is for Argentina. For this reason, it is 
not uncommon that this corridor be mainly used for bilateral trade and exclusively for 
incoming and outgoing international traffic from Argentina. 
In Picture No. 5, which depicts the corridor of Santos-Buenos Aires-Valparaíso, we may 
observe that it runs through Brazilian and Argentinean territory and ends in the Chilean 
port of Valparaíso.  However, it may be extended to the port of San Antonio through the 
regional network. 
The use of the Uruguayan highway system enables that this corridor be connected to 
both Brazilian and Argentinean routes.  This allows full integration of the country to this 
corridor. 
Picture No. 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This corridor can minister to the needs of the Brazilian provinces to the south east of 
Sao Paolo, east of Paraná, east of Santa Catalina and Río Grande; as well as the 
Argentinean provinces of Corrientes, Santa Fé, Córdoba, San Luis, north of Mendoza 
and north of Buenos Aires; and to the Fifth and Metropolitan Region of Chile. 
The condition of the roads in these three countries is good and all of them are paved. 
The length of this corridor in the Santos - Valparaíso stretch corresponds to 2,533 kms 
and the road Buenos Aires - Valparaíso stretch is 1,433 kms long. 
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4.4.2. CORRIDOR No.2 
Picture No. 3 illustrates the second corridor (Santos –Porto Alegre - Antofagasta). It can 
be noted that it runs through Brazilian, Paraguayan, Argentinean territory and finishes in 
the Chilean port of Antofagasta. We should underline that this can even extend to the 
ports of Iquique and Arica. 
This corridor can minister to the transportation needs of the Brazilian provinces: Sao 
Paulo, south of Matto Grosso do Sul, as well as central southernParaguay, the north of 
Argentina and the north of Chile. 
In the Brazilian sector, 1,565kms (94.4%) out of the total length (1,657kms) are paved 
and in good condition. Only 5,6% of the 92kms, which corresponds to the stretch of 
Dourados - Caballeros, is paved, but in a bad condition. 
In the Paraguayan sector, 834 kms (76.9%) out of the total length (1,084 kms) are 
paved.  23% of the M. Estigarribia and Pozo Hondo stretch, which is 250 km long, is 
unpaved. There is a bridge construction underway in the remaining 0.7 km of the Foz de 
Iguazú - Ciudad del Este stretch. 
Picture No.3: Santo/Porto Alegre - Antofagasta 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Argentinean sector, this corridor is paved. Stretches belonging to the border 
crossings are in regular condition.  The stretch between Pozo Hondo (Paraguay)-
Clorinda (Argentina) is unpaved and in fair condition. This entire section comprises a 
total length of 1,465 km. 
In the Chilean sector, 310 km (66.4%) out of a total length (467kms) are paved. The 
section between Jama and San Pedro de Atacama which corresponds to1,570kms 
(33.6%) is gravel and dirt. 
The total length of the corridor is 4,673 km. 
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4.4.3. CORRIDOR No. 3. 
It may be noted from Picture Nº 4, which represents the first corridor, (Santos-Matarani-
Ilo-Arica-Iquique), that this mainly runs through the Brazilian and Bolivian territory into 
the Peruvian ports of Matarani and Ilo.  It can also be noted that the main road links of 
the zone reach Arica and Iquique, and even Antofagasta. The above mentioned links 
also permit the connection with the north of Paraguay. 
Based on the current condition of the mentioned Peruvian ports, they do not represent a 
serious competition to those located in the north of Chile. However, they are threat.   
This corridor can meet the transportation needs of the Brazilian provinces: Sao Paolo, 
Paraná, Matto Grosso, Sur de Golas and the province of Matto Grosso. In Bolivia, it 
would minister to the provinces: Santa Cruz, Beni, and La Paz. Furthermore, through a 
link with Paraguay, it could minister to the Bolivian provinces of Cochabamba, 
Chuquisaca and Tarija, continuing to northern Paraguay and finishing in Matarani and 
Ilo ports in the south of Perú. 
In the Brazilian sector, 97% (4,670 km) out of the total length (4,820km) of this corridor 
is paved and in good condition.  Only 3% of the Cáceres-San Matías stretch, which is 
150 km long, is only paved with gravel but, it is planned to be completely paved in the 
future. It should be noted, however, that this section corresponds to the Brazil-Bolivia 
connection. 
In the Bolivian sector, only 31% (1,035km) of the total length (3,301 Km) of the road 
surface is paved, 67% of this stretch is a dirt road and the remaining 2% (47km) is 
gravel. 
Picture No. 4 
 
 
The connection towards Paraguay is a trunk road of the corridor which allows the needs 
of the northernmost region to be met.  The total length of all these stretches is 820km of 
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which 60% is paved (490), and the remaining 40% corresponds to dirt roads.  It should 
be emphasized that 60km out of a total length of the Juan Caballero - Pozo Colorado 
stretches (350km) are still to be constructed. 
In the sector of Peru, 59% (717km out of a total length of 1,224km) is paved; the 
remaining 41% (507km) are either gravel or dirt. 
In the Chilean sector 62% (275km out of a total length of 441km) is paved the remaining 
38% (166km) is a mix between concrete, gravel and dirt. 
The total length of this corridor is 9,786km. 
4.5. TRANSPORTED COMMODITIES THROUGH THE ROAD AND 
RAILWAY CORRIDORS. 
The following table illustrates the amount of commodities transported on the roads and 
railways through the Chilean - Argentinean border.It may be observed in these tables, 
that over the last 4 years, more cargo has been transported over roads that by railway.   
Table 2: Chile, Main products imports from Mercosur countries by tons, 2000. 
Departure 
Country 
SITC Description  TONS  
Argentina 34 GAS, NATURAL AND MANUFACTURED        2.397.327  
Brazil 64 PAPER, PAPERBOARD, AND ARTICLES OF PAPER 
PULP, PAPER OR PAPER BOARD 
       1.696.101  
Argentina 66 NONMETALLIC MINERAL MANUFACTURES, N.E.S.        1.456.531  
Argentina 04 CEREALS AND CEREAL PREPARATIONS        1.157.391  
Argentina 64 PAPER, PAPERBOARD, AND ARTICLES OF PAPER 
PULP, PAPER OR PAPER BOARD 
          899.262  
Argentina 27 CRUDE FERTILIZERS (IMPORTS ONLY), EXCEPT 
THOSE OF DIVISION 56, AND CRUDEMINERALS 
(EXCLUDING COAL, PETROLEUM AND PRECIOUS 
STONES) 
          585.884  
Brazil 27 CRUDE FERTILIZERS (IMPORTS ONLY), EXCEPT 
THOSE OF DIVISION 56, AND CRUDEMINERALS 
(EXCLUDING COAL, PETROLEUM AND PRECIOUS 
STONES) 
          222.450  
Brazil 67 IRON AND STEEL           164.094  
Argentina 09 MISCELLANEOUS EDIBLE PRODUCTS AND 
PREPARATIONS 
          126.755  
Argentina 06 SUGARS, SUGAR PREPARATIONS AND HONEY           115.330  
Argentina 28 METALLIFEROUS ORES AND METAL SCRAP           107.079  
Uruguay 25 PULP AND WASTE PAPER             92.260  
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Argentina 67 IRON AND STEEL             90.448  
Argentina 22 OIL SEEDS AND OLEAGINOUS FRUITS             65.944  
Brazil 57 PLASTICS IN PRIMARY FORMS             64.941  
Others             780.237  
Total Imports from MERCOSUR       10.022.035 
Source: BTI, International Transport Database, Transport Unit, 2000, ECLAC. 
 
Table 3: Chile, Main products imports from Mercosur countries by value, 2000 
Departure 
Country 
SITC Description  CIF Value  
Argentina 33 PETROLEUM, PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 
AND RELATED MATERIALS 
 $     1.402.415.745  
Argentina 34 GAS, NATURAL AND MANUFACTURED  $       290.890.386  
Brazil 78 ROAD VEHICLES (INCLUDING AIR-
CUSHION VEHICLES) 
 $       267.583.970  
Argentina 04 CEREALS AND CEREAL PREPARATIONS  $       142.995.312  
Brazil 64 PAPER, PAPERBOARD, AND ARTICLES OF 
PAPER PULP, PAPER OR PAPER BOARD 
 $         80.828.707  
Brazil 69 MANUFACTURES OF METALS, N.E.S.  $         68.851.199  
Argentina 01 MEAT AND MEAT PREPARATIONS  $         67.855.911  
Brazil 67 IRON AND STEEL  $         67.607.659  
Brazil 57 PLASTICS IN PRIMARY FORMS  $         65.235.896  
Argentina 08 FEEDING STUFF FOR ANIMALS (NOT 
INCLUDING UNMILLED CEREALS) 
 $         62.044.284  
Argentina 09 MISCELLANEOUS EDIBLE PRODUCTS 
AND PREPARATIONS 
 $         60.150.977  
Argentina 64 PAPER, PAPERBOARD, AND ARTICLES OF 
PAPER PULP, PAPER OR PAPER BOARD 
 $         57.458.912  
Brazil 74 GENERAL INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY AND 
EQUIPMENT, N.E.S., AND MACHINE 
PARTS, N.E.S. 
 $         56.026.342  
Brazil 01 MEAT AND MEAT PREPARATIONS  $         55.100.228  
Brazil 65 TEXTILE YARN, FABRICS, MADE-UP 
ARTICLES, N.E.S., AND RELATED 
 $         48.787.191  
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PRODUCTS 
Others    $     1.527.844.404  
 $     4.321.677.123  
Source: BTI, International Transport DataBase, Transport Unit, ECLAC, United Nations. 
This figure is foreseen to increase due to the opportunities the country is facing,which 
derive from the internationalization of markets. The amount of cargo transported by the 
railway is likewise expected to increase but not to the same proportion as road 
transport. 
 
Table 4: Intra Mercosur Commerce + 2000 (tons) 
Export 
Import  
Argentina Brazil Chile Paraguay Uruguay Imports from 
MERCOSUR 
Argentina        12.499.171        1.165.038          564.538          935.485        15.164.233  
Brazil       19.057.249         1.614.161        1.621.038        1.074.228        23.366.676  
Chile        7.449.886         2.397.506             47.334          127.309        10.022.035  
Paraguay        1.086.749            963.246            95.777             66.538         2.212.310  
Uruguay        1.325.676            751.874            91.405            16.193          2.185.147  
Exports to 
MERCOSUR 
      28.919.562        16.611.797        2.966.381        2.249.102        2.203.560        52.950.401  
Source: BTI, International Transport Database, Transport Unit, ECLAC, United Nations.  
Considering that the major part of the cargo is moved by trucks, this study will limit its 
evaluation of the road corridors. 
Table 6: Chile, Transported imports in tons, 2000 
Departure Country Airborne Waterborne Rail Truck Others 
Argentina           4.678        1.193.522          24.599        3.940.931        2.286.157  
Brazil           3.132          480.901         1.913.473                    0  
Paraguay             209            17.408             29.717   
Uruguay             384              3.344           123.581   
Total Mercosur           8.403        1.695.175          24.599        6.007.701        2.286.157  
Percentage of use 0,08% 16,91% 0,25% 59,94% 22,81% 
Source: BTI, International Transport Database, Transport Unit, ECLAC, United Nations. 
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4.6.PORT INFRASTRUCTURE. 
It should be noted that the ports are the fundamental element for transport chain 
development. When a port is unable to deal with the flow of cargo because of a lack of 
efficiency and capacity, it will cause the chain to weaken and thus the entire process 
willbe held up. 
This study does not aim at analysing the ports involved with the above mentioned 
corridors; therefore, it will only provide an overview. 
4.6.1. ARGENTINEAN PORTS. 
-The Argentinean ports present better storage capacities than the Chilean ones. 
- The port of Buenos Aires after being sold to the private sector, considerably improved 
its service with a volume increase of 300,000 containers in 1991 to 1,100,000 in 2000, 
but because of the economic crisisvolumedecreased to almost 800,000 during the last 
years. The same may be indicated about port capacity: in 1991 400,000, and in 2013 
it has reached 2,055,489. Moreover, the operative surface increased from 65 hectares 
in 1991 to 95 hectares in 1995. As a result of this, imports and exports costs were 
reduced as well as the average berthing time span of ships. (see Table 4, page 71) 
4.6.2. BRAZILIAN PORTS. 
At present, the Brazilian ports are still struggling with over jammed in and outside the 
port facilities. As an example, the Port of Santos is operating beyond its capacity which 
is causing cargo to be diverted from maritime transport to overland transport. 
4.6.3. PERUVIAN PORTS. 
The Peruvian ports still have some organizational problems, however, after the 
concession of a container terminal of Callao in 2010, DP World star the development of 
a container terminal state-of-the art an in 2014 reach and annual throughput of almost 
2,000,000 TEUs per year. At this moment, the Matarani and Ilo ports are not a serious 
competition. However, they could be a threat once the development program designed 
by the Peruvian government is implemented. 
4.6.4 CHILEAN PORTS. 
See Chapter 2, section 2.4. 
4.7. ORIGIN OF CARGO FLOW. 
In general, we may appreciate that in the continent, the industrial centres are located on 
the coast and around most populated areas. For example, in Bolivia and Paraguay, 
these areas are situated around the capital city of each country (La Paz and Asunción, 
respectively). 
Only countries agricultural and livestock raising activities tend to be found inland. 
Mining activities are located in those areas where mineral deposits are found. 
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Based on the above, within the continent, six zones of origin of cargo flows can be 
recognized for both imported and exported goods which are required for production.  
These areas are: 
Zone  Nº 1 
It comprises the northern part of the province of Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos, Córdoba, 
south of Santa Fe and San Luis (Argentina).  In this zone, the main industrial activities 
are concentrated around the city of Buenos Aires (chemical, fishing and canning, textile, 
metal-working, etc.). Throughout the entire area, the agricultural activity is mainly 
focused on growing corn and wheat. 
Zone Nº 2 
It comprises the provinces of Matto Groso do Sul, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Paraná 
and Rio Grande do Sul.  Industrial activities are concentrated around the cities of Rio de 
Janeiro and Sao Paulo and are mainly focused on the chemical, textile, applied 
mechanics, metal-working, paper and shoe making industries. 
The major agricultural activities in the provinces of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina 
and Paraná are soya, corn and wheat cultivations.  In the remaing part of the area, the 
economic activity is concentrated on the raising of livestock (sheep, cow and pig 
breeding)  
Zone Nº 3 
It includes southern Peru and the Bolivian provinces of La Paz, Oruro, Cochabamba 
and Potosi.  The main activity in the Bolivian provinces is mining.  The scarce industrial 
activity of the country (chemical, textile and metal-working) is concentrated around the 
capital city of La Paz. 
The raising of livestock (sheep, cow and pig breeding) is mostly concentrated in 
the south of Peru 
 
Zone Nº 4 
It comprises the area located between the Fourth and Tenth Region of Chile.  In this 
zone, we may find a diversified economic activity in which mining and agricultural 
exports occupy a prime place. The remaining significant activities cover the textile, 
petrochemical, fisheries, aquaculture products, metal and timber, wood pulp, among 
others.   
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Graph 1: Imports within Economic Blocks (1991- 2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: (*)  Korea, Hong-Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand 
4.8. HOW INTEROCEANIC CORRIDORS FOR ROAD TRANSPORT AND 
LATIN AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY COMPLEMENT EACH 
OTHER. 
The layout of the corridors for overland transportation has been designed in such a way 
that it permits the connection of those areas in the Southern Tip of America which 
embrace most of the economic activity. This situation favours international trade among 
the countries in this area and their integration to a sole market. 
Corridor Nº 1: 
Santos - Buenos Aires - Valparaíso is the only one that connects the three industrial 
centres of those countries situated in its system, i.e. the provinces of Rio de Janeiro and 
Sao Paulo (Brazil), the province of Buenos Aires (Argentina) and the V, VI, and 
Metropolitan regions of Chile, finally ending up in a port of the V Region.(Chile).  It 
permits the exchange of industrial, agricultural and livestock products among the 
countries linked by this corridor and it also allows the movement of both transit cargo 
and cargo that is to be exported or imported. 
Corridor Nº 2: 
Santos - Antofagasta permits the connection of the industrially concentrated area of Rio 
de Janeiro and Sao Paulo with Paraguay and the agricultural and livestock raising 
provinces located in the north of Argentina: Formosa, Chaco, Salta and Jujuy.  In Chile, 
this corridor links up with one of the major copper mining areas in the country and ends 
up in the port of Antofagasta which is the main industrial centre in the north of Chile 
(chemical, copper, metal-working and fishing or canning industries). 
Corridor Nº 3: 
Santos - Matarani - Arica - Iquique permits the connection of the industrially 
concentrated area of Santos and Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) with the area of La Paz 
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(Bolivia) and ends up in the Peruvian ports of Matarani and Ilo and the Chilean ports of 
Arica and Iquique.  This zone (south of Peru and north of Chile) does not represent an 
industrially concentrated area; therefore, these ports may be used as an entrance or 
exit gate for exported or imported products from Brazil and/or Bolivia. 
Moreover, this corridor could be used for the exchange of agricultural and/or livestock 
goods from the Matto Grosso do Soul and south of the Matto Grosso province to the 
provinces of central and southern Bolivia, with the possibility of connecting up with the 
north of Paraguay. 
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CHAPTER V DESIGN OF A PARAMERIC MODEL FOR DECISION MAKING IN PORT 
AND MARITIME LOGISTICS. 
5.0. THEORETICAL APPROACH. 
5.1. METHODOLOGY TO DETERMINE CAPACITIES OF THE SYSTEMS. 
5.1.1. INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY. 
This study contains the development of a methodology which permits an analysis of 
the capacities of a logistic distribution system. During the research, a complete 
analysis of the system was established with the purpose of determining a model of 
action in general port operations, as an application of the proposed methodology 
which transforms into an adequate device to facilitate the study of any type of 
distribution system. 
The design of an evaluation tool for different port systems that present similar 
characteristics to those presented in this report is sought. 
In this study, theoretical principles are presented in order to support the selected 
evaluation criteria; as well as the determination of parameters based on these 
criteria that will be considered relevant in order to determine physical capacities. 
From this it will be possible to obtain a measuring device that will allow a comparison 
between the different systems that are of interest. 
5.1.2. OBJECTIVES. 
To develop a methodology that will determine the physical capacities of a logistic 
distribution system in response to the ports system's requirements. 
Studies can be carried out to determine the port system capacities, that tools are 
supportive in the decision-making process. 
To determine all variables, factors and parameters that make up the distribution 
system under study, all of those which are in an operational context or those which 
can produce changes in the port system will be selected in order to obtain faithful 
representation and study of the distribution system. 
5.2.THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES. 
5.2.1. METHODOLOGY. 
DEFINITION:  "A methodology is a system of methods and principles that are 
followed in an investigation in order to organize the work process and therefore, take 
the best advantage from the available resources” 
Development of the steps to follow: In orderto conduct the study of a system through 
a certain methodology in a clear and precise manner, the following stages should be 
considered: 
Evidence:  Determine all those points that make up part of the system, verifying and 
identifying facts only, and not adding characteristics and variables that do not really 
exist and which would affect the analysis adversely. 
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Analysis:  First, this step contemplates and supposes that the problem to be 
resolved is absolutely determined and specified, which is to say that each one of the 
components and relationships of the system under study have been identified.  
Secondly, that it is divided into more simple problems, which can be considered on 
an individual basis so as to achieve a more optimal solution by attacking 
complications separately. 
Synthesis:  This includes an orderly procedure for resolving problems. The simpler 
and easier components should be undertaken firstand then gradually increase levels 
until the more complex sections are reached. 
Numbering:   This makes it possible to keep a sequence which helps to avoid 
omission of any important aspect of the system under study.  
5.2.2. ELEMENTS OF A SYSTEM. 
Different constitutive elements can be identified in a system in accordance with its 
analysis structure.   They are as follows: 
i. Components:  These are the independently identified constitutive parts of the 
system. 
ii. Variables:  These assume distinct values under different operating conditions 
of the system.  These variables can be classified as either endogenous or 
exogenous. 
The latter can be determined by the analyst or by conditions that are external 
to the system under study.  The endogenous variables are determined by the 
interaction of the components of the system. 
iii. Parameters:  These do not change during the analysis. The analyst can 
arbitrarily assign them values. 
iv. Relationships:  These correspond to the "operative" characteristics of the 
system under study.  This is to say, they are those relationships between the 
different variables and parameters that determine or condition the 
performance of the system.  The job of the analyst is to identify the 
relationships that are present in the system with the object of representing 
them in the study. 
v. Restrictions:  Refers to the restrictions that are imposed on the values of 
different variables.  These limitations can be imposed by the analyst or 
naturally by the system under study. 
vi. Criterion:  Is the manner of explaining the objectives or purpose of the 
system and how they will be evaluated.  They are also known as 
"performance measures".  They allow the identification of the parameters and 
variables that are relevant to the system under study. 
5.2.3. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY. 
i. Definition of the Problem. 
It is necessary to define the problem in the most precise way possible; this means 
that each study should begin with a formal presentation of the problem, which 
contemplates a definition of objectives that explain the reasons for utilizing the 
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proposed methodology.  Along with this, the distribution system that will be utilized 
as the object of the analysis should be identified. 
ii. Global Analysis of the System. 
Once the objectives of the study have been defined and the system under analysis 
has been identified, a complete analysis of the system should be carried out with the 
purpose of determining its constitutive elements, how it operates, and the different 
interrelationships that its conforming parts can present. 
iii. Analysis of Existing Information. 
All data that will be required in order to implement the development of the study 
should be determined.  It is of utmost importance here to resolve the problem of how 
to get information and where it can be obtained. 
It is necessary to warn the analyst that it is most likely that a sizeable amount of time 
will be consumed in this stage, due to the difficulty in obtaining sufficient and 
worthwhile information  required for the study; and in addition, that this information is  
available on time and in the desired format. 
5.3.DETERMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS OF A PORT. 
All the elements that constitute a cargo logistic distribution system are presented in 
Annex 1 and its definitions in Appendix 1.1.   
5.3.1. DEFINITION OF UTILIZED CRITERION. 
Three analytical criterions will be used for the evaluation of the system-relevant 
parameters and variables, mentioned beforehand. 
i. Economic Criterion. 
From a maritime carrier point of view, the ideal port is one that can offer a berthing 
site at the moment of arrival. On the other hand, the port considers that maintaining 
all berthing sites occupied by vessels that are carrying out cargo transfer operations 
is ideal. 
Nevertheless, both conditions are detrimental to the cost of transport. The former, 
due to the random character of vessel arrivals, would oblige the port to make 
unnecessary investments in order to maintain the under-utilized infrastructure and 
the latter, that by not having sites readily available for the vessels, would oblige 
these vessels to wait or be rerouted to another port; therefore, originating additional 
costs for transport. 
The amount of time the vessel spends in port is an important factor for determining 
transport costs.  These expenses increase when a prolonged stay is the product of 
an inefficient port.  For this, the cost of time spent waiting will be considered as one 
of the items that will be evaluated and its relative importance determined. 
The costs that are generated due to the actual transfer of the cargo will also be 
considered. This refers to the utilization of the berthing site and all the necessary 
equipment for realizing the loading/unloading of the merchandise. 
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Finally, the port's capital investment costs consider the construction and 
development of the port infrastructure and its maintenance. 
ii. Social Criterion. 
It is necessary to include this criterion, since the port is an open system situated 
between the shore and the sea. The port constitutes a very special aspect within 
human activities and its development decisively influences the lives of all that are 
within a reasonable proximity. 
Due to this, it is convenient to incorporate an analysis that contemplates topics such 
as the environment, safety, legal, and labour conditions of the persons that 
participate in the port activity, etc. 
iii. Technical-Logistical Criterion. 
This criterion seeks to evaluate the port system, while bearing in mind its logistic 
distribution.   
Each of the operations configures only one process that should be planned as a unit for 
all cargoes that the vessel receives in a port or that is destined to a specific port.  One 
must not forget to consider that the main objective of the port is to facilitate the transfer 
between the maritime and land modes of transport and, therefore, satisfy the 
requirements of both; this being not only those related to the movements and physical 
manipulation of the cargoes, but those that would make it possible to comply with 
contracts and legal regulations. 
In this criterion, the elements of distribution such as space, routes, vehicles and the 
actual cargo will be considered. 
5.4. EVALUATION OF PARAMETERS AND VARIABLES IN REGARD TO 
THE PROPOSED CRITERIA. 
In order to realize the value of each one of the parameters/variables that make up 
the system under study in regard to each item proposed by the analysis criterion, 
and therefore, determine those of major relative importance, the methodology 
proposes at this stage to assign a quantitative value of 1 to 3 to each of the 
parameters, based on the point of view that contemplates the relative importance 
that each one presents in accordance to the physical capacities of the port system. 
For the assignation of this point system, it should be kept in mind how the 
parameters are affected by each item against that which is being evaluated. 
Therefore, a value equal to 1 will be given to those parameters that do not affect a 
criterion item in question. The quantitative value equal to 2 will be assigned to those 
factors that have a relative incidence over the measurement of effort analysed.  
Finally, those elements that are assigned 3 points will be considered relevant to the 
criterion utilized in its evaluation. 
After completing the evaluation of the factors, values will be summed and a total 
obtained for each one. Based on this total, the important parameters for the system 
under study will be selected. 
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As election criterion, it is proposed that elements that reach 50 percent or more of 
the maximum obtainable points in the evaluation should be selected. 
In the evaluation regarding the economic criterion, which contemplates three 
evaluating items, the maximum point value is 9. Therefore, all those parameters that 
obtain a score of 5 or more will be selected. This is applicable for the evaluation of 
the social criterion as well. 
By using the technical-logistic criterion, which utilizes four items for the evaluation, 
the highest possible point value is 12. Therefore, those parameters/variables that 
obtain a score of 6 or more will be selected. 
The selected factors will be transferred to a criterion integrated Matrix (main result 
chart) where they will be listed from the largest to the smallest point value. 
The following pages contain the Matrixes (main result charts) where the values that 
are assigned to each parameter will be registered. Each evaluating criterion has four 
parts. 
Although the analysis and comparison of the time spent by vessels and cargo in the 
terminal is important, it will not be directly considered as a variable, but as a 
consequence.   
5.4.1. EVALUATION IN REGARD TO ECONOMIC CRITERION. 
Part 1: Factors that correspond to the Maritime Transfer Terminal Area: 
PARAMETER/VARIABLE USE COST WAITING 
COST 
TOTAL 
COST 
From Cargo    
Tonnage for transfer    
Type of merchandise    
Stowing conditions    
Loading and unloading conditions    
From Cranes:    
Types available    
Output    
Quantity available    
Capacity    
Maximum work height    
Maximum reach    
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Mobility    
From the Workforce:    
Number of persons    
Output    
Number of effective work hours    
Working conditions    
From the Port:    
Number of sites    
Length    
Depth    
Dock apron    
Safety and Surveillance 
conditions 
   
Effect of currents in berthing sites    
From the Pilots:    
Number available    
Skill    
Specialization    
From Towing Vessels:    
Number available    
Characteristics    
Types    
From Berthing Services:    
Aid to Navigation    
Access zone    
Sheltered areas    
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Anchorage zones    
Locks    
Inner harbours    
From the Vessel:    
Types    
Length    
Draft    
Beam    
Cargo capacity    
With own cargo gear     
Other equipment for 
loading/unloading 
   
Maintenance conditions    
Safety conditions    
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Part 2:  Factors of shore-based installations of the transferring terminal 
 PARAMETER/VARIABLE
   
USE COST WAITING 
COST 
TOTAL 
COST 
Shore-Based Infrastructure    
Cargo transfer zones    
Consolidation and deconsolidation 
area 
   
Inspection area    
Administrative area    
Access area    
Parking area    
Transit area    
Maintenance area    
Emergency area    
Transit warehouses    
Depository warehouses    
Patios/Yards    
 
 135 
Part 3:  Physical factors and exogenous political to the transfer terminal 
 PARAMETER/VARIABLE
   
USE COST WAITING COST TOTAL COST 
Physical Conditions of the Port    
Geographic location    
Hydrographical, depth and   type 
of sea bottom 
   
Oceanographic, tides and swell    
Weather    
From Political    
Economy and finances    
Transport    
Infrastructure    
Labour    
Research and education    
Planning and coordination    
Institutionalism andorganization    
Special Customs areas    
Free zone    
Free Port    
Free Industrial Zone    
Outside port area warehouses    
Port technology    
Planning of work projects    
Installation and implementation    
Industrial zones    
Location    
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Demand for services and transport    
Other activities    
Fishing    
Military    
Areas of development    
Current facilities    
Surroundings    
Pollution    
Marine    
Air    
Land    
Operational characteristics of the port    
Syndicate organizations    
Labour conditions    
Port management    
Competition    
Productivity    
Ground transportation    
Rail    
Bus    
Air Transport    
Maritime-fluvial Transport    
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Part 4:  Institutions that participate in maritime activities 
 PARAMETER/VARIABLE
   
USE COST WAITING 
COST 
TOTAL COST 
Defence Ministry    
Navy    
National police    
Investigation Service    
DIRECTEMAR    
Meteorological Service    
Hydrographical and 
Oceanographic Service 
   
Economy Ministry    
National Fisheries Service    
Fisheries Development Institute     
Finance Ministry    
National Customs Service    
Internal Revenue Service    
Agriculture Ministry    
Agriculture and Livestock Service    
Transport and Communications 
Ministry 
   
Public Works Ministry    
Port Works Directorate    
Public Health Ministry    
Environmental Health Service    
Labour Ministry    
Regional Labour Office    
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Justice Ministry    
National Port Enterprise     
Central Bank of Chile    
National Congress    
Judicial Power    
Tribunals    
Appeals Court    
Supreme Justice Court    
Customs Tribunal    
Maritime Court    
Private    
Ship-owners    
Companies that own vessels    
Companies that operate vessels    
Shipping agencies    
Stevedoring agencies    
Custom brokers     
Exporters and importers    
Classification societies    
Insurers    
Shipyards    
Shipyards for vessel maintenance    
Associations    
Ship-owners association    
Chilean Shipping Chamber    
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Shipping agencies association    
Chilean Customs Chamber    
Chilean Exporters Association    
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5.4.2. EVALUATION IN REGARD TO SOCIAL CRITERION. 
Part 1:  Factors that correspond to the Maritime Transfer Terminal Area 
PARAMETER/VARIABLE ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
SAFETY 
CONSID. 
LABOR 
CONSID.  
TOTAL 
From Cargo     
Tonnage for transfer     
Type of merchandise     
Stowing conditions     
Loading and unloading 
conditions 
    
From Cranes:     
Types available     
Output     
Quantity available     
Capacity     
Maximum work height     
Maximum reach     
Mobility     
From the Workforce:     
Number of port workers     
Output     
Number of effective work 
hours 
    
Working conditions     
From the Port:     
Number of berth     
Length     
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Depth     
Dock apron     
Safety and surveillance 
conditions 
    
Effect of currents in berths     
From the Pilots:     
Number available     
Skill     
Specialization     
From Tugboats:     
Number available     
Characteristics     
Types     
From Berthing Services:     
Aids to Navigation     
Access zone     
Sheltered areas     
Anchorage zones     
Locks     
Inner harbour     
From the Vessel:     
Types     
Length     
Draft     
Beam     
Cargo capacity     
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With own cargo gear     
Other gear for 
loading/unloading 
    
Maintenance conditions     
Safety conditions     
Part 2:  Factors of shore-based installations of the transferring terminal 
PARAMETER/VARIABLE ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
SAFETY 
CONSID. 
LABOR 
CONSID.  
TOTAL 
Cargo transfer 
zones 
    
Consolidation and 
deconsolidation 
area 
    
Inspection area     
Administrative 
area 
    
Access area     
Parking area     
Transit area     
Maintenance area     
Emergency area     
Transit 
warehouses 
    
Depository 
warehouses 
    
Yards     
 
Part 3:  Physical factors and exogenous politics to the transfer terminal 
PARAMETER/VARIABLE ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
SAFETY 
CONSID. 
LABOR 
CONSID.  
TOTAL 
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Physical Conditions of the 
Port 
    
Geographic location     
Hydrographical, depth     
Oceanographic, tides 
and swell 
    
Climatologic     
From Political     
Economy and finance     
Transport     
Infrastructure     
Labour     
Research and 
education 
    
Planning and 
coordination 
    
Institutionalism and 
organization 
    
Special Customs areas     
Free Zone     
Free Port     
Industrial Free Zone     
Bond warehouse outside 
port areas 
    
Port technology     
Planning of work 
projects 
    
Installation and 
implementation 
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Industrial zones     
Location     
Demand for services 
and transport 
    
Other activities     
Fishing     
Military     
Areas of development     
Current area     
Surroundings     
Pollution     
Marine     
Air     
Land     
Operational characteristics 
of the port 
    
Syndicate 
organizations 
    
Labour conditions     
Port management     
Competition     
Productivity     
Ground transportation     
Rail     
Bus     
Air Transport     
Maritime-fluvial Transport     
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Part 4:  Institutions that participate in maritime activities 
PARAMETER/VARIABLE ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
SAFETY 
CONSID. 
LABOR 
CONSID.  
TOTAL 
Defence Ministry     
Navy     
National police     
Investigation Service     
DIRECTEMAR     
Meteorological 
Service 
    
Hydrographical and 
Oceanographic 
Service 
    
Economics Ministry     
National Fisheries 
Service 
    
Fisheries 
Development 
Institute 
    
Finance Ministry     
National Customs 
Service 
    
Internal Revenue 
Service 
    
Agriculture Ministry     
Agriculture and 
Livestock Service 
    
Transport and 
Communications Ministry 
    
Public Works Ministry     
Port Works     
 146 
Directorate 
Public Health Ministry     
Environmental Health 
Service 
    
Labour Ministry     
Regional Labour 
Office 
    
Justice Ministry     
EMPORCHI     
Banco Central de Chile     
National Congress     
Judicial Power     
Tribunals     
Appeals Court     
Supreme Justice 
Court 
    
Customs Court     
Maritime Court     
Private     
Ship-owners     
Companies that own 
vessels 
    
Companies that 
operate vessels 
    
Shipping agencies     
Stevedoring agencies     
Customhouse 
brokers 
    
Exporters and     
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importers 
Classification 
societies 
    
Insurers     
Shipyards     
Shipyards for vessel 
maintenance 
    
Associations     
Ship-owners 
association 
    
Chilean Shipping 
Chamber 
    
Shipping agencies 
association 
    
Chilean Customs 
Chamber 
    
Chilean Exporters 
Association 
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5.4.3. EVALUATION REGARDING TECHNICAL-LOGISTICAL CRITERION. 
Part 1:  Factors that correspond to the Maritime Transfer Terminal Area 
PARAMETER/VARIABLE LAND 
SPACE 
ROUTES 
AND 
ROADS 
VEHICLES CARGOES TOTAL 
From Cargo      
Tonnage for transfer      
Type of 
merchandise 
     
Stowing conditions      
Loading and 
unloading conditions 
     
From Cranes:      
Types available      
Output      
Quantity available      
Capacity      
Maximum work 
height 
     
Maximum reach      
Mobility      
From the Workforce:      
Number of port 
workers 
     
Output      
Number of effective 
work hours 
     
Working conditions      
From the Port:      
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Number of berth      
Length      
Depth      
Dock apron      
Safety and 
surveillance 
conditions 
     
Effect of currents in 
berth 
     
From the Pilots:      
Number available      
Skill      
Specialization      
From Tugboats:      
Number available      
Characteristics      
Types      
From Berthing Services:      
Buoy markings      
Access zone      
Sheltered areas      
Anchorage zones      
Locks      
Inner harbours      
From the Vessel:      
Types      
Length      
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Draft      
Beam      
Cargo capacity      
With incorporated 
cranes 
     
Other mechanisms 
for 
loading/unloading 
     
Maintenance 
conditions 
     
Safety conditions      
Part 2:  Factors of shore-based installations of the transferring terminal 
PARAMETER/VARIABLE LAND 
SPACE 
ROUTES 
AND 
ROADS 
VEHICLES CARGOES TOTAL 
Cargo transfer 
zones 
     
Consolidation and 
deconsolidation 
area 
     
Inspection area      
Administrative area      
Access area      
Parking area      
Transit area      
Maintenance area      
Emergency area      
Transit warehouses      
Depository 
warehouses 
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Patios/Yards      
Part 3:  Physical factors and exogenous politics to the transfer terminal 
PARAMETER/VARIABLE LAND 
SPACE 
ROUTES 
AND 
ROADS 
VEHICLES CARGOES TOTAL 
Physical Conditions of the 
Port 
     
Geographic location      
Hydrographical, 
depth 
     
Oceanographic, tides 
and surf 
     
Climatologic      
From Politics      
Economy and 
finance 
     
Transport      
Infrastructure      
Labour      
Research and 
education 
     
Planning and 
coordination 
     
Institutionalism and 
organization 
     
Special Customs areas      
Free Zone      
Free Port      
Industrial Free Zone      
Bond warehouses outside      
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port areas 
Port technology      
Planning of work 
projects 
     
Installation and 
implementation 
     
Industrial zones      
Location      
Demand for services 
and transport 
     
Other activities      
Fishing      
Military      
Areas of development      
Current facilities      
Surroundings      
Pollution      
Marine      
Air      
Land      
Operational 
characteristics of the port 
     
Syndicate 
organizations 
     
Labour conditions      
Port management      
Competition      
Productivity      
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Ground transportation      
Rail      
Bus      
Air Transport      
Maritime-fluvial Transport      
 
Part 4:  Institutions that participate in maritime activities 
PARAMETER/VARIABLE LAND 
SPACE 
ROUTES 
AND 
ROADS 
VEHICLES CARGOES TOTAL 
Defence Ministry      
Navy      
National police      
Investigation 
Service 
     
DIRECTEMAR      
Meteorological 
Service 
     
Hydrographical and 
Oceanographic 
Service 
     
Economy Ministry      
National Fisheries 
Service 
     
Institute of Fishery 
Development 
     
Finance Ministry      
National Customs 
Service 
     
Internal Revenue 
Service 
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Agriculture Ministry      
Agriculture and 
Livestock Service 
     
Transport and 
Communications Ministry 
     
Public Works Ministry      
Directorate of Port 
Works 
     
Public Health Ministry      
Public Health 
Service 
     
Labour Ministry      
Regional Labour 
Office 
     
Justice Ministry      
EMPORCHI      
Banco Central de Chile      
National Congress      
Judicial Power      
Tribunals      
Appeals Court      
Supreme Justice 
Court 
     
Customs Tribunal      
Maritime Court      
Private      
Ship-owners      
Companies that own 
vessels 
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Companies that 
operate vessels 
     
Shipping agencies      
Stevedoring 
agencies 
     
Custom brokers      
Exporters and 
importers 
     
Classification 
societies 
     
Insurers      
Shipyards      
Shipyards for vessel 
maintenance 
     
Associations      
Ship-owners 
association 
     
Chilean Shipping 
Chamber 
     
Shipping agencies 
association 
     
Chilean Customs 
Chamber 
     
Chilean Exporters 
Association 
     
Chilean Maritime 
League 
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5.5. CONSTRUCTION OF MATRIXES WITH RELEVANT PARAMETERS 
AND VARIABLES. 
From the evaluation carried out in accordance to item 5.4, parameters were obtained 
that will be considered relevant for the analysis of the system under study, bearing in 
mind the utilized criterions. 
In order to obtain the parameters, those that have obtained greater consideration in 
each one of the four matrixes that make up the criterion analysis will be selected. 
As a result, there is a criterion-integrated matrix that contemplates those 
parameters/variables of major importance and puts in order of relevance the 
items that were evaluated. 
5.5.1. ECONOMIC CRITERION. 
The following chart illustrates the matrix that resulted from the economic criterion 
evaluation that contemplated the valuation that corresponds to the three chosen 
items; these are utilization cost, the cost for waiting for services and the cost of 
capital for the port infrastructure. 
ECONOMIC CRITERION  
RELEVANT PARAMETER SCORE OBTAINED 
   1.-  
  2.-  
  3.-  
n-1  
5.5.3. SOCIAL CRITERION. 
The following table presents the matrix that resulted from the estimate in accordance 
to the social criterion that contemplates the evaluation that corresponds to the three 
selected items; these are the environment, port system safety conditions and labour 
conditions of personnel that participate in port activities. 
SOCIAL CRITERION  
RELEVANT PARAMETER SCORE OBTAINED 
   1.-  
  2.-  
  3.-  
n-1  
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5.5.4. TECHNICAL-LOGISTICAL CRITERION. 
The following table presents the matrix that resulted from the evaluation in 
accordance to the technical criterion that contemplates the value that corresponds to 
the four selected items; these are space, routes, vehicles, cargo; all of these 
elements comply with the logistics distribution system. 
TECHNICAL-LOGICTICS 
CRITERION 
 
RELEVANT PARAMETER SCORE OBTAINED 
  
   1.-  
  2.-  
  3.-  
n-1  
5.6. COMPARISON OF RELEVANT PARAMETERS/VARIABLES WITH 
STANDARDS. 
Once the criterion integrated matrixes are obtained, which are formed by the 
relevant parameters in accordance to the evaluation carried out utilizing the 
performance measures aforementioned, a comparison should be made with the 
standards obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), or with other international standards. 
By not having the mentioned standards readily available, it is recommended that the 
historical measures of the system under study be used. 
5.7. DETERMINATION OF RESULTS. 
The result of the comparison is obtained from the evaluation of the physical 
capabilities and performance of the distribution system under analysis. This allows 
the determination of how the available resources are utilized, what their deficiencies 
are, and in which areas these resources are not being utilized efficiently. 
As a result of the application of the proposed methodology, an integrated systemic 
comprehension is concluded. This means that all the elements that make up the 
method and the ones whichare relevant to the system have been identified. 
All the information obtained from the investigation transforms the methodology into a 
tool which aids the decision-making process, which is a permanent process in a 
distribution system due to the changes of the requirements that the surroundings 
impose on it. 
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5.8. WORK DISCUSSION. 
The study of a logistic distribution system, like a port, implies a holistic analysis of all 
its components and a thorough knowledge of the elements and their interaction. 
In order to carry out an analysis, it is necessary to identify all the different sub-
systems that allow a deeper knowledge, which would not be possible if a study of the 
complete system is not undertaken. Additionally, it is essential to contemplate the 
setting and surroundings of the system under study, since they exert fundamental 
influences on it, and on the other hand, the system impacts and affects the setting in 
which it exists. 
The suggested methodology is a means for analysing and evaluating the physical 
capacities of a distribution system, according to the user’s preferences. This requires 
the availability of information that would allow the system under study to be 
profoundly explained. 
It should be mentioned that most of the information required sometimes is not easy 
to get, and apart from this, the analyst that is responsible for putting the methodology 
into practice should have very special characteristics. Preferably, he or she should 
be involved in and be part of the system; and in spite of this, also be objective in the 
evaluation process. 
Together with acquiring certain knowledge of the capacities of the system, an 
integral knowledge of it should be obtained. This is of vital importance for the 
management and decision-making process that involves alterations not only to the 
system but also to its surroundings, which are generally at an elevated cost.
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CHAPTER VI  CONCLUSIONS. 
6.1. CONCLUSIONS. 
I. The process of port reforms initiated in Chile during 1981 did not consider a 
“Labour Re-conversion Scheme” for the maritime personnel (private companies 
and unions), leaving the workforce unprotected. Only the workers connected to the 
Public Port Enterprise (EMPORCHI) were considered in the legislation. 
II. The port restructuring Model that has been taking form during the last 37 years, 
has shown a sustained improvement in the Chilean port efficiency, giving way to 
important reductions in operational costs of all companies not only related to the 
maritime port business, but also exporters and the national economy as a whole.  
III. Rationalization of port work force is a fact, which has favourably affected the 
operational costs shown in the detail explanation of Chapter I.  
IV. Regarding the legal framework of Chilean ports, it is possible to say, that due to 
the length of the Chilean Port restructuring process, legislation is extremely 
abundant although there are still some aspects that have not been covered, 
leaving some visible holes especially with regards to employment.  
V. The legislation mentioned above is mainly aimed at the state port sector, no 
provision has been made to date regarding the private port sector, the former 
being used by adoption (legal framework for State Owned ports exist but not for 
private ports or a frame law covering all ports).  
VI. The port workers, have only been partially re-employed, mainly those with higher 
qualifications and operational efficiency.  
VII. Workforce training in the private sector, according to the previous legislation 
considered their qualification in aspects related to industrial security and hygiene, 
but not their technical knowledge or skills specific to their activities. The current 
legislation applies the same rules, but only for the workers with “permanent” 
employment in one of the shipping companies not for the “casual” workforce which 
provide services for specific “shift” of 7.5 hrs. The situation of the EMPORCHI 
workers was different due to the labour conditions and rulings they were governed 
by.  
VIII. There are no national regulations that take into account the details of the technical-
professional qualifications of the port workers. Training depends on particular 
needs of private companies, some of which have internal training programs.  
IX. Nowadays, the Maritime Authority decree the obligation for any port worker to 
approve a special course before to enter to the port sector, mainly on occupational 
safety and health not regarding the full range of “occupational competences” to 
perform their work. 
X. From the point of view of the Chilean export products, competitiveness of the 
national port model has undoubtedly benefited andthis indirectly affects other 
workers positively and consequently, the country as a whole. 
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XI. The port restructuring process had a high social cost, even though considerable 
amounts of resources were distributed as compensation, they were not always put 
to optimum use, from the point of view of economic sustenance for the worker. 
This was mainly due to the lack of a re-employment scheme. 
XII. The Chilean port re-structuring process was the pioneer on the region and even, in 
it nature, in the world. No other experience exist on this matters on late 1970s, “try 
and error” was the method which rules. 
XIII. The political and social pressures seem to have lessened, but only in the short 
term, as the real causes have not been eliminated by the current legislation. It is 
also important to consider that the influence of the port sector on the local 
economy is of great importance for the geographical and geopolitical reality of a 
country such as Chile. Therefore, the authorities of this sector should pay special 
attention to this.  
XIV. The development strategies of third world countries place a strong emphasis on 
the expansion of their international commercialization processes, which are 
highly dependent on efficient transport services and reasonable costs. For this, it 
is a priority that the methodology for the drawing up of a policy presents a correct 
analysis of the market force, services, technology and rights that govern 
transport systems in order that these subjects may be adequately included in the 
strategy 
XV. Developing countries, the majority of which are users and not providers of 
transport services, face a world scenario of fierce competition concerning the use 
of vanguard technology, solid internal legislation and flexible, dynamic and 
consistent commercial strategies based on the application of economies of scale 
which are directed towards rendering multi-modal services with computerized 
processing of information and communications. 
XVI. The abovementioned technologies, legislations and strategies are inherent to 
and originated in developed countries, obligating these countries to be subject to 
a prompt adoption of these procedures with the idea of maintaining competition 
in the market. 
XVII. The actual framework for the drawing up of transport policies in developed 
countries is characterized by countless factors of an economic, labour, strategic, 
social, commercial, etc. nature and should be clearly oriented towards the 
policy’s final objective 
XVIII. It can be concluded that maritime policy models can be as many as the 
imagination of the policymaker can muster, but the most important thing is that 
the objectives to be reached must be absolutely clear and in accordance with the 
national development strategy.  
XIX. The drawing up of a modern and efficient policy in an emerging economy should 
be coherent, consistent, integral and systemic with regard to the consideration of 
macroeconomic, political, labour, social and strategic objectives of the particular 
country. 
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XX. In the southern cone of South America, it is possible to identify a series of 
logistic corridors.  
XXI. The coastal countries have been applying restructuring policies to their port 
systems which has allowed them to improve the efficiency of their ports.  
There is a direct relation between the improvement of the port system and the 
facilitation of a country’s external trade.   
XXII. The economic policies of the southern cone countries have been reoriented 
towards the increase of imports, which makes them dependent on an efficient 
logistic system which will allow them to place their products in international 
markets.   
XXIII. The infrastructure of roads and railways in the southern cone are still 
insufficient. 
XXIV. Only recently has it been possible to detect initiatives for the integration of 
logistic corridors. 
XXV. The efficiency of the logistic corridors will depend from the facilitation of the 
bureaucratic processes and paper work, it is require to re-formulate the 
mandates and processes of the relevant public services like: customs, 
quarantine, immigration, public health, and even provision of cashier open 
24/7. 
XXVI. World tendency is to provide a “single window” approach. 
XXVII. Logistic concepts are new to the southern cone, and therefore the 
establishment of logistic platforms has only been effectively considered after 
the year 2000. 
XXVIII. Logistic integration policies are being discussed by governments without any 
resolution to date. 
XXIX. As there is no legal framework or a specific policy, there are no projects or 
investments oriented towards the strengthening of logistic corridor 
infrastructure.    
XXX. The study of a logistic distribution system implies a global analysis of all its 
components and a thorough knowledge of all the relationships among the 
elements, whether on an individual basis or together as a whole. 
XXXI. An in-depth analysis also requires identifying and delving into sub-systems.  
This is not possible to analyse it in a broad study. Additionally, it is essential to 
consider how the system and its components acts upon and is affected by its 
surroundings. 
XXXII. The suggested methodology is a means for analysing and evaluating the 
physical capacities of a distribution system. This requires the availability of 
detailed information that would facilitate a profound explanation of the system. 
XXXIII. It is worthwhile mentioning the difficulty of obtaining the information presented 
here. The analyst responsible for putting the methodology into practice must 
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have particular qualities. Preferably, he or she should be involved in and be 
part of the system, but nonetheless objective in the evaluation process. 
XXXIV. To know the capacities of the system is to understand it as an integrated unit. 
This is of vital importance for management and decision-making processes 
which involvechanges not only to the system but also to its surroundings,  
1.2. RECOMMENDATIONS. 
a) The governments of the southern cone countries should increase their 
efforts in order to improve the infrastructure of their logistic corridors and 
it efficient connectivity and integration. 
b) The governments of the southern cone countries should encourage the 
establishment of logistic platforms that will facilitate the physical and 
administrative distribution of the cargo. 
c) It is necessary that the persons responsible in each country establish the 
required technological platforms to allow efficient information 
management for external trade. 
d) It is necessary to improve the road and rail infrastructure of the logistic 
corridors. 
e) Countries should sign cooperation agreements to improve physical, 
technological and administrative infrastructure at the border passes in 
order to reduce the “dwell time” of cargo and vehicles. 
f) The countries of the region should take into consideration, when 
designing their maritime transport policies, the changes in the 
environment and the national strategic objectives, in order that the 
advantages of the policy may turn into effective benefits for the country’s 
population. 
g) It is recommended, for the majority of decision making processes, the 
use of similar methodologies to those developed in this study, in order to 
be able to identify and correct the deficiencies detected.  
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ANNEX 1 
ELEMENTS THAT CONSTITUTE A PORT SYSTEM 
Part 1: Port and Ships Particulars 
Port Particulars Berths Quantity  
Length  
Maximum 
draft 
 
Swell effect  
Current effect  
Pier apron  
Breakwater   
Occupational 
Safety, Health 
and 
Environment 
Control  
Certification 
Insurance 
Environmental 
issues 
MARPOL 
PRFs 
 
Certification 
MARPOL 
Annex VI 
Port Security Security 
controls 
 
Surveillance 
system 
ISPS 
compliance 
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Safety of 
Navigation 
Services  
Pilotage Quantity  
Training and 
skills 
 
Pilot Boat  
Tugboat Quantity  
Type  
Bollard pull  
Mooring  Mooring boat  
Mooring 
personnel 
 
Port entry Outer 
anchorage 
 
Access channel 
draft 
 
Locks  
Inner harbours  
Operational 
hours to entry or 
leave port wharf 
Day time only 
Day and night 
Support to 
Navigation 
Aids to 
Navigation 
 
VTS  
Vessels Annual traffic   
Maximum ship 
allowed 
  
Particulars Type  
Tonnage  
Cargo gear  
Nationality  
Compliance with 
PSC 
 
Services to 
Vessels 
Bunkering 
services 
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 Fresh water 
provision 
  
 Offshore  power 
supply  
  
 MARPOL PRFs    
Cargo Particulars Tonnage  
Transferred 
  
Cargo Type    
Type of Stowing   
Loading & 
Unloading 
Operations 
  
Cargo 
Throughput 
Crane service Type   
Output  
Quantity  
Technical 
Characteristics 
Capacity 
Air Clearance 
Outreach 
Mobility-
Deployment 
Work shifts 
 
Number of 
persons per 
gang  
 
Number Shifts 
per day 
Productivity per 
shift  
Crane Drivers Quantity 
Training 
Productivity 
Working 
Conditions 
 
Other Cargo Dry Bulk  
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Handling 
Equipment Liquid Bulk 
Heavy Cargo 
  
 
Part 2 – Shore Side Facilities 
Port Facilities Cargo transfer zones Area 
Container Stuffing and un-
stuffing  
Number of TEUs 
Cargo inspection areas Area 
Dangerous cargo zones Area or TEUs 
Parking areas Number of truck slots 
Cargo weighing scale   Maximum capacity 
Maintenance and repair port 
facilities 
 
Container yards TEU ground slots 
Break bulk and over side cargo 
yards 
Area 
Cover areas and warehouses M2 and or M3 
Storage Warehouse M2 and or M3 
Emergency response services Type: fire brigade, ambulance,  spill 
response 
Administrative building  
Container freight station (CFS)  
 
Part 3: General Characteristics 
Physical Conditions of Port Area Geography 
Hydrography 
Oceanography 
National Policy Economic 
Transport 
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Infrastructure and investment 
Banking and financial 
Labour 
Research and education 
Planning and coordination 
Public governance 
Custom Primary or Special Zones Free Zone 
Free Port 
Industrial Free Zones 
Bond Yards and Warehouses 
Logistic Platform Multiuser spaces 
Single window concept 
Distribution centres 
Integration of public services 
IT logistic platform 
Industrial Zones Distance from port 
Demand for services and transport 
Non-Commercial Activities related to 
Sea 
Nautical sport 
Fishing 
Military 
Availability Areas for Development In current premises 
Surrounding 
Environmental Protection Air 
Sea 
Soil 
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Labour Environment Unionism and syndicates 
 Labour conditions 
Port Management Executives skills 
Competition 
Productivity 
Port commercialization 
User council 
Port marketing 
Intermodal transport system Legal framework 
Real integration of modes 
Land transport  
Railways 
Roads 
Air transport  
Maritime transport Connectivity 
Number of 
services 
Inland-
transport 
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Part 4 Institutional Setup 
Stakeholder Map 
Public Government Ministry of 
Defence 
Navy 
Coast Guard 
Hydrographical 
Service 
Meteorological 
Service 
Antiterrorist 
Tactical Team 
Interior Police 
Migration 
Services 
Antinarcotic 
Services 
Economy National 
Fisheries 
Services 
Finance  National 
Customs 
Services 
Internal 
Revenue 
Services 
Agriculture Quarantine 
Transport  Maritime 
Transport 
Directorate 
Public 
Enterprise 
System 
State Port 
Enterprises  
Railway State 
Enterprise 
Public Works Port Works 
Directorate 
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Health Public Health 
Labour Regional 
Labour 
Directorate  
Justice  
Central Bank  
Legislative 
Power 
Parliament Working 
Commissions 
Judicial 
System 
Supreme Court 
Appeal Court 
Tribunals  
Customs Tribunal 
Maritime Court 
Private Ship-Owner Ship Owners 
Ship Operators 
Maritime 
Agents 
Shipping Agents 
Stevedoring Agents 
Freight Forwarding Agents 
Custom Agents 
Classification 
Societies 
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 Insurance 
Companies 
  
Naval 
Auxiliary 
Services 
Shipyards 
Ship Maintenance services 
Associations Ship-owner Association 
Maritime and Port Chamber 
Custom Chamber 
Export Association 
Shipping Agent Association 
Chilean Maritime League 
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APPENDIX 1.1 
TERMS DEFINITIONS 
(Applicable to the present document) 
The following definitions are included for better identification and analysis: 
Definitions of Part 1. 
Factors that correspond to the Maritime Transfer Terminal Area. 
1.0.  Cargo characteristics and conditions. 
1.1.Tonnage to be transferred:   
Amount of cargo that requires manipulation, whether it coming from the vessel to the 
apron of the port or vice versa. 
1.2.Type of merchandise:  
In accordance to the characteristics of cargo units and methods of operation, 
classification is as follows: 
Cargo by lifting (LoLo): Refers to container cargo by way of special installations. 
The operative scheme is similar to that of general merchandise. 
Cargo by rolling (RoRo): Is the merchandise formed by a series of elements that 
are susceptible to being loaded or unloaded from the vessel on an individual basis 
by horizontal deployments. The cargo may include vehicles, containers that are 
transported by a mobile transport element, etc. In addition, passengers are included 
in this category. 
Cargo by flotation (FloFlo): Refers to the cargo that is directly transferred by way 
of flotation from the water’s berth front to the vessel. There are various types that are 
differentiated by the shape and size of the barges (by overhead cranes in the stern, 
LASH system or SEABEE). 
Dry Bulk: Within this group are solid products in loose form that can be manipulated 
by special mechanical means on a continuous basis. Its type will depend on the 
dimensions of its composition. 
Liquid Bulk: We have included in this group those products that can be manipulated 
in a liquid form without having to be packaged in small capacity recipients. They are 
easily handled and expeditely transported. 
1.3.Stowing conditions:  
Order that rules the disposition of the vessel's cargo with the objective of rendering 
safety to the vessel and its crew members, and decrease operation costs and also 
protect the cargo. 
1.4.Loading and unloading conditions:   
The conditions of the cargo should be considered not only from the point of view of 
consolidation but also the manner in which it is removed from Customs.  The FCL, 
 178 
LCL and empty conditions and direct and indirect removal conditions should 
dominate. 
2.0. Cargo Transfer:   
All resources that are needed for the transfer of cargo will be utilized for the analysis. 
2.1.Crane Service: 
Types of Cranes: Cranes are specific equipment for loading and unloading. They 
are divided into the following categories: 
Pelican cranes: A varied range of models are included within this types that, in 
general, are made up of the following fundamental parts: Boom, the part that 
supports the weight of its extremity and allows mobility to the desired point. 
Revolving Part, this supports the boom and allows them to revolve together. Engine 
room, sustains the revolving part and the superstructure and allows movement and 
the elevation mechanism, with its key and pulleys. 
Mobil cranes: The mobility of this type of cranes is advantageous because it can be 
located wherever necessary and is able to close in on the cargo whenever 
necessary.  As a result, it has a greater manoeuvring capacity. 
Output: It is a measurement of performance that depends on the type of cargo. 
Amount of available cranes:  number of cranes that are in working condition. 
Crane Characteristics: 
Lifting capacity:  The amount of cargo that can be transported the farthest 
distance. 
Maximum work outreach:  It is measured from the revolving axle to the hook; also 
the average minimum radius is indicated. 
Mobility - Displacement: Refers to the flexibility of movement which allows it to get 
closer to the cargo.  Manoeuvre capacity. 
2.2. Workforce:  
Refers to the organization of personnel directly related to the transfer of cargo. 
Number of personnel: Is the number of persons available in the operations 
department. 
Output: Is the measurement of human resource effort that can be expressed as 
units of transferred cargo for each workforce or work shift. 
Number of effective work hours: The number of work shifts should be determined; 
and the availability of natural light should be considered since it could have an 
influence. 
Crane drivers: Are differentiated from general stevedore personnel, since they 
possess special training.Number of personnel that are capable of operating a crane. 
Specialisation:  Requires special courses. 
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Output: Amount of effort that is directly related and measured through the 
performance of the crane. 
2.3.Equipment for cargo transfer:   
Equipment and elements necessary to carry out loading/unloading operations and 
that constitute those materials that are essential for the movement and transfer of 
cargo (i.e. grommets, nets, cages, spreaders, palettes, etc.).  Also used are such 
vehicles as the fork lift crane, straddle carrier, top lifter, reach stackers, chassis, etc. 
3.Port Characteristics. 
3.1.Number of sites:  amount of berthing sites available. 
3.2.Characteristics of the berths:  
Length: Distance measured in longitudinal units between the limiting boundaries of 
the berth. 
Draft:Distance from the water line at cero water level (datum) to the bottom of the 
sea.  
Maximum draft: Maximum permitted depth for the vessel to carry out their 
manoeuvres with safety. 
Apron of the dock: Is the area that projects from the water front to the first 
warehouse or, to the beginning of the esplanade when there are no warehouses. In 
this zone cleats, dock cranes, electricity network, etc. can be found. Likewise, it is 
the place where the direct or indirect transfer arrives or begins at. 
3.3. Safety and surveillance conditions in the port:   
This is a major problem for the ports, due to the fact that the majority of the 
installations are located in the middle of the urban nucleus. Within these measures 
are: the isolation of the operations zone and the prohibition of all unauthorized 
persons to enter, fire prevention measures, etc. 
3.4. Environmental safety and hygiene conditions:   
These are all those measures that are adopted in order to avoid contamination and 
environmental damage in the area where the port operates. 
3.5. Effect of currents on the berth:   
This is the movement of the vessel due to the effect of currents and tides. 
4.Services for vessels 
4.1. Pilots:  Specialized personnel that carry out the function of receiving the vessel 
and being in charge of berthing manoeuvres. 
4.2.Tug Boats: 
Number available:  Quantity of towing vessels which are in operating conditions. 
Characteristics: The main characteristic of towing vessels is the pushing or towing 
capability that they possess, by which the unit that measures this condition has been 
established as HP (horse power) and more used is the bollard pull tons. 
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Types: Two types of tug boatsexist in the thesis context; those which offer 
“port”services and those for “oceanic” service. 
4.3.Berthing service: 
Aids to Navigation: Are made up of all the installations, equipment and 
infrastructure and navigational aids that signal the navigation channels, canals and 
pilot areas and anchorage areas, constituting themselves as elements of support 
and safety. 
Access zone:  Corresponds to the entrance section of the inner harbour and is 
made up by the pilot’s waiting area, the weighting anchor area, the access channel 
and the manoeuvring area within the inner harbour. 
Sheltered structures: Are all those constructions whose objective is to render 
protection to berthed vessels while in transit as well as to protect the installations, 
the infrastructure and cargo from inclement weather. 
Anchorage zone: Is made up of the section designated by the Maritime Authority or 
the port as the authorized area for vessels to anchor whether they are waiting for 
authorities, pilots, instructions, etc. 
Lock: Is formed by a navigation channel with gates in its extremities which allows 
vessels to navigate by maintaining two different levels of water in the exterior and 
interior of the inner harbour or manoeuvring space. 
Inner harbour: Is an artificial construction that renders protection and shelter in the 
berthing areas and in the manoeuvring area that is located in its interior. 
5.Vessels: 
5.1.Types:  
The vessels that make ports-of-call can be differentiated into diverse types in 
accordance to their characteristics or by the type of cargo that they are transporting.   
5.2.Characteristics: 
Length: Longitudinal dimension of a vessel which assumes different names 
depending on where the measurement was taken: 
 Between the extreme points (maximum length); 
 Its measurement in the maximum draft line (length between 
perpendiculars). 
Draft: Is the vertical dimension of a vessel that is measured from the waterline to the 
keel or the bottom of the keel. This can be measured in its extremities (bow to stern), 
as well as in its middle section. 
Beam: Transversal dimension of the vessel, which is measured in the master or 
middle section (the widest part) of the vessel. 
Cargo capacity: Space available in the vessel for transporting cargo, whether it is 
on deck or in the hold, usually is named deadweight (DWT) and it is measure in 
metric or long tons.  
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5.3. Quantity: 
This is the number of different types of vessels that use the installations and port 
resources. 
5.4.Equipment for cargo handling:   
This refers to all the installations that the vessel possesses which are designated for 
the manipulation of cargo. 
Ship Cargo Gear:  These can be of boom, pelican or gantrytypes (specialized for 
containers), etc. 
Other mechanisms for loading and unloading:  correspond to diverse systems for 
the manipulation of cargo as well as the system of vacuum discharge, conveyors 
systems, etc. 
Definitions of Part 2. 
Factors of shore-based installations of the transferring terminal. 
2. Cargo transfer zone: 
Corresponds to that area made up by the berthing site and the apron of the dock, 
where the cargo is transferred from or to the vessel (for multipurpose ports) and by 
the mooring and its respective connections in the case of terminals destined for 
liquids  
3. Consolidation and deconsolidation area:   
Is the specified section or space in which the loading and unloading of containers is 
carried out. 
4. Inspection areas:   
Are constituted by that section or space in which the cargo and the containers are 
inspected by competent authorities (Fitosanitary control, Customs, etc.) 
5. Administrative area: 
This is the area designated for the construction of offices buildings and 
administrative services. 
6. Access areas:   
These are formed by those sections of access or gates of the port precinct. 
6. Parking and detainment area:  
This area is made up of two sections: 
 Parking that is destined for those vehicles that enter the port precinct 
whose drivers are carrying out required administrative paperwork. 
 Parking for those vehicles that enter the port precinct for delivery or 
receipt of cargo or containers. 
7. Transit areas:   
 182 
They are spaces that mainly deal with the deployment of vehicles and persons within 
the port precinct. 
8. Maintenance and Revision areas:   
In these areas are all the available installations for the maintenance and reparation 
of port equipment. 
9. Emergency areas:   
Are those spaces available for emergency equipment and infrastructure, such as fire 
hydrants, firehouses, ambulances, etc. 
10. Transit Warehouses:   
Are those enclosed warehouses where transitory merchandise is deposited whether 
it is going to be embarked or was unloaded from a vessel for indirect transfer. 
11. Deposit Warehouses:   
Are those enclosed warehouses where merchandise is deposited waiting clearance 
for its later removal and/or indirect transfer. 
12. Yards:   
Are those uncovered areas that are used for the deposit of temporary merchandise, 
as a waiting zone for lorries, vans, etc. for indirect transfer. 
Definitions of Part 3. 
Physical factors and exogenous policies to the transfer terminal. 
1. Physical conditions of the port area.   
Refers to the characteristics of the port location site.(e.i.geographic, hydrographical 
or oceanographic). 
2. Special Customs precincts. 
Customs exemption zones:  are zones that enjoy a series of custom exemptions that 
could include from total and absolute freedom to some simple tariff reductions or 
paperwork limitations. 
Extra-Port warehouses:  correspond to those bond warehouses or precincts that 
are in or out of the port-city that are authorized by Customs for the collection or 
storing of cargo that is under conditions of the customs exemption zone. 
3. Port technology. 
Work planning:  this refers to all the general activities of the port, in that which 
refers to services and operations as well as the planning of work projects and 
installations; and precisely, all these jobs and studies should try to achieve a port 
that forms a harmonic and equilibrated conglomerate in order to favour optimal 
operation. 
Installation and implementation:  the continuous progress of the transport 
systems and, aboveall, the increase in vessel dimensions has made it necessary to 
continually update the ports to the specifications of its users.  For this, the 
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installations and port implementation should follow a modernization rhythm in 
accordance to the requirements in order to avoid serious problems as a product of 
not rendering adequate service to the new forms of transport. 
4. Industrial zones.   
The need to provide sufficient land area in the spaces close to port installations 
fundamentally predominates.  Therefore, it is considered basic to study shore 
conditions first and then, the possibility of deep water, since more and more massive 
bulk traffic in specialized large vessels is more important. All of this is the product of 
industrial zones that generate a constant increase for the demand of transport. 
5. Non-commercial activities associated with the sea. 
The non-commercial activities associated with the sea (nautical sports, military) also 
require adequate port installations and that motivate the construction of these 
installations within the general port and that in some cases, demands the 
construction of a special port for a specific need. 
7. Availability of areas for development. 
The availability of areas for future port expansions is an important issue, mainly 
because that influence the type of port operations and organization, is important 
for other port related business also. 
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ANNEX 2 
METHODOLOGY TO FORECAST CONTAINER TERMINAL DEMAND. 
1. General Aspects. 
Generally, the design and development of a container terminal presents problems, 
mainly in that which refers to efficiency and effectiveness of the utilisation of 
resources. The mistakes made in its design translate into the causes of deficient 
operation. 
These mistakes generally come about from: 
 An underestimation of the area required for the terminal, which results in 
congestion and inefficient handling or manipulation of the containers. 
 Inadequate placing of installations when the layout is first designed, which 
results in interferences between activities and deficient cargo handling. 
Three vital design aspects will be considered for the designing of a terminal:   
 Land space requirements,  
 Terminal configuration, and  
 Layout of the terminal. 
The first step in planning should be to determine the total area that is required for the 
terminal. There are many interrelated factors involved in this, but it is possible to 
identify two main elements that get the process started: determination of the 
expected demand and then the calculation of space and location needed to meet 
this demand. 
2. Determination of Demand. 
Due to operational and administrative reasons, containers normally are not 
transferred directly between the pier and internal transport. Therefore, a storage 
area must be available in the terminal for storing containers that are in transit, 
meanwhile administrative procedures involved in delivery are carried out. 
The container area is the main area of use in the terminal and one of the most 
subject to demand as approximately 70% of the terminal area is assigned for 
stacking containers, meanwhile other areas (administrative and control offices, 
access routes and roads, etc. occupy only 30% of the area). 
The amount of space needed for handling and storing is directly related to the 
number of containers that transit through the terminal and the average stationary 
time spent by the containers there (Dwell Time). 
2.1. Determination of the number of containers. 
In order to predict the number of containers that will be utilized and moved through 
the Port of Valparaiso, a model of multiple calculation was used which carried out 
projections independently for 20 (TEU) and 40 (FEU) foot containers, where the 
following results were obtained: 
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ESTIMATED VALUES TABLE 
(Number of TEU containers) 
YEAR ESTIMATED VALUE 
1995 121,655 
1996 129,943 
1997 138,250 
1998 141,401 
1999 155,004 
2000 163,328 
2001 171,613 
2002 179,975 
2003 203,581 
2004 196,716 
2005 205,092 
 
ESTIMATED VALUES TABLE 
(Number of FEU containers) 
YEAR ESTIMATED 
VALUE 
1995 76,894 
1996 84,167 
1997 91,461 
1998 98,771 
1999 106,190 
2000 113,500 
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2001 120,772 
2002 128,121 
2003 135,471 
2004 142,837 
2005 150,199 
 
By using TEU as the base and considering that FEU containers occupy twice the 
amount of space as a 20 TEU container, an estimate of the total number of 
containers can be made from the obtained results. 
TABLE OF ESTIMATED TOTAL VALUES 
(Number of TEU containers) 
YEAR ESTIMATED 
VALUE 
TEU 
ESTIMATED 
VALUE 
FEU in TEUs 
ESTIMATED 
TOTAL 
TEU 
1995 121,655 153,788 275,443 
1996 129,943 168,334 298,277 
1997 138,250 182,922 321,172 
1998 141,401 197,542 338,943 
1999 155,004 212,380 367,384 
2000 163,328 227,000 390,328 
2001 171,613 241,544 413,157 
2002 179,975 256,242 436,217 
2003 203,581 270,942 474,523 
2004 196,716 285,674 482,390 
2005 205,092 300,398 505,490 
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2.2. Average Dwell Time of Containers. 
The average stay of containers in the terminal results from the estimation of dwell 
time for import, export, LCL, FCL and empty containers.  In order to calculate it, the 
relative weight of each type of container and their particular permanence time should 
be available. 
In this case, the dwell time is considered as a parameter that can be varied in order 
to carry out sensibility tests based on them. An average container dwell time of 3 to 
5 days in the terminal will be used as test values. 
 
2.3.Stacking Height in the Container Yard. 
This parameter refers to the maximum amount of containers that can be stacked and 
directly influences in the space required for storing containers. 
The following are the principal factors that determine the possible number of stacked 
containers: 
 Dimensions: The physical characteristics of containers are directly related to 
their handling; above all when handling them at heights, and here it is where 
20ft. containers present better manoeuvrability, especially when they have to 
be stacked. 
 Types: Some containers have special characteristics which determine that 
they can’t be stacked, or that they require storage spaces with additional 
equipment which means they have to be stored apart from the others.  For 
example, refrigerated containers need to be connected to electrical outlets. 
 Status:  Special attention must be paid to the classification of the container 
depending on if it is for export, import or empty etc.  For example, empty 
containers can be stacked up to a height of 5 containers considering that its 
stay in the terminal is greater. 
 Handling equipment: Even though in theory containers can be stored 5 
containers high, this height is directly related to the equipment that is 
available for handling. 
2.4.Type of System/Equipment used. 
In order to define the type of system to be used in the terminal, it is necessary to 
make a comparison between the different types available, taking into consideration 
factors such as:  area of use, associated costs, necessary manpower, operation 
factors, etc.  Table 1 contains the details of this comparison. 
Considering the differential characteristics of each of the systems that were 
evaluated, they will be used as determining parameters by which a sensibility 
analysis will be carried out taking into account the total area of the terminal 
according to the system that is used. 
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TABLE 1 
Comparison between Systems for Handling Containers 
System Tractor / 
Chassis 
Straddle 
Carrier 
Direct 
Straddle 
Carrier 
Relay 
Yard 
Gantry 
Crane 
Front 
Loader 
Reach 
Stacker 
Area Used 180 TEU/He 650 
TEU/He. 
650 
TEU/He 
750 
TEU/He 
275 
TUE/He 
500 
TEU/He 
Development 
Costs 
Very Low Medium Medium High Low Low 
Equipment 
Costs 
Low High High Moderate Low Low 
Maintenance 
Costs 
Low High High Low Medium Medium 
Skill Low High High High Medium Medium 
Pro and Cons 
Operational 
Factors 
Good access, 
Minimum box 
damage, 
Higher speed 
to reach 
storage area. 
Very 
flexible, 
Good 
storage 
conditions 
Very 
flexible 
Good use 
of area, 
Restricted 
flexibility 
Versatile 
equipment, 
easy 
movement 
Middle 
turning 
circle 
Versatile 
equipment, 
easy 
movement 
Short 
turning 
circle 
Longer 
outreach 
Source: Prepared by the author with information from UNCTAD, ATAS Container development 
Course and Kalmar Industries 
 
3.Calculation of Total Area Needed. 
In order to calculate in hectares the total space that is needed by the terminal it is 
contemplated that 30% of the area is designated for administrative and maintenance 
office installations, accesses, etc.  The remainder 70% is the surface area set aside 
for storing the containers, considering that 10% of this area is for containers with 
special needs. 
In order to select the best possible design, a sensibility analysis should be carried 
out that considers the following situations: 
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Situation 1: 
In order to make an estimate in hectares of the total space for the terminal, this 
situation considers: 
 Expected demand for the year 2005 being 505,490  20 ft. containers; 
 The average dwell time per container is equal to 3 days. 
 Situation 1.1 
 -  Handling equipment, tractor/chassis type 
 Situation 1.2 
 -  Handling equipment, Straddle carrier (direct) type 
 Situation 1.3 
 -  Patio Gantry crane system 
Situation 2: 
In order to make an estimate in hectares of the total space for the terminal, this 
situation considers: 
 Expected demand for the year 2005  being 505,490  20 ft. containers 
 The average dwell time per container is equal to 5 days 
 
Situation 2.1 
 -  Handling equipment, tractor/chassis type 
 Situation 2.2 
 -  Handling equipment, Straddle carrier (direct) type 
 Situation 2.3 
 -  Patio Gantry crane system 
The steps to follow for calculating the area needed are: 
1.  Determine the number of "slots" in accordance to the number of 20 ft. 
containers that will pass through the terminal annually. 
2.  Consider the average amount of dwell time of the containers. 
3.  Consider the container handling system. 
4.  Obtain the total area by using the distribution percentages that were pointed 
out earlier. 
3.1.Calculations for Situation 1.1: 
Demand:  505,490 20ft. containers 
Dwell time:  3 days 
Tractor/chassis equipment:  180 TEU/acre 
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1.  Number of slots: 
  505490 / 365  =  1385 slots 
2.  Dwell time consideration: 
  1385  *  3     =  4155 slots 
3.  Incorporating equipment: 
  4155 / 180    =  23.083 Hectares 
4.  Total area of the terminal: 
70% of CNT yard      =  23.083 Hectares 
 special CNT =   2.308.8 Hectares 
 general CNT= 20.775 Hectares 
30% of general area =  9.892 Hectares 
Total area of terminal = 32.975 Hectares 
3.2.Calculations for Situation 1.2: 
Demand:  505,490 20ft. containers 
Dwell time:  3 days 
Direct straddle carrier:  385 TEU/acre 
1.  Number of slots: 
  505490 / 365  =  1385 slots 
2.  Dwell time consideration: 
  1385  *  3  =  4155 slots 
3.  Incorporating equipment: 
  4155 / 385  =  10.7922 Hectares 
4.  Total area of the terminal: 
70% of CNT patio     =  10.7922 Hectares 
 special CNT =   1.07922 Hectares 
 general CNT =   9.71298 Hectares 
30% of general area  =  4.6252 Hectares 
Total area of terminal = 15.4174 Hectares 
3.3.  Calculations for Situation 1.3: 
Demand:  505,490 20ft. containers 
Dwell time:  3 days 
Yard gantry crane:  750 TEU/acre 
1.  Number of slots: 
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  505490  /  365  =  1385 slots 
2.  Dwell time consideration: 
  1385  *  3  =  4155 slots 
3.  Incorporating equipment: 
  4155  /  750  =  5.54 Hectares 
4.  Total area of the terminal: 
70% of CY =  5.54 Hectares 
 special CNT =   0.554 Hectares 
 general CNT =   4.986 Hectares 
30% of general area  =  2.3743 Hectares 
Total area of terminal = 7.9143 Hectares 
3.4. Calculations for Situation 2.1: 
Demand:  505,490 20ft. containers 
Dwell time:  5 days 
Tractor/chassis equipments:  180 TEU/acre 
1.  Number of slots: 
  505490  /  365  =  1385 slots 
2.  Dwell time consideration: 
  1385  *  5 =  6925 slots 
3.  Incorporating equipment: 
  6925  /  180  =  38.4722 Hectares 
4.  Total area of the terminal: 
70% of CNT patio      =   38.4722 Hectares 
 special CNT  =     3.84722 Hectares 
 general CNT  =   34.62498 Hectares 
30% of general area  =    16.4881 Hectares 
Total area of terminal = 54.9603 Hectares 
3.5. Calculations for Situation 2.2: 
Demand:  505,490 20ft. containers 
Dwell time:  5 days 
Direct straddle carrier:  385 TEU/Hectares 
1.  Number of slots: 
  505490 / 365  =  1385 slots 
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2.  Dwell time consideration: 
  1385  *  5 =  6925 slots 
3.  Incorporating equipment: 
  6925 / 385  =  17.987 Hectares 
4.  Total area of the terminal: 
70% of CNT patio      =   17.987 Hectares 
 special CNT  =      1.7987 Hectares 
 general CNT  =   16.1883 Hectares 
30% of general area  =      7.7087 Hectares 
Total area of terminal = 25.6957 Hectares 
3.6. Calculations for Situation 2.3: 
Demand:  505,490 20ft. containers 
Dwell time:  5 days 
Yard gantry crane:  750 TEU/Hectares 
1.  Number of slots: 
  505490  /  365  =  1385 slots 
2.  Dwell time consideration: 
  1385  *  5   =  6925 slots 
3.  Incorporating equipment: 
  6925 / 750  =  9.2333 Hectares 
4.  Total area of the terminal: 
70% of CNT patio      =    9.2333 Hectares 
 special CNT  =     0.92333 Hectares 
 general CNT =   8.30997 Hectares 
30% of general area  =      3.9571Hectares 
Total area of terminal = 13.1904 Hectares 
The following table (Table 2) demonstrates the calculations carried out for each 
situation with the idea of comparing the different alternatives. 
 STORAGE AREA 
(Hectares) 
GENERAL AREA 
(Hectares) 
TOTAL TERMINAL 
AREA (Hectares) 
SITUATION 1    
       SITUATION 1.1 23.0830 9.8927 32.9757 
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       SITUATION 1.2 10.7922 4.6252 15.4174 
       SITUATION 1.3 5.5400 2.3743 7.9143 
    
SITUATION 2    
       SITUATION 2.1 38.4722 16.4881 54.9603 
       SITUATION 2.2 17.9870 7.7087 25.6957 
       SITUATION 2.3 9.2333 3.9571 13.1904 
4.Alternative Method for Calculating the Terminal Area. 
In determining in hectares the total space required for a terminal, equal proportions 
are utilized for the assignation of spaces than those used in the previous method 
(30% for general areas and 70% for container storage). 
In this methodology, two situations will be used for comparison. They are based on 
the variation of average container dwell time, maintaining the remaining associated 
parameters with fixed values. 
Situation 1: 
In order to make an estimate in hectares of the total space for the terminal, this 
situation considers the following: 
 Expected demand for the year 2005 of 505,490  Teu´s; 
 Average dwell time per container is equal to 3 days; 
 One TEU occupies 15 square meters; 
 Each slot contains an average of 2.5  Teu´s. 
Situation 2: 
In order to estimate in hectares the total space for the terminal, this situation 
considers the following: 
 Expected demand for the year 2005 as 505,490  Teu´s; 
 Average permanence time per container (Dwell Time) is equal to 5 days; 
 One TEU occupies 15 square meters; 
 Each slot contains an average of 2.5 Teu’s. 
In order to determine in hectares the total space needed, the following system 
should be used: 
 1.  Determine the number of slots (TGS´s) in accordance to the number of 
20ft. containers that pass through the terminal annually. 
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 2.  Consider the average dwell time of containers. 
 3.  Consider the average number of containers per slot. 
 4.  Transform the TGS´s to hectares. 
 5. Obtain the total area by using the distribution percentages previously 
mentioned. 
4.1. Calculations for Situation 1: 
Demand:  505,490  20 ft. containers. 
Dwell Time:  3 days. 
Number of CNT slots:  an average of 2.5 
1.  Number of slots 
   505490/365  =  1385 TEU´s 
2.  Considering Dwell Time 
   1385  *  3  =  4155 TEU´s 
3.  Numbers of TEU´s per slot 
   4155  /  2.5  =  1662  TGS´s 
4. Land’s requirement 
   1662  *  15) / 1000 = 24.93 Hectares 
5. Total area required by the terminal 
 70 % for containers yard   =  24.93  Hectares 
  special Teu´s = 2.493 Hectares 
  normal Teu´s = 22.437 Hectares 
 30 % for general purposes = 10.684 
 Total Land Required by the Terminal  =  35.614 Hectares 
4.2. Calculations for Situation 2: 
Demand:  505,490  20 ft. containers. 
Dwell Time:  5 days. 
Number of CNT slots:  an average of 2.5. 
1.  Number of slots 
   505490/365  =  1385 TEU´s 
2.  Considering Dwell Time 
   1385  *  5  =  6925 TEU´s 
3.  Numbers of TEU´s per slot 
   6925/2.5  =  2770  TGS´s 
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4. Land’s requirement 
   (2770  *  15) / 1000 = 41.55 Hectares 
5. Total area required by the terminal 
 70 % for containers yard   =  41.555  Hectares 
  specialTeu’s  = 4.155 Hectares 
  normalTeu’s  = 37.395 Hectares 
 30 % for general purposes = 17.807 Hectares 
 Total Land Required by the Terminal = 59.35 HECTARES 
SUMARY TABLE 3 
 STORAGE AREA 
(Hectares) 
GENERAL AREA 
(Hectares) 
TOTAL TERMINAL 
AREA (Hectares) 
SITUATION 1 24.93 10.684 35.614 
SITUATION 2 41.55 17.807 59.35 
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ANNEX 3 
THE THEORETICAL APPROACH APPLIED TO THE PORT OF VALPARAISO 
The proposed methodology will be utilized as an example in order to evaluate the 
physical capacities of the Port of Valparaiso, with the objective of being able to 
demonstrate its utilization in placing values on the logistic distribution system. 
1. -Defining the problem 
The purpose is to carry out an evaluation of the port of Valparaiso’s infrastructure 
capacity and receive an analysis and global knowledge of the port system. 
2. -Global analysis and constitutive elements of the Port of Valparaiso 
2.1. - Description of the Valparaiso port terminal. 
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Geographic locations  Latitude:  33º01'22"W 
   Longitude:  71º38'22"W 
Climate   Mild 
Cloud cover   4.8 at 0800 hours 
Predominant winds  Direction:  SW and NW 
   Speed:  23 knots 
Rain   360.2 mm/year 
Temperatures   Maximum average:19º 
   Minimum average: 11º 
Natural protection  Non-existent 
Sheltered water areas  50 Hectares  
Sediments and dredging Berths 5 and 6 (twice yearly) 
Tide variation   1.66 m 
Sheltered pier   1,000 m2 
Buoys   No mooring buoys 
Berthing sites   8 berthing sites with a total longitude of 
1,750 m. 
Warehouses and cargo  14 warehouses with 114,595m2 and 
Yards   85,463 He. 
Floating dock   "Valparaiso III" with capacity of lifting  
   10,000 tons and operated by SOCIBER. 
2.2. Facilities 
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Communications TELEGRAPHS:  State Telegraph Company and other 
commercial ones and also national and international 
commercial cable companies.  
 TELEPHONES:  7 operators.   
 COASTAL RADIO: The Maritime Administration 
maintains a central station in the Maritime Governor’s 
building that possesses CBV-2 characteristics and 
renders service to both national and international vessels.   
  
COMPANY TELEPHONE: 257167. 
Transport RAILWAYS: The electric train of the 
State Railroad Company links the port with Limache 
mainly for passengers. For cargo, Diesel Locomotives 
from Valparaiso to Santiago are in use.  
ROADWAYS:  Valparaiso is linked with Santiago by way 
of a paved motorway (four lanes) that runs for 114 Km.  It 
also connects with the Pan-American Highway that runs 
length-wise north and south. Regionally, the highway 
system is good. At 148 Km distance from the port, the 
international route begins in Los Andes that connects the 
region with the Argentinean city of Mendoza. The section 
that pertains to Chile is a distance of 71 Km to the border, 
which passes through the Bermejo Pass. 
The Valparaiso Port Enterprise provide direct access to 
the port via a special complex of roads and tunnels under 
the city of Valparaiso, connecting the port facilities with 
the Economic and Logistic Zone (ZEAL) and main 
highway to Santiago 
AIR:  There are three airfields in the area close to 
Valparaiso; Airforce Base in Quintero, the Viña del Mar 
airport (Torquemada/Con-Con sector), and the Rodelillo 
aerodrome belonging to the civil aviation.  The latter is 
managed by the Valparaiso Air Club. Its asphalted 
runway is 900 m long and 20 m wide. The "Comodoro 
Arturo Benitez" International Airport is 95 Km from 
Valparaiso. 
Pilots Pilotage is compulsory for all ships calling. There are 
pilots that are authorized by the Valparaiso Maritime 
Authority. The reception of vessels is approximately 2.5 
cables from the breakwater. (At 009º and at 456 m from 
the breakwater). 
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Tugboats There are 10 private tugboats whose powervaries 
between 40 to 68 BPT 
Supplying of Fuel There is an expending pump (DIPEVAL Ltd.) situated in 
the jetty which is only for supplying fishing schooners and 
tugboats. 
Commercial sites are supplied by way of trucks and 3 
small tanker ships to supplyfuel to ships. 
2.3. Basic Infrastructure 
A.  Breakwater.  The port of Valparaiso formed chiefly by the wharf, sheltered by a 
breakwater that starts at Punta Duprat, and projects from the north-northeast for a 
distance of 300 meters and then continues in a south-easterly direction another 700 
meters. 
The first part of this pier is made up of monolithic blocks of concrete which measure 
25 meters in length and 16 meters wide, on top of a base that reaches the height of 
14 meters, where the water is more than 18 meters deep.In order to avoid waves 
passing over the top of this construction, a 6 meter high, 3 meter wide defence 
rampart was constructed. 
In the principal part of the breakwater pier the depth (cota) was elevated to the 
COTA (elevation reading) by 12 meters, since it is less likely to be exposed to the 
frontal action of the waves. The structure itself is formed by masonry blocks placed 
in an inclining position. On top of them a layer of cement was added up to the plus 4. 
COTA. 
The width of this section of the breakwater pier or "Molo" is 12 meters. 
B.  Berthing Infrastructure.  Among the projects that provide shelter, the following 
berthing projects are being developed: 
1. The sea wall was built with masonry blocks weighing 60 tons put on top of 
a prism of rock and sand, After 1990 the apron and the sea wall for 
enforced and made aseismic. The sea frontl has a total length of 1005 
meters (berths 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) up to Muelle Prat. 
2. The jetty, which is a solid structure of 240 meters in length and 100 meters 
wide, is situated across from the actual railroad station terminal and sets 
out from the Coast way in a north-north-easterly direction. The walls are 
built with masonry blocks in inclined layers (so as to maintain its 
arrangement during the settling of the muddy bottom), and are on top of a 
prism of a section that varies to a 10 meter depth. Behind them is a prism 
of large cobblestones and stones, the area between them being filled with 
sand. 
3. MuelleBarón was built outside the sheltered wharf towards the east and is 
oriented to a northerly direction. It is 200 meters long and 30 meters wide. 
It was built upon concrete columns allows it to be dredged up to 10 meters 
deep. 
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2.4.  Berthing characteristics 
BERTH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Length (m) 142 200 230 230 107 245 125 
Draft (m) 13.8 13.8 13.8 9.4 9.4 8.5 6.2 
Cranes:        
Gantry 2 
Pmx 
- 3 
Post 
Pmx 
- - - - 
Multipurpose - - - 1 - - - 
Mobile Container 
(Gottwald and 
Demag) 
- - 1 - - 1 1 
Other equipment: - - - - - - - 
RMG - - 12 - - - - 
Reach-Stacker - - n/a - - - - 
Predominant 
cargoes 
Containers, general cargo, fresh vegetables and 
refrigerated cargoes 
Warehouses 2.3 hectares 
Yards and patios 24 hectares 
2.5. Port Statistics. 
Cargo throughput in metric tons: 
Cargo Type / Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Break bulk 139,2982 151,2984 160,0546 172,4635 
Containerized 253,7436 295,6318 306,4912 337,8872 
Various historic figures: 
Activity / Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
TEU´s 256,386 291,403 300,031 319,368 
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Cargo Ships  1,353 1,029 1,029 1,016 
Cruise Ships 30 41 31 38 
Passengers 47,211 70,048 61,353 68,507 
 
2.8. Normal working hours of the port: 
VESSEL SERVICE:  Daily 
1st shift:  0800 to 1530 hours 
2nd shift:  1530 to 2300 hours 
3rd shift:  2300 to 0600 hours 
Extended hours: 0600 to 0800 hours 
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4. DEDUCTION OF MATRIX WITH PARAMETERS/VARIABLES THAT ARE 
RELEVANT TO THE PORT OF VALPARAISO. 
4.1.  Economic Criterion 
The following table presents the matrix that was integrated in the evaluation in 
accordance to the economic criterion applied to the elements that constitute the port 
terminal of Valparaiso. 
ECONOMIC CRITERION: 
RELEVANT PARAMETER POINTS OBTAINED 
1.-  Weather conditions (effect in the operations) 3 
2.-  Port management 3 
3.-  Competition 3 
4.-  Productivity 3 
5.-  Railroad transport 2 
6.-  Work crews, number of persons 3 
7.-  Number of berthing sites 3 
8.-  Length of berthing sites 3 
9.-  Characteristics of pier apron 3 
10.- Number of cranes 3 
11.- Port access zones 2-3 
12.- Maritime-fluvial transport (transhipment) 3 
13.- Bus transport 3 
14.- Development areas (in surroundings, in site) 2 
15.- Oceanographic conditions (tides, swell)  
16.- Cargo transfer zones 3 
17.- Temporary storage warehouses 1 - 3(including ZEAL) 
18.- Depository warehouses 3 
19.- Patios 2 
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20.- Consolidation/deconsolidation areas 3 (bond yards) 
21.- Inspection areas 3 (bond yards) 
22.- Outside port area warehouses 3 (custom authorise 
bond yards) 
23.- Economic policy 3 
24.- National Transport Policy 3 (implicit policy) 
25.- National Infrastructure Policy 2 (base in demand) 
26.- National Labour policy 3 
27.- Fishing activities 3 
28.- Loading and unloading operations 
  
3 
29.- Crane output  
   
3 
30.- Types of cranes available 
   
3 
31.- Output of the work crews 
   
3 
 32.- Effective work hours   3 
 33.- Effect of currents in berthing site 
  
2 
 34.- Vessel lengths  
   
3 
 35.- DIRECTEMAR  
   
3 
 36.- National Customs Service 
   
3 
 37.- National Agriculture and Livestock Service
  
3 
 38.- EMPORCHI - EPV   3 
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 39.- Vessel ship-owners and operators 
  
3 
 40.- Shipping  and stevedoring agencies  3 
 41.-  Associations that are related to the Port 3 
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4.2. - Social Criterion 
The following table presents the matrix that resulted from the evaluation in accordance 
to social criterion. 
SOCIAL CRITERION: 
RELEVANT PARAMETER POINTS 
OBTAINED 
1.-  Port safety and surveillance conditions 3 
2.-  Environmental safety conditions 3 
3.-Maintenance and vessel maintenance 
conditions 
3 
4.-  Marine, shore and air pollution 3 
5.-  Inspection areas 3 
6.-  Cargo transfer zones 3 
7.-  Environmental Health Service 3 
8.-  Working conditions 3 
9.-  Type of merchandise 3 
10.- Effect of currents in berthing sites 2 
11.- Maintenance and emergency areas 3 
12.- Regional Labour Office 3 
13.- Anchoring area 3 
14.- Consolidation and deconsolidation areas 3 
15.- National Police Force 3 
16.- Investigation Service 3 
17.- DIRECTEMAR 3 
18.- National Customs Service 3 
19.- National Agricultural and Livestock Service 3 
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20.- Directorate of Port Works 3 
21.- Vessel owners and operators 3 
22.- Shipping and stevedoring agencies 3 
23.- Associations related to the Port 3 
24.- Hydrographical and oceanographic conditions 3 
25.- Transport policy 2 
26.- Research and education policy 3 
27.- Planning and coordination policy 3 
28.- Port technology 3 
29.- Development areas (in surroundings, in site) 2 
30.- Syndicate organizations 3 
 206 
4.3. - Technological-logistical Criterion 
The following table presents the matrix that resulted from the evaluation in accordance 
to the technological-logistical criterion. 
TECHNICAL-LOGISTICAL CRITERION:                       
RELEVANT PARAMETER  POINTS 
OBTAINED 
1.-  Vessel types  3 
2.-  Vessel cargo capacity  3 
3.-  Tonnage to be transferred 3 
4.-  Type of merchandise  3 
5.-  Cargo transfer zones  3 
6.-  EMPORCHI - EPV  3 
7.-  Type of cranes available  3 
8.- Pier apron characteristics 3 
9.-  Signalling service  3 
10.- Transit areas  3 
11.-Consolidation and deconsolidation areas
   
3 
12.- Yards   3 
13.- Depository warehouses  3 
14.- Oceanographic conditions 3 
15.- Infrastructure policy  2 
16.-Development areas, in surroundings  3 
17.- Railway transport  2 
18.- Bus transport  2 
19.- Maritime-fluvial transport (transhipment) 3 
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20.- Stevedoring conditions  3 
21.- Loading and unloading operations 3 
22.- Number of berthing sites 3 
23.- Port access zones  2 
24.-Transport and Communication Ministry 
  
3 
25.-Shipping and stevedoring agencies 3 
26.- Chilean Shipping Chamber 3 
27.- Public Services availability and services 3 
28.- Transport Policy 3 
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5.  DETERMINATION OF THE GLOBAL MATRIX 
This matrix is made up those parameters that individually have obtained a larger 
total number of points after evaluating the three suggested criterion. The minimum 
score to be included in the matrix corresponds to a third of the maximum total points 
(30 points) as a result of the sum of the three criterions. 
This matrix also contains relevant parameters to determine the physical capacities 
of the Port of Valparaiso. These parameters should be compared with international 
standards that are available in order to determine management efficiency and 
operation of the infrastructure and existing human resources. 
The latter will make it possible to determine if the amount of available resources is 
sufficient and adequate in order to satisfy the requirements of achieving optimal 
operation. If this is the case, any deficiency in the use of these should be noted. 
Whatever the reasons for the deficiencies of the system, these will be detected by 
the methodology and therefore it will make it possible to focus improvements 
towards these specific areas. 
The following page demonstrates the global matrix that was obtained for the Port of 
Valparaiso. 
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5.2. Results of the Methodology Application 
5.2.1. General Aspects 
All relevant parameters respond to the methodology and score higher that 6 are 
chosen as relevant for the case of Valparaiso – Chilean Case. Eventually in other 
ports’ cases parameters could be included or changed.   
Importance indicated as High (H) represent the most relevant parameters, Medium 
represent the parameters which need to be consider in the case of Valparaiso Port 
Sector but also it considered matters which are not anymore important for the port 
sector, because they were solved with a proper “maritime public governance” or 
State policy already in place. 
5.2.2. Recommendations from Matrix Analysis 
5.2.2.1. Regarding Institutional Issues and Public Maritime Governance 
a) The Maritime and Port Chamber shouldpromote a strategy on good 
governance, policies and institutional coordination within the public authorities 
and government. 
b) To promote public and private stakeholder networking on common matters.    
c) To promote the establishment of a permanent “maritime coordination 
commission or forum” to discuss complex issues and the identification of 
measures which provide solutions to the identified constraints. 
d) To promote a secure facilitation of the country international trade.  
5.2.2.2. Regarding Cargo Facilities and Constraints 
a) To prepare a Port Master Plan of development. 
b) To prepare prefeasibility studies to evaluate the demand forecasted and 
propose infrastructure development and investment plans. 
c) To promote and evaluate changes and innovative solutions in cargo 
technologies with the aim to improve cargo throughput. 
d) To identify and evaluate innovative solutions for the physical restriction of port 
facilities, promoting solutions like:logistics platforms, dry ports and bond yards 
outside port premises, coordinating the feasibility of these solutions with public 
entities and potential private investors. 
